The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
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We, the authors, remain responsible for the contents of this book and any errors herein.
Foreword

We wrote this short book to call public attention to the dangers of polygraphy and to protect the innocent from polygraph abuse. Because of our government’s reliance on this pseudoscientific procedure, thousands of truthful persons have been falsely accused of deception and suffered serious adverse consequences. On the other hand, deceptive persons can easily defeat polygraph “tests” through countermeasures, as did convicted spy Aldrich H. Ames.

We hope that this book will help to stimulate informed public debate about polygraph policy and hasten the day when our government comes to its senses and ends its reliance on this latter-day trial by ordeal. Our reliance on unreliable polygraphy is undermining—not strengthening—our national security. Polygraphy must be abolished.

We are distributing this book in electronic format free of charge in order to reach the broadest audience possible. We didn’t write this book to make money. We only ask that you tell others about this book if you find it informative and useful.

This book is formatted for double-sided printing, and we encourage you to print out as many copies as you like to share with your family, friends, and colleagues.

We view this book as a work in progress and plan to release updated editions as new information warrants. Check AntiPolygraph.org for the latest edition.

Contact us to learn how you can help to put an end to polygraphy. We welcome your comments by e-mail at the addresses below. If you wish to protect the privacy of your correspondence, e-mail us for our PGP public keys.

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Introduction

To the rulers of the state then, if to any, it belongs of right to use falsehood to deceive either enemies or their own citizens for the good of the state: and no one else may meddle with this privilege.

—Plato

Truth will out!

—Old English saying

In this book, you will learn the little-known truth about polygraphy. You will learn:

• that polygraphy is not science (p. 1 ff.);
• that polygraphy, like phrenology and graphology, is without scientific validity (p. 1 ff.);
• that our Government’s reliance on unreliable polygraphy serves to protect spies, undermining—not enhancing—our national security (p. 11 ff.);
• that polygraph “tests” are actually interrogations (pp. 2, 69 ff.);
• that polygraphy depends on your polygrapher lying to and deceiving you (p. 41 ff.);
• the simplistic method by which your polygrapher decides whether you are truthful or deceptive (pp. 1, 53);
• that polygraphy is biased against the truthful (p. 54);
• that polygraph “testing” can be (and has been) easily defeated through countermeasures (p. 5)
• how to ensure that you pass your polygraph interrogation (p. 65 ff);
• how to recognize interrogation tactics and not be fooled by them (p. 62);
• what to do if you have been falsely accused (p. 84 ff.);
how you can help put an end to polygraph abuse (p. 91 ff.); 
where to learn more about polygraphy (p. 100 ff.).

(If you face an upcoming polygraph “test” and need to learn what to expect as quickly as possible, you may wish to proceed directly to Chapters 3 and 4 [p. 41 ff.] and come back to Chapters 1, 2 and 5 later.)

Every year, thousands of law-abiding Americans submit to polygraph interrogation. And every year, hundreds—if not thousands—are falsely accused based on their polygraph chart readings and are routinely denied due process.

Those subjected to polygraph interrogation include employees of, and applicants for employment with:

• federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and U.S. Secret Service (applicants for state and local law enforcement agencies probably comprise the largest population subjected to pre-employment polygraph screening);
• fire departments (many firefighters and paramedics are subjected to polygraph screening);
• national intelligence agencies, including CIA, NSA, DIA, and NRO;
• the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps;
• the U.S. Department of Energy.

While the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act banned the use of polygraphy by most of the private sector, our Government exempted itself. Some industries, such as armored car companies, also received exemptions.

We care deeply about our country and our communities. In writing this book, our purpose is to help protect the innocent from polygraph abuse and to help strengthen our collective security by exposing waste, fraud, and abuse.

We believe that our Government should not, through the polygraph screening process, lie to and deceive its employees and those seeking
employment. We believe that Government should not determine the trustworthiness of its employees based on a pseudoscientific procedure that fundamentally depends on trickery, is biased against the truthful, and yet may be easily defeated by deceptive persons who employ countermeasures.

States should adopt the Minnesota polygraph statute (Appendix C), which prohibits all polygraph “testing” of employees or prospective employees, as a model. And Congress must broaden the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act to provide protection for all Americans.

Discover now the lie behind the lie detector.
CHAPTER ONE
On the Validity of Polygraphy

When we lie, our blood pressure goes up, our heart beats faster, we breathe more quickly (and our breathing slows once the lie has been told), and changes take place in our skin moisture. A polygraph charts these reactions with pens on a moving strip of paper.... The result is jagged lines that don’t convey a lot to you. But...an examiner can tell from those mechanical scribbles whether or not you’ve spoken the truth.

—polygrapher Chris Gugas, The Silent Witness, 1979

Whoever undertakes to set himself up as judge in the field of truth and knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter of the Gods.

—Albert Einstein

Polygraphy is not science. Like its discredited sister disciplines, phrenology and graphology, it is codified conjecture masquerading as science. Polygraph “testing” is an unstandardizable procedure that is fundamentally dependent on trickery. As such, it can have no scientific validity. The computerization of polygraph chart reading in recent years has no more made the underlying procedure “scientific” than has the computerization of astrological chart reading.

The polygraph format most widely used in the United States is commonly known as the “Control Question Test” (CQT). The overwhelming majority of polygraph examinations administered in the United States are of this format, and when we speak of “polygraphy” in this book, we refer to the CQT.

In the CQT, truth and deception are inferred from a comparison of a subject’s physiological responses (breathing, blood pressure, and perspiration rates) while answering “relevant” versus “control”
questions—questions the answers to which are known or assumed to be untrue.² If responses to the relevant questions are greater, deception is inferred. If responses to the “control” questions are greater, truth is inferred. If responses are about the same, the result is deemed inconclusive.

The validity of the cqt has never been scientifically established, nor can it be: the so-called “Control Question Test” is utterly lacking in scientific “control,” and it is not a standardized psychometric “test” such that its validity might be determined through scientific experimentation.

Professor John J. Furedy of the University of Toronto (Furedy, 1996) explains regarding the “Control” Question “Test” that

³basic terms like “control” and “test” are used in ways that are not consistent with normal usage. For experimental psychophysicists, it is the Alice-in-Wonderland usage of the term “control” that is most salient. There are virtually an infinite number of dimensions along which the R [relevant] and the so-called “C” [“control”] items of the cqt could differ. These differences include such dimensions as time (immediate versus distant past), potential penalties (imprisonment and a criminal record versus a bad conscience), and amount of time and attention paid to “developing” the questions (limited versus extensive). Accordingly, no logical inference is possible based on the R versus “C” comparison. For those concerned with the more applied issue of evaluating the accuracy of the cqt procedure, it is the procedure’s in-principle lack of standardization that is more critical. The fact that the procedure is not a test, but an unstandardizable interrogatory interview, means that its accuracy is not empirically, but only rhetorically, or anecdotally, evaluatable. That is, one can state accuracy figures only for a given examiner interacting with a given examinee, because the cqt is a dynamic interview situation rather than a standardizable and specifiable test. Even the weak assertion that a certain examiner is highly accurate cannot be supported, as different examinees alter the dynamic examiner-examinee rela-

³We will also discuss “control” questions in fuller detail in Chapter 3.
tionship that grossly influences each unique and unspecifiable cqt episode.

As Professor Furedy notes, the cqt is not a standardized “test,” but an “unstandardizable interrogatory interview.” One consequence is that the examiner’s subjective opinion may influence the outcome, as was demonstrated in an experiment that Professor Leonard Saxe of Brandeis University helped CBS “60 Minutes” design (Saxe, 1991):

In 1986, I was privy to a drama staged by the producers of CBS TV’s news program, “60 Minutes,” that investigated the controversial use of polygraph tests by private employers. My initiation into the lie detector conflagration was the unintended outcome of an assignment from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to examine the validity of polygraph tests.... The “60 Minutes” staff sought my help as they designed a demonstration of the use of polygraph tests. What resulted was an elaborate deception experiment that would have been the envy of 1960s social psychologists.

Using CBS-owned Popular Photography magazine as a front, “60 Minutes” hired several polygraphers to identify the culprit in an alleged theft. The design was quite sophisticated: CBS randomly selected four polygraph examiners from the telephone directory and had each polygrapher examine four employee suspects. The polygraphers were initially contacted by a manager at the magazine, who told them that more than $500 of camera equipment had been stolen, almost definitely by someone on the inside. The polygraphers did not know that other examiners had been engaged, and they conducted their examinations in a Popular Photography office. Unbeknownst to them, the office had been modified to enable surreptitious filming. When the polygraphers arrived on-scene, each was told that although all of the suspects had access to the camera, one of the four was probably the guilty party. A different person was “fingered” for each polygrapher.

Not surprising to polygraph critics, each examiner found the person who had been fingered to be deceptive, and each examiner tried mightily to get the guilty person to confess. No one, of course, had stolen anything. The four employees were confederates, paid $50 if they could convince the polygrapher of their innocence.
With dramatic flair, CBS demonstrated that polygraphers do not necessarily use psychophysiological information to make their diagnoses of deception.

Polygraphy is not science. The cqt can have no scientific validity because it is not a scientific procedure. Yet there are some who pretend to make a distinction between the scientific validity of the cqt for security screening purposes as opposed to the investigation of specific incidents. We will discuss both applications of polygraphy.

**Polygraph Screening**

No one in the Federal Bureau of Investigation is more qualified than Supervisory Special Agent Dr. Drew C. Richardson to render an informed opinion on the scientific validity of polygraph screening. Dr. Richardson earned a doctorate in physiology from George Washington Medical Center in 1991. The nsa funded his doctoral dissertation research, which related to the use of novel cardiovascular indices applied to a lie detection task, and he collected his data at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI). Dr. Richardson is a graduate of the DoDPI basic polygraph examiner’s course and has worked in the Bureau’s now defunct polygraph research unit.

Speaking before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts (Richardson, 1997), Dr. Richardson testified:

1. [Polygraph screening] is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity. Although there is disagreement amongst scientists about the use of polygraph testing in criminal matters, there is almost universal agreement that polygraph screening is completely invalid and should be stopped. As one of my colleagues frequently says, the diagnostic value of this type of testing is no more than that of astrology or tea-leaf reading.  

   1The colleague Dr. Richardson refers to here is Professor Furedy. Upon
2. If this test had any validity (which it does not), both my own experience, and published scientific research has proven, that anyone can be taught to beat this type of polygraph exam in a few minutes.

3. Because of the nature of this type of examination, it would normally be expected to produce large numbers of false positive results (falsely accusing an examinee of lying about some issue). As a result of the great consequences of doing this with large numbers of law enforcement and intelligence community officers, the test has now been manipulated to reduce false positive results, but consequently has no power to detect deception in espionage and other national security matters. Thus, I believe that there is virtually no probability of catching a spy with the use of polygraph screening techniques. I think a careful examination of the Aldrich Ames case will reveal that any shortcomings in the use of the polygraph were not simply errors on the part of the polygraph examiners involved, and would not have been eliminated if FBI instead of CIA polygraphers had conducted these examinations. Instead I believe this is largely a reflection of the complete lack of validity of this methodology. To the extent that we place any confidence in the results of polygraph screening, and as a consequence shortchange traditional security vetting techniques, I think our national security is severely jeopardized.

4. Because of the theoretical considerations involving false positive results and because of anecdotal stories told to me by self-alleged victims of polygraph screening, I believe that the Bureau is routinely falsely accusing job applicants of drug usage or drug dealing. Not only is this result irreparably harming these individuals, but it is likely denying the Bureau access to qualified and capable employees. Although these individuals do not have an inalienable right to Federal Government employment, they do have an inalienable right to just treatment by their government.

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reviewing a draft of this book, Dr. Furedy wrote to clarify that his reference is “to all forms of the North American ['Control' Question 'Test'] polygraph, and not just the screening use.”
5. I believe that claims of cost effectiveness, and the utility of polygraph screening are altogether wrong, reflect misplaced priorities, and lead to activities that are damaging to individuals and this country.

Dr. Richardson is not the only scientist to warn that polygraph screening is without validity. Before his retirement in 1995, the late Dr. William J. Yankee, then DoDPI director, had assembled an independent scientific advisory board which reviewed and provided comment on DoDPI’s academic curriculum and intramural research program. This board was comprised of Drs. John J. Furedy, William G. Iacono, Edward S. Katkin, Christopher J. Patrick, and Stephen W. Porges. It was the consensus of the scientific advisory board that polygraph security screening is without scientific validity. When the current director of DoDPI, Michael H. Capps, succeeded Dr. Yankee, he promptly dismissed the entire scientific advisory board.

Dr. Sheila D. Reed, now a professor at the University of North Texas, developed and tested the polygraph screening format adopted by the Department of Defense in 1993 and the Department of Energy in 1999. Her research and her observations of DoDPI teaching methods led her to the conclusion that polygraph screening should be stopped. When she voiced this opinion publicly, DoDPI officials falsely accused her of having lied to the CIA, stripped her of her security clearance, seized her computer and research data, relieved her of her duties, and eventually coerced her into leaving DoDPI.

False Positives and the Base Rate Problem

In 1983, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) published a study on the scientific validity of polygraph “testing” (Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, 1983). The OTA report notes at p. 100:

One area of special concern in personnel security screening is the incorrect identification of innocent persons as deceptive. All other
factors being equal, the low base rates of guilt in screening situations would lead to high false positive rates, even assuming very high polygraph validity. For example, a typical polygraph screening situation might involve a base rate of guilt of one guilty person (e.g., one person engaging in unauthorized disclosure) out of 1,000 employees. Assuming that the polygraph is 95 percent valid, then the one guilty person would be identified as deceptive but so would 50 innocent persons. The predictive validity would be about 2 percent. Even if 99 percent polygraph validity is assumed, there would still be 10 false positives for every correct detection.

The OTA review assumes that a polygraph screening validity rate of 95% entails that 95% of guilty subjects will be detected. But with an extremely low base rate of guilt, as is the case with espionage, such an assumption is not warranted. If we allow that not more than one in a thousand persons examined are actually spies, then an accuracy rate of at least 99.9% can be achieved by simply ignoring the polygraph charts altogether and peremptorily declaring all examinees innocent. Of course, the usefulness of such a “test” for catching spies would be zero. Yet this is essentially how the remarkably high accuracy rates claimed for some security screening programs (such as those of the Departments of Defense and Energy) are achieved! The interpretation of polygraph charts is manipulated so that almost everyone “passes.”

Specific-Issue “Testing”

As Dr. Richardson testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “there is almost universal agreement that polygraph screening is completely invalid and should be stopped.” However, some researchers, like Professor Charles R. Honts (an opponent of polygraph screening), claim that “control” question “tests” are nonetheless highly accurate when used in specific-incident investigations. (The case of the missing hard drives at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the spring of 2000 is an example where polygraphy was used in the investigation of a specific incident.)
But Professor David T. Lykken, (Lykken, 1998 pp. 133–36) notes that as of 1998, only four studies purporting to assess the field validity of the “Control” Question “Test” had passed the muster of peer review in a scientific journal. Only four. And taken together, these four studies do not establish that polygraphy operates at above chance levels in specific-issue “testing.” It should also be noted that in any event, these four studies could not possibly have established the validity of the cqt, because, as Professor Furedy has aptly pointed out, the cqt is not a standardizable and specifiable test such that its validity might be scientifically established.

In 1994, William G. Iacono and David T. Lykken conducted a survey of opinion of members of the Society for Psychophysiological Research (SPR) (Iacono & Lykken 1997). Members of this scholarly organization constitute the relevant scientific community for the evaluation of the validity of polygraphic lie detection. Members of the SPR were asked, “Would you say that the cqt is based on scientifically sound psychological principles or theory?” Of the 84% of the 183 respondents with an opinion, only 36% agreed.

Moreover, SPR members were asked whether they agreed with the statement, “The cqt can be beaten by augmenting one’s response to the control questions.” Of the 96% of survey respondents with an opinion, 99% agreed that polygraph “tests” can be beaten.
CHAPTER TWO
On Polygraph Policy

You can fool some of the people all the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.

—Abraham Lincoln

You can fool too many of the people too much of the time.

—James Thurber

As we have seen, the field validity of polygraphy has not been established by competent scientific research, nor can it be. The majority of the relevant scientific community does not believe the format most widely used by Government—the “Control” Question “Test”—to be based on scientifically sound psychological principles or theory. An even greater majority of that relevant scientific community believes that the “Control” Question “Test” can be beaten by augmenting one’s response to the “control” questions. And, as we shall see in Chapter 3, such polygraph “testing” depends on the polygrapher lying to and deceiving the subject.

Doesn’t the Government Know?

Yes. It does. Or at least it should. The OTA report (Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, 1983) warned Congress:

OTA recognizes that NSA and CIA believe that the polygraph is a useful screening tool. However, OTA concluded that the available research evidence does not establish the scientific validity of the polygraph for this purpose.

In addition, there is a legitimate concern that the use of polygraph tests for personnel security screening may be especially susceptible to: 1) countermeasures by persons trained to use physical movement, drugs, or other techniques to avoid detection as deceptive; and 2) false positive errors where innocent persons are incorrectly identified as deceptive. (p. 5)
The OTA’s warning has gone unheeded. While in 1988, Congress ratified and President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) prohibiting most polygraph screening in the private sector, the Act expressly exempted federal, state, and local government. In the years since the OTA report, the reliance of Government on polygraphy has grown, rather than diminished.

The Joint Security Commission Report

The Joint Security Commission convened on 11 June 1993. Reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the Commission was tasked with developing a new approach to security in the post-Cold War era, and was directed “to undertake an objective review of the Federal personnel security screening polygraph program to determine how well it works, how it could be improved, and whether it should be continued.” The Commission submitted its report (Joint Security Commission, 1994) some six months later on 28 February 1994.

Regarding the validity of polygraph screening, the Commission notes in chapter 4:

Many polygraph proponents and some research experts believe that it is unnecessary to study the validity of the polygraph process, meaning its accuracy in distinguishing truth from deception. They contend that as long as the polygraph elicits admissions to screen out unsuitable applicants and actual security risks, questions about the polygraph’s validity remain academic. However, if the polygraph does not have established scientific validity in the screening arena, judgments about truthfulness based solely on chart interpretation will continue to be controversial. Without established validity, the process lacks full integrity and appears more like trickery because information is obtained from subjects under the pretense that it is in their best interest to be forthright since false answers will be discovered. Furthermore, arguments could be made that the polygraph may not have the same effect on a nonbeliever; that is, unless the validity of the process can be demonstrated, there is nothing to prevent a practiced deceiver from passing a
polygraph examination. In fact, circumstantial evidence lending credence to this view was documented by a President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board study in 1988.

The Commission was clearly aware that the validity of polygraph screening has not been established by competent scientific research. The Commission understood full well that polygraph screening depends on the polygrapher lying to and deceiving the subject. The Commission also makes it clear that it was aware that innocent people may be falsely accused, and that guilty people may avoid detection.

But incredibly, the Joint Security Commission decided to ignore all of this and to recommend that the polygraph program be retained:

Despite the controversy, after carefully weighing the pros and cons, the Commission concludes that with appropriate standardization, increased oversight, and training to prevent abuses, the polygraph program should be retained. In the CIA and the NSA, the polygraph has evolved to become the single most important aspect of their employment and personnel security programs. Eliminating its use in these agencies would limit the effectiveness of security, personnel, and medical officers in forming their adjudicative judgments.

The Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case

On Monday, 21 February 1994—just seven days before the Joint Security Commission issued its report—the FBI arrested Aldrich Hazen Ames and charged him with spying for the former Soviet Union and later, Russia. Since beginning his betrayal in 1985, Ames had passed two CIA polygraph “tests” during which he falsely denied having committed espionage, first on 2 May 1986 and again on 12 and 16 April 1991. In 1988–1989, while Ames was betraying his country, the CIA’s Office of Security—which had by that time realized that there was a mole in CIA’s ranks—wasted a year focusing its attention on an innocent employee who “had difficulty generally getting
through routine polygraph examinations over the course of his CIA employment.” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1994)

The above-cited Senate report states that “Ames said he never received training from the KGB on how to beat the polygraph.” But DoDPI researcher Dr. Andrew Ryan has directly contradicted this Senate report. Speaking at the Department of Energy’s public hearing on polygraph policy at Sandia National Laboratories on 16 September 1999 (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999c), Dr. Ryan stated:

...What we do know is that people have been successful in the past in using countermeasures to defeat the polygraph exam. The Ames case was an example. He was taught by the Soviets how to defeat our process.... (p. 20 of hearing transcript)

The following day, speaking at Los Alamos National Laboratory (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999d), Dr. Ryan stated:

...We do acknowledge that there have been cases where we’ve been defeated by countermeasures.

I guess one of the most famous ones was the Aldrich Ames case, by the CIA. It was found he was trained by the Soviets in how to defeat the polygraph. So we basically had a mole inside the agency taught how to beat the polygraph, even though he went through several of them. (p. 153 of hearing transcript)

Revisionists in the counterintelligence community have claimed that upon close inspection, signs of deception can be found in the charts of the polygraph examinations that Ames passed. Edward J. Curran of FBI counterintelligence was dispatched to the CIA in the aftermath of the Ames case. (He has since moved on to become chief of the Department of Energy’s Office of Counterintelligence.) In an October, 1999 Scientific American article, Tim Beardsley writes (Beardsley, 1999):

Asked about the possibility that spies might trick the test by self-stimulation, Curran says he has “never seen it work yet.” He hotly denies that the polygraph failed to raise suspicions about
Ames: the polygrapher in that case made errors, Curran maintains, because subsequent examination of Ames’s polygraph charts shows evidence of deceptiveness.

In claiming that he has “never seen [polygraph countermeasures] work yet,” the Department of Energy’s chief of counterintelligence is willfully blind. Were he willing to see, he might find enlightenment from Dr. Richardson of the FBI laboratory division. We will recall his Senate testimony (previously cited at p. 5):

…I think a careful examination of the Aldrich Ames case will reveal that any shortcomings in the use of the polygraph were not simply errors on the part of the polygraph examiners involved, and would not have been eliminated if FBI instead of CIA polygraphers had conducted these examinations. Instead I believe this is largely a reflection of the complete lack of validity of this methodology. To the extent that we place any confidence in the results of polygraph screening, and as a consequence shortchange traditional security vetting techniques, I think our national security is severely jeopardized.

One psychophysicologist who has requested anonymity discusses the question of whether the polygraph could have caught Aldrich Ames in an unpublished paper. Because of the particular importance of the Ames case, we cite this scientist’s discussion of it in its entirety (Anonymous, n.d.):

Could the Polygraph Have Caught Aldrich Ames?

In the wake of the failure of the polygraph to detect CIA double agent Aldrich Ames, there has been considerable discussion of what exactly went wrong. Unfortunately, most government leaders seeking an explanation have not consulted the independent scientific experts on the polygraph, but rather have spoken only to those who have the most to hide—the polygraphers within the government. In the absence of any input from scientists who possess relevant knowledge and do not have a job to protect, the truth regarding this situation has not been forthcoming.

The fact that Ames failed to exhibit detectable polygraph responses to a number of specific questions directly bearing on his
crimes is not in dispute. This is a matter of record. What polygraphers have often stated, however, is that Ames exhibited tell-tale responses to some other questions (e.g., financial ones), and that this should have tipped off the polygrapher or someone in his chain of command. This contention could not be further from the truth.

The truth is that many of the questions on CIA screening polygraph exams are highly emotionally charged, and many if not most completely innocent people have trouble with at least some of the questions. If Ames did indeed respond somewhat to some of the questions, this would not set him apart from several thousand other employees who were subjected to polygraph interrogation.... With 20-20 hindsight, knowing that a polygraph chart belonged to a spy, a polygrapher could point out difficulties with virtually any polygraph chart—particularly if his audience did not include independent scientists competent to evaluate what was being said.

There is a scientific way to detect whether or not the polygraph might have possibly caught Aldrich Ames. Take the records of the 100 polygraph interrogations that preceded Ames’, and the 100 interrogations that followed Ames’. Remove any identifying information from the polygraph charts. Give these charts, along with Ames’ chart, to a panel of the best polygraphers. See if they can pick out the one spy from the 200 polygraph charts.

Have them rank the charts from most guilty looking to most innocent.

Even if the polygraph were as high as 90% accurate for screening (which experts agree that it is not), 20 innocent people out of these 200 cases would have failed the test. Given that Ames passed the test and did not show responses to several espionage-related questions, there would be many innocent individuals in such a test who would look much guiltier than he did.

Given that Ames did not show any tell-tale responses to questions directly relating to his crimes, even if he did indeed show some stress responses to some of the other questions, this would put him somewhere in the middle of the sample. Perhaps 30 to 50 percent of the people would have polygraph results that would look more guilty than Ames’. Now let us extrapolate this to the whole Agency. If, say, 10,000 people took polygraph exams, 3,000 to 5,000 of them would look guiltier than Ames on each test.
Even if only 10% looked worse than Ames, this would amount to 1,000 people. It would not be practical to fire or even to investigate all of these people.

The situation becomes even more problematical when we take into account the fact that people are tested repeatedly. (Recall that Ames passed the polygraph not once but twice while engaging in espionage.) When people take the test repeatedly, the chances of falsely being found guilty increase. If 30% of Agency employees did worse than Ames did on one test, statistically 99% of the employees would show a result worse than Ames’ on at least one test if they were tested every five years over a 35-year career.

What if we assume that the polygraph is as high as 90% accurate, a figure much higher than what scientific studies and experts have found? This would mean that only 10% would falsely be found guilty. These 10% would have results worse than Ames, who was determined to be truthful. If only 10% of those tested did worse than Ames on one test, statistically over 50% of employees would do worse than Ames if tested seven times over a career…. Clearly, the polygraph does not provide information that would allow the Agency to correctly identify one or a few spies from amongst thousands of employees.

From these facts it is clear that any contention that the polygraph might have been successful in detecting Aldrich Ames—if only the results had been more carefully scrutinized—is sheer nonsense. In light of the known facts of the Ames case—even if we make the most favorable assumptions imaginable regarding the accuracy of the polygraph—any criterion that would have identified Ames as suspicious would also have implicated at least half of the other CIA employees over the course of their careers.

The failure of the polygraph in the Ames case came as no surprise to the scientific experts in the field. As Dr. Charles Honts (1991) (a leading supporter of the use of the polygraph in criminal investigations—but not in screening) stated, “The problems posed by the inability of national security screening tests to detect deception are exacerbated by the demonstrated existence of effective countermeasures. Given that polygraph tests used for screening are likely to be inaccurate with guilty subjects to begin with, the existence of effective countermeasures virtually assures that a well-
prepared and determined opponent could achieve nearly a 100% penetration of the national security polygraph screen.”

This statement is in accord with historical fact. Indeed, the failure of the polygraph in the Ames case was the rule rather than the exception. According to Robert Gates of the CIA, numerous double agents, particularly Cubans and East Germans, have passed the CIA polygraph over the years. What was unusual about Ames was not that he passed the polygraph, but that he did much more damage than many other double agents who also passed.

The CIA’s Reaction to the Ames Case

Instead of learning from the OTA’s warning and from the experience of the Ames case, the CIA responded with a polygraph crackdown. The threshold for passing was raised, and as a result, CIA polygraphers falsely accused hundreds of employees of deception. Washington Post staff writer Vernon Loeb notes in a 16 July 2000 article on the Department of Energy’s polygraph screening program (Loeb, 2000):

[Department of Energy counterintelligence chief Edward J.] Curran acknowledged that “false positives” became a serious issue at the CIA in the wake of the Aldrich Ames spy scandal when polygraphers were reluctant to accept any explanations from employees who indicated “deception” during their tests, leaving hundreds of employees unable to pass the test.

In the words of former Director of Central Intelligence John M. Deutch, “[CIA’s] reliance on the polygraph is truly insane.” (Weiner, 1999)

The FBI Reacts

The FBI didn’t learn from the Ames case, either. In March 1994—a month after the FBI arrested Ames, who had successfully employed countermeasures to pass his CIA polygraph “tests”—FBI director Louis J. Freeh mandated polygraph screening for all new special agents hired. (Kerr, 1997) Having failed to learn from the CIA’s experience, the FBI was about to receive an object lesson of its own
on polygraph validity. Attorney Mark S. Zaid, in a federal polygraph lawsuit brought in behalf of seven plaintiffs (Zaid, 2000), writes at para. 50:

Upon information and belief, when the FBI implemented its polygraph program in 1994, the then current special agent class had already begun its training. Nevertheless, members of the 1994 class were administered polygraph examinations and approximately half the class failed. However, the FBI simply overlooked this problem and waived the requirements of the polygraph for the 1994 class.

The FBI has not publicly acknowledged the 1994 special agent class polygraph incident. Nor has it learned from it: the FBI continues to rely on polygraph screening.

As a rule, the Bureau conducts pre-employment polygraph screening of applicants only after they have received a tentative offer of employment. Those being polygraphed are the best and the brightest. But in the first three years of the pre-employment polygraph program, 20% were “determined to be withholding pertinent information” (Kerr, 1997) through a process that, as Supervisory Special Agent Dr. Drew Richardson testified, “is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity.” (Richardson, 1997)

The FBI summarily terminates the applications of those “determined to be withholding pertinent information” based on their polygraph chart readings. There is no appeal process.

Coincidentally, in a recent laboratory study conducted by Dr. John A. Podlesny of the FBI laboratory division and Professor John C. Kircher of the University of Utah (Podlesny & Kircher, 1999), 20% of subjects who were innocent of committing a mock crime were classified as either “deceptive” or “inconclusive.” (In the pre-employment context, an inconclusive outcome is treated the same as a deceptive outcome.)

In addition to pre-employment polygraph screening, the FBI also conducts periodic screening of current employees. Special Agent
Mark E. Mallah worked in FBI foreign counterintelligence. In January, 1995, he and other agents in his unit were required to undergo a counterintelligence scope polygraph examination. SA Mallah’s polygrapher accused him of showing signs of deception on the question about unauthorized contact with foreign nationals. A full-scale espionage investigation ensued that continued until September 1996. Although SA Mallah was ultimately cleared of having had unauthorized contacts with foreign nationals, his polygrapher’s false accusation and the ensuing rumor and innuendo ruined his career prospects with the Bureau. He chose to resign, and did so with a clean record. (Mallah, 1998)

Special agents aren’t the only FBI employees required to submit to polygraph screening. All FBI employees must submit. Even the janitorial staff are polygraphed. (Curreri, 2000)

Despite the experience of the Ames case, the 1994 special agent class incident, the case of Special Agent Mark Mallah, and the testimony of the Bureau’s own leading polygraph expert, the FBI persists in its reliance on polygraph screening. And it has forbidden that leading polygraph expert, Dr. Drew C. Richardson, from testifying in court on polygraph matters. (Mateo, 2000)

Nonetheless, FBI’s parent agency, the Department of Justice, knows something about the unreliability of polygraphy. Arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Scheffer against the admissibility of polygraph “evidence” in military cases, DOJ lawyer Michael R. Dreeben noted that “[t]he fundamental unreliability of polygraph evidence is underscored...because of the possibility that countermeasures can defeat any test.” (Asseo, 1997)

The Department of Energy Polygraph Program

In 1999, the Department of Energy (DOE), in reaction to unsubstantiated allegations of Chinese espionage at Los Alamos National Laboratory, greatly expanded its polygraph screening program for employees and contractors with access to certain nuclear weapons-
related information. At first, DOE announced that some 12,000 employees would face polygraph screening.

In September 1999, the Department held a series of four public hearings on polygraph policy at which General Eugene E. Habiger, retired, director of the Department’s Office of Security and Emergency Operations, presided. The ostensible purpose for these hearings was to allow the public to comment on the Department’s proposed polygraph regulation, which had been published in the Federal Register in August.

At the beginning of each of these four hearings, DOE’s polygraph program manager, Mr. David M. Renzelman, delivered a brief presentation during which he provided false and misleading information about polygraph screening to the public. He suggested that the purpose for the “pre-test” interview is to make sure that the subject understands what is meant by “espionage” and “sabotage,” whereas its main purpose (as we will see in Chapter 3) is actually to elicit admissions and to obtain leads that may be useful in a “post-test” interrogation.

Mr. Renzelman lied to scientists and engineers at Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory about the rationale for the directed-lie “control” questions used in DOE’s polygraph screening format, claiming that they “are designed to elicit your capability of responding physiologically should you intentionally tell a lie.” (Maschke, 1999). (We will discuss the true rationale for directed-lie “control” questions in Chapter 3.)

During the course of DOE’s public hearings on polygraph policy, General Habiger’s panel heard from dozens of scientists who warned of the lack of validity, the danger of false positives and false negatives, the base-rate problem, and the fact that lie detector “tests” can be easily defeated through countermeasures. But their concerns fell on deaf ears. The public hearings were merely window dressing: the decision to implement polygraph screening had already been made.
Although in response to public pressure, DOE did eventually announce a dramatic lowering of the number to be subjected to polygraph screening from 12,000 to 800, it seems that DOE has quietly decided to drastically increase the number of employees to be polygraphed. As of July 2000, some 800 DOE employees had already been polygraphed. (Loeb, 2000) And when the DOE polygraph policy was announced in the 16 March 2000 issue of the Lockheed Martin Energy Systems newsletter Energy Systems News, the announcement stated that the policy would affect approximately 1,500 current employees and 250 potential employees at DOE’s Y-12 facility near Oak Ridge, Tennessee alone:

Within the next few weeks, DOE or its agent will begin administering counterintelligence polygraph examinations to employees awaiting acceptance into the Special Access Program, the Personnel Security and Assurance Program or the Intelligence Program. The test, which will affect approximately 1,500 incumbent employees and 250 potential Y-12 job candidates, will consist of questions formulated to obtain counterintelligence information, including questions related to espionage, sabotage, unauthorized disclosure of classified information and unauthorized contact with foreign nations [sic].

Job candidates will be required to take a polygraph examination prior to placement. Employees will be randomly examined within the next five years.

A subsequent announcement in the 6 April 2000 issue of Energy Systems News stated:

Polygraph teams will rotate through the complex spending two weeks at each facility and testing some 60 individuals per visit. The prioritized listing of sites calls for Los Alamos to be visited first, followed by Savannah River, Oak Ridge, Richland, Rocky Flats, and Oakland.

This screening rate of 60 persons every two weeks combined with the indication in the former article that employees will be screened “within the next five years” suggests that in reality, thousands—not
hundreds—of DOE employees are to be subjected to polygraph screening.

**On the DOE False Positive Rate**

In July 2000, DOE counterintelligence chief Edward Curran told *Washington Post* staff writer Vernon Loeb that not a single one of the 800 DOE employees polygraphed up to that point had “failed.” This is a truly amazing claim. Dr. Sheila Reed, who developed the “Test” for Espionage and Sabotage (TES) screening format used by DOE, conducted three laboratory experiments attempting to assess TES validity, using volunteers who committed mock acts of sabotage or espionage. (The TES is a variety of “Control” Question “Test” and as such suffers from the same lack of scientific control and standardization. See Chapter 3 for further discussion of the TES.)

Dr. Reed’s three experiments showed false positive rates of 15.2%, 2%, and 11.1%, respectively, for an average false positive rate of 9.4%. Keep in mind that in these laboratory experiments, the subjects had nothing to lose if they were falsely accused of deception. One might naturally expect a higher false positive rate in the field, where truthful persons whose careers depend on the outcome might well be more anxious while truthfully denying having committed espionage than when falsely denying—on the polygrapher’s instructions—a common human failing such as having told a lie, even once in one’s life.

Applying this experimental average false positive rate of 9.4% to a population of 800 employees screened, one would expect 75 false positive outcomes. But Edward Curran asserts that there were none! Could it be that this amazing false positive rate of 0% is achieved by arbitrarily choosing to ignore charts where the outcome, according to standard DoDPI doctrine, should properly be “significant response” (that is, “deception indicated”)?

Indeed, this seems to be, in essence, how DOE has achieved its claimed false positive rate of 0%. Loeb reports:
...Curran...said that about 20 percent of test subjects showed physiological responses indicating some “deception” to a question about unauthorized contacts.

But all of those subjects ultimately passed when asked the question a second time after being allowed to explain a minor transgression or admit to past conduct that may have been causing slight feelings of guilt, Curran said.

The true false positive rate in the DOE polygraph program is 20%, not zero. But DOE polygraphers are no doubt aware that they cannot get away with falsely accusing 20% of those they interrogate of being spies and saboteurs. It seems clear that, after grilling subjects a bit, DOE polygraphers are choosing to overlook charts which, based on DoDPI doctrine, should be scored as indicating deception.

**On the DOE False Negative Rate**

Edward Curran said of DOE employees, “These are not bank robbers or embezzlers. These are patriotic American citizens who already have clearances—you expect them to pass.” (Loeb, 2000) But the ostensible purpose of DOE’s polygraph program is to detect espionage and sabotage, not bank robbery and embezzlement. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence that bank robbers and embezzlers are any more likely than anyone else to commit espionage or sabotage.

DOE’s expectation that employees will pass makes it all the easier for any real spies or saboteurs to escape detection. Just because all DOE employees polygraphed as of July 2000 ultimately “passed,” it does not follow that none of them were spies or saboteurs. By relying on unreliable polygraph “testing,” DOE and other agencies may succeed in deluding themselves into a false sense of security, but actual spies will go undetected, as did CIA’s Aldrich Ames. The false negative rate of DOE’s polygraph program will, in all likelihood, never be known.
The Case of Wen Ho Lee

In 1995, a “walk-in” approached the Central Intelligence Agency outside of the PRC and provided an official PRC document classified “Secret” that contained design information on the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, the most modern in the U.S. arsenal, as well as technical information concerning other thermonuclear warheads.

Thus began an ongoing investigation of suspected Chinese espionage within the Department of Energy, according to chapter 2 of the report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, more commonly known as the “Cox Report.” But in the very next paragraph, the Cox Report notes:

The CIA later determined that the “walk-in” was directed by the PRC intelligence services. Nonetheless, the CIA and other Intelligence Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that it contained U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information.

The Cox Report does not disclose how the CIA determined that the “walk-in” was “directed by the PRC intelligence services.” Nor does the Cox Report offer any insight into why the PRC intelligence services would provide the CIA with documents that could reasonably be expected to compromise their own sources and methods.

Could it be that the CIA determined that the “walk-in” was directed by the PRC intelligence services because a CIA polygrapher found portents of prevarication when he gazed into the polygraph charts? As previously noted (p. 16), hundreds of CIA employees were unable to pass their polygraph screening exams in the wake of Aldrich Ames’ arrest in 1994, and the 1995 “walk-in” incident occurred squarely in that wake.

If the CIA did terminate its relationship with the “walk-in” based on the voodoo science of polygraphy, then it committed a blunder of monumental proportions.
In light of the information provided by the “walk-in,” the U.S. Department of Energy launched an espionage investigation that was eventually taken over by the FBI. Soon after the FBI took over the investigation, it focused on Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Lee as its sole suspect. On 23 December 1998, Dr. Lee submitted to a polygraph interrogation administered by DOE contractor Wackenhut Corrections Corp. regarding compromise of the W-88 warhead. Dr. Lee received one of the highest “passing” scores possible. CBSNews.com reported, “The polygraph results were so convincing and unequivocal, that sources say the deputy director of the Los Alamos lab issued an apology to Lee, and work began to get him reinstated in the X-Division.” (CBSNews.com, 2000)

However, when the FBI later wanted to search Wen Ho Lee’s home, Special Agent Michael W. Lowe, at para. 11 of an affidavit in support of a search warrant filed on 9 April 1999 (Lowe, 1999), swore that:

> …following the interview on December 23, 1998, DOE polygraphers administered a polygraph examination of LEE. The examiner’s initial opinion was that LEE was not deceptive. However, subsequent quality control reviews of the results, by both DOE and by FBI Headquarters (HQ) resulted in an agreed finding that LEE was inconclusive, if not deceptive, when denying he ever committed espionage against the United States.

That DOE’s original determination that the polygraph charts unequivocally indicated that Dr. Lee was truthful could be reinterpreted through “quality control reviews” to be “inconclusive, if not deceptive” is further proof—if any were needed—that polygraph chartgazing is no science. The polygrapher may read whatever he (or his boss) pleases into the charts.

Paragraph 17 of SA Lowe’s affidavit also deals with polygraphy:

> On February 10, 1999, the FBI conducted a polygraph examination of LEE. During this examination, the FBI asked LEE whether he had provided two classified codes...to any unauthorized person and whether he deliberately obtained any W-88 documents. It
was the examiner’s opinion that the polygraph results were inconclusive as to those questions. The second question was rephrased to cover a broader range of activities. LEE was then asked the follow [sic] two questions:

Q: Have you ever given any of those two codes to an unauthorized person?
A: No.

Q: Have you ever provided W-88 information to any unauthorized person?
A: No.

The polygraph examiner concluded that LEE’s answers to these questions were deceptive.

However, it has subsequently been reported that the details about the W-88 warhead provided by the “walk-in” could not have been stolen from Los Alamos (if indeed they were stolen at all). Wen Ho Lee could not have provided the W-88 information. The FBI thoroughly botched this espionage investigation, which at the time of writing (September 2000) is on-going.

Other Agencies
Apart from CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Departments of Defense and Energy, other federal agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service, DEA, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the Food and Drug Administration also rely on polygraphy. In addition, many state and local law enforcement agencies and fire departments use polygraphy to screen applicants and to interrogate their current employees in internal affairs investigations.

If They Know Polygraphy Is Unreliable, Why Do They Rely on It?
Government agencies rely on polygraphy primarily because naïve and gullible subjects, fearing that the polygraph will detect the slight-
est hint of deception, will often make admissions that they might not otherwise make. Those innocent persons who are falsely accused in the process are considered “acceptable losses.”

In an article on DOD’s decision to adopt polygraph screening (Park, 1999), physicist Robert L. Park, writes:

The 1971 Oval Office tapes captured President Richard M. Nixon explaining why he had ordered polygraph screening for the White House staff: “Listen, I don’t know anything about polygraphs and I don’t know how accurate they are, but I know they’ll scare the hell out of people.”

In 1983, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) reported:

It appears that NSA (and possibly CIA) use the polygraph not to determine deception or truthfulness per se, but as a technique of interrogation to encourage admissions. NSA has stated that the agency “does not use the ‘truth v. deceptive’ concept of polygraph examinations commonly used in criminal cases. Rather, the polygraph examination results that are most important to NSA security adjudicators are the data provided during the pretest or posttest phase of the examination”… (Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, p. 100)

On 4 May 1993, the NSA wrote to the White House, “over 95% of the information the NSA develops on individuals who do not meet federal security guidelines is derived via [voluntary admissions from] the polygraph process.” (National Security Agency, 1993) And as previously noted (p. 10), the Joint Security Commission acknowledged in its 1994 report that many polygraph proponents “contend that as long as the polygraph elicits admissions to screen out unsuitable applicants and actual security risks, questions about the polygraph’s validity remain academic.”

After Supervisory Special Agent Drew C. Richardson’s damning Senate testimony on polygraph validity, Senator Charles E. Grassley
wrote in a letter (Grassley, 1997) to the new director of the FBI laboratory division, Dr. Donald M. Kerr:

…Dr. Richardson is perhaps the FBI’s most eminently qualified expert on polygraphs. In his testimony, Dr. Richardson states the following regarding polygraph screening:

“It is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity. Although there is disagreement among scientists about the use of polygraph testing in criminal matters, there is almost universal agreement that polygraph screening is completely invalid and should be stopped.”

Enclosed is a copy of the full text of Dr. Richardson’s testimony. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, I request that you respond in writing to the Subcommittee answering Dr. Richardson’s charges on grounds of science. If you disagree with his charges, I ask that you so state, and also indicate your intention to raise the matter with the FBI Director immediately and advise him of your position. If Dr. Richardson is correct, polygraph screening should be banned from the FBI.

Senator Grassley requested that the Director of the FBI laboratory division answer Dr. Richardson’s charges on grounds of science. But instead, this is how Dr. Kerr (who with a doctorate in plasma physics from Cornell University should have known better) replied:

With regard to the testimony provided to your Subcommittee on September 29, 1997 by the Chief of the FBI’s Hazardous Materials and Response Unit, Dr. Drew Richardson, you have asked for my position regarding the use of polygraph examinations as an applicant screening procedure. For the reasons set forth below, I support the use of polygraph testing for applicants seeking employment with the FBI.

In March, 1994, Director Freeh authorized the use of polygraph examinations for all FBI employment applicants. Since that time,

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Dr. Kerr, who came to the FBI laboratory division without a background in forensic science, served as director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1979–1985.
the FBI has conducted approximately 16,200 pre-employment polygraph examinations. Of those, 12,930 applicants (80 percent) passed and continued processing; 3,270 applicants (20 percent) were determined to be withholding pertinent information. When these individuals were interviewed about their unacceptable performance in the polygraph session, 1,170 (36 percent) admitted to withholding substantive information, thereby confirming the results of the polygraph examination.

The FBI’s polygraph screening focuses exclusively on counterintelligence issues, the sale and/or use of illegal drugs, and the accuracy and completeness of information furnished by applicants in their employment applications. It is not a substitute for, but merely one component of, a thorough and complete background investigation. We have found that conventional investigative methods are not always capable of detecting certain national security risks and personal suitability issues, which have been discerned through polygraph interviews.

Tellingly, the director of the FBI laboratory division failed to answer Dr. Richardson’s charges on grounds of science, as Senator Grassley had requested. Nor did Dr. Kerr state whether he disagrees with Dr. Richardson’s charges, as the Senator had asked. Instead, Dr. Kerr admitted that he supports polygraph screening because his boss, Director Freeh, authorized it and because it is useful for obtaining admissions.

Part of Dr. Kerr’s response to Senator Grassley is also misleading. Dr. Kerr claimed that polygraph screening “is not a substitute for, but merely one component of, a thorough and complete background investigation.” He neglected to mention that the FBI summarily rejects the applications of those whose polygraph charts are interpreted either as indicating deception or inconclusive. For them, the polygraph is a substitute for a “thorough and complete background check.” Moreover, the FBI enters derogatory “information” about those who “fail” into a federal interagency database, creating a permanent smear and harming their prospects for employment elsewhere.
All Americans should be concerned that the director of the FBI laboratory division—an ostensibly scientific institution—supports the use of a procedure that, as Dr. Richardson has charged and Dr. Kerr did not dispute—is “completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity.”

Despite official claims to the contrary, it also appears that the primary purpose of the Department of Energy’s polygraph program is simply to elicit admissions. During DOE’s public hearings on its then-proposed polygraph regulation, polygraph program manager David M. Renzelman claimed:

I have a mandate from Mr. Curran and General Habiger that we’re not interested in what people commonly refer to as pillow talk.

Pillow talk is a slang term that is pretty much used in DOE to describe what happens when a husband goes home or a wife goes home and talks to their significant-other or spouse, or a friend or neighbor or somebody, about something that’s classified.

By that we mean something that other person does not have a clearance for, access to, or need to know.

That’s a couple of things; probably a security infraction, but that’s not what I’m concerned about, and it’s not terribly intelligent, because it shouldn’t be done. (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999d)

But one DOE employee tells a story that gives the lie to Mr. Renzelman’s claim that DOE’s polygraph program is not concerned with “pillow talk.” (Anonymous, 2000):

Since I had the nagging thought of possible disclosure to my spouse, I caved when he said that I should talk about anything that was bothering me and that they could emphasize or even reword the questions as needed to make me more comfortable. So I talked about it, and although he questioned pretty hard at first, he allayed my fears and the second set of questions went well.

The interrogation: after a short break, we sat down again. He said that the results were good, but there was a slight indication on one of the repeats of one [of the] questions that something was bothering me and he asked if I [was] thinking of the stuff I
told my [spouse]. I think he was lying, but it did not matter because my answer was truthfully No. This lead [sic] into a thorough and relentless grilling about what I may have said, when I may have said it, did my [spouse] specifically ask any questions, etc, etc, etc. I did not have an answer, it was just fuzzy memories of cutting of conversations because I suddenly realized that they were starting to get classified. I couldn’t remember any specifics. He took copious notes and kept asking, until I halfway made something up just to get him to stop.

The DOE polygrapher was keenly interested in this employee’s possible “pillow talk.” Since polygraph screening lacks both theoretical foundation and scientific validity—and stands virtually no chance of exposing a true spy—it seems that the primary purpose of the DOE polygraph program is, despite Mr. Renzelman’s representations to the contrary, precisely to elicit such admissions of “pillow talk” and other security infractions.

Interestingly, the DOE false positive rate of 20% (see pp. 21–22) corresponds precisely with DoDPI’s estimated base rate of guilt for security violations. (Barland, Honts, & Barger, 1989 at p. 57)

Is it mere coincidence that DOE polygraphers are finding 20% of those they polygraph to be deceptive with regard to unauthorized contacts (or other security violations)? Maybe. But maybe not… Could it be that, assuming a base rate of guilt of 20% for security violations, DOE polygraphers are simply adjusting their scoring criteria to produce a 20% “significant response” rate, and then grilling whoever “fails” for admissions of security violations?

Polygrapher Bias

Special Agent H.L. Byford, an FBI polygrapher, wrote in an e-mail exchange with the webmaster of NoPolygraph.com (Byford, 1999):

It only gets tight, when there are indications of drug usage above the guidelines or drug dealing. I mean, if someone has smoked marijuana 15 times, he’s done it 50 times. Don’t you agree? Those who have any doubts about how many times they used are going
to fail. Those who are certain that they only tried it once or three times or five or whatever, will pass….I got to tell you though, if I was running the show, there would be no one in the FBI that ever used illegal drugs!

By SA Byford’s own admission, an FBI applicant who reports that he smoked marijuana say, about eight times (well within the Bureau’s limit of 15 times), but cannot precisely recall the number of times, is going to “fail.”

Inflation/Fabrication of Admissions

Unfortunately, polygraphers not infrequently inflate or fabricate admissions. This is especially the case when the polygrapher believes that the charts indicate deception, or is simply biased against the subject.

The case of Dr. Wen Ho Lee provides a striking example of admissions inflation. Special Agent Lowe, at para. 18 of his affidavit in support of the FBI’s request for a warrant to search Dr. Lee’s home (Lowe, 1999), swore that after determining that Lee had shown deception on two questions

[t]he polygraph examiner then gave LEE an opportunity to discuss his answers further. During the discussion, LEE volunteered the following new information that he had not revealed in the prior interviews with the FBI or DOE. LEE said that during his trip to the PRC in 1986, he was approached by WEI SHEN LI, who [sic] LEE knew to be involved in the PRC’s Nuclear Program. LI came to see LEE, and asked if LEE could assist him in solving a problem he (LI) was having. LEE agreed. LEE illustrated what he had provided to LI in the form of an equation to assist LI in solving his problem. The polygrapher’s report states that LEE said that this equation was the same used in two classified codes. LEE admitted that his assistance to LI could have been used easily for nuclear weapons development.

Dr. Lee, who had agreed to be polygraphed without the benefit of legal counsel, made the mistake of trying to explain to his FBI polyg-
raper why he might have physiologically “responded” to a relevant question.

Here we see SA Lowe spinning an innocuous statement into a damaging “admission.” Dr. Lee, trying to explain why he might have physiologically “responded” to a relevant question, mentioned that he had provided a Chinese scientist with a mathematical equation in 1986 during a DOE-authorized visit to Beijing. That this equation is used in two classified codes does not mean that the equation itself is classified. Dr. Lee committed no security violation by sharing it.

But SA Lowe intimated to the judge that Dr. Lee “admitted” that he assisted China’s nuclear weapons development program! SA Lowe further insinuated that Lee had been deliberately withholding this information from DOE and FBI investigators. But Lowe failed to disclose to the court that Dr. Lee had listed the names of the scientists with whom he met in a 1986 trip report (Stober, 2000), but was asked no further questions at the time.

As former FBI special agent Mark Mallah testified during DOE’s public hearings on polygraph policy (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999a):

...[I]n my experience, polygraph examiners inflate their own figures, mischaracterize what is an admission, all for the purpose of serving their own industry.

Now, I’m not saying they’re lying. But I am saying that they have a strong incentive to shade all the evidence in their favor.

And also be aware that to a polygraph examiner/interrogator, a confession is like a trophy. So the slightest sliver of anything—anything that can be construed or misconstrued as damaging—that examiner has a strong incentive to say, “I got an admission; this person was deceptive; here’s the proof.”

The Case of David A. Tenenbaum

The case of David A. Tenenbaum seems to be one of the most egregious instances of admissions fabrication on record. Mr. Tenen-
baum, an American orthodox Jew fluent in Hebrew, is an engineer with the U.S. Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) in Warren, Michigan whose official duties had originally included liaison with Israeli officials. Sometime around January 1997, counterintelligence officials at TACOM came to suspect Mr. Tenenbaum of being an Israeli spy. On 13 February 1997, Mr. Tenenbaum submitted to a polygraph interrogation conducted by Special Agent Albert D. Snyder of the Defense Security Service (then the Defense Investigative Service), who accused him of deception. A lengthy espionage investigation ensued, but Mr. Tenenbaum was ultimately absolved of all wrongdoing.

In a complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Mateo, 1999), Mr. Tenenbaum’s attorney alleges at para. 34:

[that] Agent Snyder indicated to plaintiff that he had “done other Jews before,” including one Jew who married an Israeli. Agent Snyder claimed to have gotten all of these “Jews” to confess, even though in some cases it may have taken months. Agent Snyder claimed he would get plaintiff to confess, no matter how long it took. Agent Snyder called plaintiff a liar and said he could tell plaintiff was a spy just by looking into his eyes. Further, Agent Snyder claimed that all plaintiff had to do was confess and he would suffer only a “slap on the wrist.” Agent Snyder also spoke about his involvement with the Jonathan Pollard case. Jonathan Pollard (also a Jew) was a navy intelligence officer who is serving a life sentence for his conviction of spying for Israel. In spite of these accusations, plaintiff nevertheless tried to cooperate with defendant Snyder. Afterwards, defendant Snyder asked plaintiff to write out a confession, which plaintiff refused.

Mr. Tenenbaum maintains that he made no admissions whatsoever to espionage or providing classified information to unauthorized persons. Yet FBI Special Agent Sean Nicol, in an affidavit filed in support of an FBI request for a warrant to search Mr. Tenenbaum’s home (and cited in Mr. Tenenbaum’s complaint), swore in relevant part:
(2) In conjunction with a single scope background investigation conducted by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Livonia, Michigan, as part of a security clearance upgrade for David A. Tenenbaum, Mechanical Engineer, Combat Vehicle Team, tank Automotive Research and Development Engineering Center (TARDEC), US Army tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Warren, Michigan. Tenenbaum consented to a polygraph examination. On February 13, 1997, a polygraph examination was administered to Tenenbaum by Special Agent Albert D. Snyder, polygraph examiner, DIS.

(3) During an interview of Tenenbaum by Snyder, after the examination, Tenenbaum admitted to divulging non releasable classified information to every Israeli Liaison Officer (ILO) assigned to TACOM over the last ten years. Tenenbaum stated that he inadvertently provided his Israeli contacts, specifically the ILOs and Dr. Reuven Granot, Scientific Deputy Director, Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD), classified information from the three Special Access Program (SAP) projects to which he had access. The non releasable classified information provided to the Israelis by Tenenbaum includes hydra codes from the Light Armor Systems and Survivability (LASS), ceramic armor data, Advanced Survivable Test Battery (ASTB) data, Heavy Survival Test Battery (HSTB) data, and patriot missile countermeasures data. Additionally, Tenenbaum admitted providing the Israelis with unreleasable classified information regarding the Bradley tank and the HUMV.

Tenenbaum admitted that he has taken documents classified “For Official Use Only” from TACOM to his residence, that he has taken cover sheets labeled SECRET from TACOM to his residence, and that he has taken TACOM computers to his residence, and currently has a TACOM computer at his residence.

Mr. Tenenbaum vehemently denies the “admissions” attributed to him in SA Nicol’s affidavit. Mr. Tenenbaum’s complaint goes on to state:

Almost the entire contents of this affidavit are false.

37. Plaintiff never consented to a polygraph examination. He was coerced/threatened into taking a polygraph examination.
38. Plaintiff did not admit to divulging non-releasable classified information to any Israeli liaison officer assigned to TACOM over the last ten years. Plaintiff merely informed defendant Snyder that he had worked with other engineers and scientists in various other countries and they shared information. They shared only non-classified information and shared this information after it was cleared by their respective superiors.

39. Plaintiff never indicated to defendant Snyder that he “inadvertently provided Israeli contacts, specifically, the Israeli Liaison Officers and Dr. Reuven Granot, Scientific Deputy Director, Israeli Ministry of Defense, classified information from three Special Access Programs projects to which he had access.” In fact, plaintiff had very limited access to Special Access programs and had eventually withdrawn from working on these programs with his supervisor’s permission. Certainly, plaintiff never provided classified information from Special Access Programs or classified information from any other program to anyone.

40. Plaintiff denied indicating that he had provided non-releasable classified information to the israelis [sic], including HYDRA codes from the Light Armor Systems Survivability (L.A.S.S.). Plaintiff did not have access to HYDRA codes, and furthermore, L.A.S.S. was not a classified program. This was a project that the United States, Germany and Israel were working to jointly develop.

41. Plaintiff denied giving any classified Ceramic Armor Data to anyone. The Ceramic Armor Data referred to in the affidavit was to be part of the D650 Foreign Material Acquisition Program whose funds Mr. Tenenbaum competed for and “won” and were approved by TACOM. The purpose of this program was to buy specific ceramic armor from a company in Israel for testing purposes. Again, this was a totally unclassified program that had not even begun at the time of the DIS interview process or the polygraphs. Mr. Tenenbaum did not have access to classified information involving Ceramic Armor Data.

42. Plaintiff denied giving any advance survivable test battery data. To the best of plaintiff’s knowledge, the type of program referred to in the affidavit does not even exist.
43. Plaintiff denied giving any information regarding patriot [sic] missile countermeasures data. Plaintiff has no knowledge of patriot missile countermeasures data.

44. Plaintiff did not indicate to defendant Snyder that he had given the Israelis non-releasable classified information regarding the Bradley Tank and the HUMV [sic]. There is no such thing as a Bradley Tank. This vehicle is referred to as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Plaintiff reiterates that he never provided any type of classified information to the Israelis.

45. Plaintiff denied indicating to defendant Snyder that he had taken documents classified “For Official Use Only” from TACOM to his residence. Plaintiff did not take classified information to his residence. Plaintiff did have a TACOM computer at his residence, but he possessed that computer with his superiors’ permission and approval so that he could work out of his home. Plaintiff could not have taken any classified documents from TACOM since he did not have access to the safes that contained the classified documents.

46. That in light of the false information given by defendant Snyder to the FBI, FBI Agent Sean Nicol either knowingly swore out a false affidavit or had been purposely mislead [sic] by defendant Snyder. In any event, based on this affidavit, a United States Magistrate Judge authorized the search of plaintiff’s residence...

Incidentally, according to the American Polygraph Association (APA) website, polygrapher Albert D. Snyder won the Association’s William L. Bennet Memorial Award in 1986 in “recognition of excellence-achievement...as a token of APA appreciation for unrelenting efforts and display of ability in the APA interest,” and in 1992, he received the Al & Dorothea Clinchard Award “honoring extended, distinguished, devoted and unselfish service in behalf of the APA membership.”

At the time of writing, Mr. Tenenbaum’s lawsuit is still pending, and in what seems to be a clear violation of the 1st Amendment, the FBI has prohibited Dr. Drew Richardson—its leading expert on polygraph “testing”—from providing testimony about polygraphy
in Mr. Tenenbaum’s behalf, or even having any communication whatsoever with Mr. Tenenbaum’s lawyers. (Mateo, 2000)

**Predetermined Outcomes**

Government officials have also used polygraph “testing” as a pretext for adverse action in the absence of evidence. Take the case of former CIA lawyer Adam J. Ciralsky, an orthodox Jew who came under suspicion of having provided classified information to an Israeli national. In April 1999, National Public Radio reported (National Public Radio, 1999):

Ciralsky was interrogated by CIA investigators on numerous occasions and accused of a lack of candor for not disclosing that his chaperone on a high school trip to Israel at age 15, with whom he had not spoken in years, was an Israeli citizen. He was ordered to take polygraph examinations, which CIA officials say he failed. His lawyers believe that internal CIA memos show the test was rigged. In one, an unidentified CIA official writes, “Tenet (meaning the CIA director) says this guy is out of here because of his lack of candor…subject is scheduled for a poly… Once that’s over, it looks like we’ll be waving goodbye to our friend.”…

According to the internal memo, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet wanted Mr. Ciralsky fired. Can there be any doubt about what the result of Mr. Ciralsky’s polygraph “test” would be? He “failed,” and was eventually fired in late 1999. Yet the CIA has produced no evidence that Mr. Ciralsky provided any classified information to any unauthorized person or violated any security regulation.

**How Can They Be So Blind?**

In his 1997 Senate testimony, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Dr. Drew Richardson (Richardson, 1997) provided a cogent analysis of the institutional problems that have blinded some policymakers to the problems of polygraphy:
I think the aforementioned problems with polygraph continue to exist within the Bureau and elsewhere for the following reasons:

1. Polygraph research (direction, funding, and evaluation), training, and operational review is controlled by those who practice polygraphy and depend upon it for a living. This is tantamount to having the government’s cancer research efforts controlled by the tobacco industry. Independent scientific experts must be (and have not been) consulted to obtain an objective view of polygraphy.

2. Within the Bureau, polygraph examiners who have little or no understanding of the scientific principles underlying their practice, report to mid-level managers who are largely ignorant of polygraph matters. These in turn report to executives, who have real problems for which they seek needed solutions (e.g., the need to protect national security from the danger of espionage, and the need to hire employees with appropriate backgrounds). These executives are left unable to evaluate that polygraph is not a viable solution and do not comprehend that ignorance and mis-information are built into their own command structure.

3. The fact that the human physiology is marvelously wonderful and complex, that polygraph methods have been able to accurately record this physiology for most of this century and beyond, and the fact that computerized acquisition and evaluation of this data is now available, in no way compensates for the vast shortcomings of polygraph applications and questioning formats. State of the art technology utilized on faulty applications amounts to nothing more than garbage in, garbage out.

As Dr. Richardson observed, ignorance and misinformation are built into the command structure. We hope that this book will serve to dispel that ignorance and counter that misinformation.

A Modest Proposal

Policymakers who mandate polygraph “testing” for others generally support their decisions on the ground that the jobs of those being
“tested” are so sensitive as to justify this unusual practice: even if it’s not scientifically valid, it’s still “better than nothing.”

We suggest that the jobs of those who are mandating polygraph screening for others are even more sensitive than the jobs of those for whom they are mandating it. If polygraph “testing” is truly necessary for those with sensitive jobs in law enforcement, intelligence, and defense, then it should be a fortiori necessary for those to whom they report. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.

We propose the establishment of a National Polygraph Agency whose mission it will be to “test” all persons sworn into public office in the United States. No person who fails to pass a polygraph screening “test” would be permitted to assume public office, and current office-holders would be subjected to periodic re-examination. The President and Members of Congress shouldn’t mind answering a few simple questions like, “Have you ever made a campaign promise you didn’t intend to keep?” or “Has your vote ever been influenced by a campaign contribution?” Federal judges should not object to being asked such simple questions as, “Have you ever allowed your personal views to influence a legal decision?” Political appointees should have no problem with being asked, “Have you ever made, for political reasons, a decision that was not necessarily in the public interest?”

If the 20% failure rate of the FBI polygraph screening program were applied to Congress, we would see 20 senators and 87 representatives expelled and barred from holding public office. Two justices of the Supreme Court would be similarly be ejected. Any innocent persons among them would have to be written off as “acceptable losses.” After all, national security is at stake!

Summary

Thus far, we have seen that the “Control” Question “Test” lacks scientific “control” and is not a standardizable, specifiable “test.”
As a result, its validity cannot be determined through scientific means. The majority of psychophysicologists do not believe polygraphy to be based on sound scientific principle, and an overwhelming majority believes that polygraph “tests” can be beaten through countermeasures. We have also seen that governmental agencies know this, but cynically rely on polygraphy because it is useful for eliciting admissions from naïve and gullible subjects.

As the lie behind the lie detector becomes more and more widely known, those agencies that rely on polygraphy will be able to fool fewer of the people less of the time. They won’t fool you. In the next chapter, you will learn how polygraph “tests” really work (and don’t).
CHAPTER THREE
Polygraphy Exposed

JUSTICE AND SECURITY THROUGH TRUTH

—Department of Defense Polygraph Institute motto

Tests of deception, ironically, must themselves include a deceptive element. Polygraph tests present, perhaps, the most egregious problem.

—Leonard Saxe

“I thought Oz was a great Head,” said Dorothy.
“And I thought Oz was a lovely Lady,” said the Scarecrow.
“And I thought Oz was a terrible Beast,” said the Tin Woodman.
“And I thought Oz was a Ball of Fire,” exclaimed the Lion.
“No, you are all wrong,” said the little man meekly. “I have been making believe.”

“Making believe!” cried Dorothy. “Are you not a Great Wizard?”
“Hush, my dear,” he said. “Don’t speak so loud, or you will be overheard—and I should be ruined. I’m supposed to be a Great Wizard.”

L. Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, 1900

Like the Wizard of Oz, who used deception to inspire fear, polygraphers, too, depend on trickery to instill fear in their subjects. In this chapter, we will expose the little tricks used by the little men behind the polygraph curtain.

Polygraph “tests” have three distinct phases:

1. the “pre-test” interview and “stim test”;
2. the “in-test” phase (polygraph exam);
3. the “post-test” interrogation (when applicable).

We will discuss all three phases, exposing the deception on which polygraphy depends.
The “Pre-Test” Interview

In this phase, the polygrapher will attempt to establish rapport with you. He will ask about your background and interests, and may well remark on something both of you have in common. He will use information gleaned during this “pre-test” interview to choose the “control” questions he will be asking you later, and he will also exploit this information in an attempt to elicit admissions during any “post-test” interrogation. In addition, the polygrapher will take note of any damaging admissions you make.

Your polygraph examiner will next briefly explain how the polygraph instrument works. Here is the textbook explanation that Department of Defense Polygraph Institute-trained polygraphers provide to their subjects (Dollins, 1997):

You may be a little nervous, especially if you have not had a PDD [“psychophysiological detection of deception,” a more scientific-sounding term for “lie detection”] examination before. This is expected and is quite normal. To help put you at ease, I will explain what the instrument is and how it works. The polygraph is a diagnostic tool that is used to determine if a person is telling the truth. It simply records physiological changes that take place in your body when you are asked questions. Today, changes in your respiration, sweat gland activity, and blood pressure will be recorded. Please notice the two rubber tubes on the desk. One will be placed across your chest and the other will be placed around your abdominal area. They will be used to record your breathing. There are two metal finger plates next to the rubber tubes. These plates will be attached to two of your fingers and will record your sweat gland activity. Finally, there is a blood pressure cuff on the desk. It is the same type of cuff a doctor uses to measure blood pressure. It will be placed on your arm and will monitor changes in your cardiovascular activity.

These physiological changes are a result of an automatic response system in your body. It is a response system over which you have no control. For example, visualize yourself walking down a dark alley late at night. Suddenly you hear a loud noise. You will instantaneously decide either to remain where you are and investigate
the source of the noise, or to flee the area, sensing danger to your well being. Regardless of the choice you make, your body automatically adjusts itself to meet the needs of the situation; your heart may beat faster, your breathing may change and you may break out in a cold sweat.

When you were growing up, if you are like most people, you were raised to know the difference between right and wrong. Quite probably, all of the adults you came in contact with--your parents, grandparents, relatives, teachers, church officials--taught you that lying, cheating, and stealing were wrong. Ever since you were a young child, you have been programmed to know that lying is wrong. Think about the first time you lied and got caught. Remember how your body felt during that confrontation. Your heart may have been racing or you may have been sweating. However, the responses were automatic; your body adjusted to the stress of the situation.

People are not always 100% honest. Sometimes it is kinder and more socially acceptable to lie than to be honest - such as telling someone you like their clothes when you really think the clothes are awful. It is important for you to understand that even though a lie might be socially acceptable or only a small lie, or a lie by omission, your body still responds. The recording on the polygraph will show only the physiological responses. It cannot know what kind of lie you are telling. Therefore, it is extremely important that you be totally honest… (pp. 33-34)

The above explanation is carefully designed to instill fear. But like the Wizard of Oz, the polygrapher is making believe. His explanation is deliberately false and misleading: telling a lie may or may not result in physiological changes measurable by the polygraph. When the polygrapher says, “It is important for you to understand that even though a lie might be socially acceptable or only a small lie, or a lie by omission, your body still responds,” he really means, “It is important for me that you believe this to be true.”

Fear is an essential element of all polygraph “tests.” In its 1994 assessment of the Ames case, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports, “A former polygrapher noted that without proper preparation, a subject has no fear of detection and, without fear
of detection, the subject will not necessarily demonstrate the proper physiological response.” (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1994) But fear of being falsely accused may also entail physiological responses measurable by the polygraph and result in truthful persons being accused of deception.

### The “Stim Test”

Your polygrapher will next conduct what in the polygraph trade is commonly known as a “stimulation test” or “stim test,” though DoDPI calls it an “acquaintance test.” Your polygrapher will tell you that the purpose of this little demonstration is to allow him to “adjust the instrument” and to make certain that you are “capable” of physiologically responding if you were to intentionally tell a lie. *But this explanation is itself a lie.* The true purpose of the “stim test” is to dupe you into believing that your polygrapher can read your mind and that the slightest deception will be detected.

In earlier times, the “stim test” was usually done with a deck of cards. Your polygrapher would ask you to pick a card and not show it to him. Then, while you are connected to the polygraph, he would ask you to answer “no” to each question he asked. Suppose you draw the jack of diamonds. Your “stim test” might go like this:

- Did you pick a face card? (No.)
- Did you pick a number card? (No.)

Your polygrapher nonchalantly tells you, “It’s obvious you picked a face card.” He then proceeds to ask:

- Did you pick a king? (No.)
- Did you pick a queen? (No.)
- Did you pick a jack? (No.)

He then informs you, “You’ve clearly drawn a jack.” He continues:

- Did you pick a spade? (No.)
- Did you pick a club? (No.)
Did you pick a diamond? (No.)
Did you pick a heart? (No.)

Your polygrapher gazes into his charts and earnestly tells you, “It’s clear you picked the jack of diamonds. No doubt about it. You’re a ‘screamer.’ You can’t tell a lie without your body giving you away.”

But what your polygrapher wouldn’t tell you is that you drew your card from a trick deck, in which every card is a jack of diamonds. In another version of this card trick, an assortment of genuinely different cards is used, but the polygrapher has memorized their order.

But nowadays, the card trick has largely given way to the “numbers test.” In a known-solution numbers “test,” your polygrapher will ask you to pick a number, say, from one to six, and to write it on a sheet of paper. The number will be known to both of you. Let’s say you pick “4.” You write it on the slip of paper. Your polygrapher will then write in the other numbers, 1, 2, 3 and 5, 6 in a list above and below or to the left and right of the “4” that you wrote, then he will affix the paper to the wall in front of you. Your polygrapher will next instruct you to answer “no” each time as he asks, “Did you write 1? Did you write 2?, etc. And he will tell you that when you answer “no” to the number that you wrote, you are to look at that number on the wall and to consciously think about having chosen it and written it down, and then to deliberately lie and say “no.”

Did you write 1? (No.)
Did you write 2? (No.)
Did you write 3? (No.)
Did you write 4? (No.)
Did you write 5? (No.)
Did you write 6? (No.)

Whether you showed any discernible reaction while “lying” or not, your polygrapher will attempt to convince you that you are not
capable of lying without the polygraph instrument detecting it. This is how DoDPI instructed examiners to explain the “stim test” to volunteers in a recent research project (Dollins, 1997):

Administer a standard known solution numbers test-- using the rationale below. DO NOT show the test to the examinee, but convince the examinee that deception was indicated. NOTE: be sure to use the word acquaintance or demonstration test when discussing this with the examinee.

I’m now going to demonstrate the physiological responses we have been discussing. This test is intended to give you the opportunity to become accustomed to the recording components and to give me the opportunity to adjust the instrument to you before proceeding to the actual test. In addition, this test will demonstrate to me that you are capable of responding and that your body reacts when you knowingly and willfully lie.

The standard four components (two pneumograph tubes, electrodermal plates, and cardiovascular cuff) are attached at this time, followed by the acquaintance test. The acquaintance test should be conducted in the manner taught at DoDPI.... The results will be discussed with the examinee as follows:

That was excellent. It is obvious that you know lying is wrong. You’re not capable of lying without your body reacting. You reacted strongly when you lied about that number. Even though I asked you to lie and it was an insignificant lie, you still responded. That will make this examination very easy to complete as long as you follow my directions.

Don’t be your polygrapher’s fool. The lie detector cannot detect lies (it only records physiological data), and your polygrapher cannot read your mind. The most “prestigious” polygraph school, the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, churns out polygraphers after a mere 520-hour (14-week) course of instruction. Mind reading is not on the DoDPI curriculum.
Reviewing the “Test” Questions

Next, your polygrapher will review with you all the questions that he will be asking you while you are hooked up to the machine. The polygrapher will ask you if there is anything that is bothering you that you think you should mention before the polygraph “test” begins, and any admissions will be duly noted.

As a rule (not always strictly followed), polygraphers are prohibited from asking questions about religious and political beliefs and sexual matters. However…

CIA Applicants Beware!

Both CIA and NSA use a broader “life-style” polygraph screening “test.” CIA polygraphers in particular seem to have a prurient interest in the private lives of those they interrogate. In 1997, one CIA applicant, whose wife had recently left him, was asked the following mix of questions during the “pre-test” phase of his pre-employment polygraph screening:

• Have you ever participated in groups advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Government?
• Have you ever performed services for another intelligence service?
• Do you masturbate?
• What do you think about while masturbating?
• Have you ever had sex with another man?
• Have you ever thought about having sex with another man?
• Have you ever killed another person?
• Have you ever thought about killing another person?
• Have you ever thought about killing yourself?
• Do you lie?
• How much do you lie? Daily? Weekly?
• Would you lie to make yourself look better, if you knew you wouldn’t get caught?
• Why did your wife leave you?
• Couldn’t you satisfy your wife sexually?
• Has she or any other woman accused you of being unable to satisfy them?
• Have you ever cheated on your wife?
• Have you ever thought about cheating on your wife?
• Do you daydream?
• Would you consent to us medicating you for continued examination?
• Have you ever thought about having sex with your mother?
• Have you ever bounced a check?
• Have you ever been arrested for DUI?
• Should you have been?

In an article about the CIA’s polygraph program published in the 27 November 1996 issue of The Independent, Daniel Jeffreys reported:

Sarah, a case officer, found the inquisitors at “The Farm”, the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia, persistently curious about her private life. She describes her last polygraph, in July, as an exercise in abuse and intimidation. “They kept coming back to my sex life,” she says. “They asked how many times we have sex in a month, what kind of sex we have, what kind of positions, what I was wearing. How can I have a normal sexual relationship now, knowing that whatever I do in bed I may be asked to describe in detail to one of my superior officers?”

…

Case officer “Mary” is a good example. On assignment in Turkey she fell in love. When it came to her polygraph test, officers took her through a list of the most perverse sexual acts, asking her if she had ever practised them with her new boyfriend. “I felt there was a degree of sexual harassment involved,” she says. “I think the interrogators got a kick out of asking the questions. My feeling was that it was no way to treat a fellow professional. With the prospect of similar tests at least every two or three years, I decided to resign.”

…
In 1995 Jane, on a posting in Asia, met a foreigner and they fell in love. When she reported the relationship, as required by CIA regulations, she was subjected to repeated polygraphs of a most intimate nature. “I passed every one,” she says. “Whatever they asked, I was clean.” Then Jane decided she wanted to marry. “The Agency told me my fiance must take a polygraph. He did, and he failed. He’s not an intelligence professional, and I think he was just spooked.”

Jane was given a choice: dump the man or leave the Agency. She chose the man. “I have plenty of marketable talents and I can survive without the CIA” she says. “The question is, can the CIA survive without me, and the hundreds of people like me who think the senior officers have made conditions intolerable because they can’t risk another Aldrich Ames?”

If you are considering going to work with the CIA, you may wish to ponder just how intimate a relationship you are willing to have with your Government.

**Question Types**

“Control” Question “Tests” consist of three distinct kinds of questions: relevant, irrelevant, and “control” questions.

**Relevant Questions**

These questions have directly to do with the matter at hand. In specific issue “tests,” they deal directly with the crime under investigation. If, for example, you are suspected of leaking an embarrassing memo, then the relevant questions asked during your polygraph examination could well be:

1. Do you suspect someone of leaking that memo?
2. Do you know who leaked that memo?
3. Did you leak that memo?

With polygraph screening, the relevant questions are more general. Let us take the FBI’s polygraph screening program as an example.
FBI laboratory division director Dr. Donald M. Kerr mentioned in his letter to Senator Grassley (Kerr, 1997), “The FBI’s polygraph screening focuses exclusively on counterintelligence issues, the sale and/or use of illegal drugs, and the accuracy and completeness of information furnished by applicants in their employment applications.” If you are an applicant for employment with the FBI, then your relevant questions could very well be:

1. Has any group or organization directed you to seek FBI employment?
2. Have you ever been in contact with anyone representing a non-US intelligence service?
3. Have you violated the FBI guidelines concerning the use of illegal drugs?
4. Have you deliberately withheld any important information from your application?

If you are a Department of Defense or Department of Energy employee facing a security screening polygraph interrogation, your relevant questions might very well be:

1. Have you had unauthorized contact with a foreign national?
2. Have you provided classified information to an unauthorized person?
3. Have you committed an act of espionage against the United States?
4. Have you committed an act of sabotage against the United States?

The “Sacrifice” Relevant Question

In some polygraph formats, the first relevant question—whether probable- or directed-lie—is what is known as a “sacrifice” relevant question. That is, although the question is relevant, it is not scored. The polygrapher assumes that truthful persons might physiologically
respond to the first relevant question simply by virtue of its being the first one.

The sacrifice question is usually something along the lines of, “Do you intend to answer all questions truthfully?” This is how DoDPI has instructed examiners to explain the sacrifice relevant question while administering the directed-lie “Test” for Espionage and Sabotage (Dollins, 1997):

Explain and review the sacrifice relevant question. The sacrifice relevant may be reviewed as the first relevant question or as the last (third) relevant question. Provide a rationale for the sacrifice relevant question (e.g. “I need to ensure that you intend to be truthful to the security questions, so I am going to ask you...”). The rationale may depend on whether the sacrifice relevant is reviewed as the first or third relevant question.

Use one of the following sacrifice relevant questions (the first is preferred).

Do you intend to answer the security questions truthfully?

Regarding the security questions, do you intend to answer truthfully?

Note that the rationale for the sacrifice relevant question that the polygrapher provides to the subject is false and misleading. The question is not intended to “ensure that you intend to be truthful to the security questions,” and is not scored at all.

Note also that in this particular case, the polygraph examiner asks the subject if he intends to answer the security questions truthfully rather than if he intends to answer all questions truthfully. This is because in the directed-lie “Test” for Espionage and Sabotage, the subject will be instructed to answer the “control” questions untruthfully, as we shall see below (p. 56).

“Control” Questions

These questions are more general, and come in two distinct varieties: “probable-lie” and “directed-lie.” The probable-lie format is by far
the most common, and is used in both pre-employment polygraph screening and in criminal interrogations. Virtually all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that rely on polygraph screening use the probable-lie format, while the directed-lie format is used by the Departments of Defense and Energy for polygraph screening. In addition, some private polygraphers employ a mix of probable-lie and directed-lie “control” questions.

As noted in Chapter 1, the “control” questions in “control” question “tests” do not provide any kind of “control” within the scientific meaning of the word. Although polygraph researchers are increasingly using the more descriptive term, “comparison questions,” they are still commonly called “control questions” in polygraph circles. We will use both terms interchangeably.

**Probable-Lie “Control” Questions**

In a probable-lie “Control” Question “Test,” the polygrapher will tell you that you must answer all questions truthfully, but he actually assumes that you will be deceptive when answering the “control” questions. He will deceive you about that expectation.

The OTA report (*Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing*, 1983) explains at p. 20:

> The polygraph examiner does not tell the subject that there is a distinction between the two types of questions (control and relevant). Control questions are described as intending to determine if the subject is the “type of person” who would commit a crime such as the one being investigated.… The examiner stresses that the subject must be able to answer the questions completely with a simple “yes” or “no” answer, that the polygraph will record any confusion, misgivings, or doubts, and that the subject should discuss any troublesome questions with the examiner.… Thus, the situation is set up such that the subject is persuaded that the examiner wants the truth. In reality, however, the examiner wants the subject to experience considerable doubt about his or her truthfulness or even to be intentionally deceptive.…
“Control” questions tend to be broad and sweeping, spanning a long period of time. Common “control” questions include:

- Have you ever lied to a loved one?
- Have you ever taken something that does not belong to you?”
- Since the age of 18, have you ever considered hitting someone in anger?

Since most everyone can answer “yes” to all of these questions, the typical examinee will admit to one or two minor transgressions. The polygrapher will then move to contain these admissions, in order to leave you with the uneasy feeling that you haven’t told all. The polygrapher accomplishes this by trying to convince you that any further admissions on these questions will call your character and integrity into question, and that you would end up failing the “test” before it even begins.

Following limited admissions, the “control” questions often end up structured as, “Other than what you just told me, have you ever lied to a loved one?” The theory is that when you answer the question “no,” you must still be withholding something, or at least feel uneasy about not remembering some incident from long ago. The polygrapher treats your response to this question as though it were a lie.

The polygrapher assumes that if your physiological responses as measured by the polygraph are stronger when answering a relevant question (e.g. “Have you violated this agency’s guidelines concerning the use of illegal drugs?”) than when answering the “control” questions (e.g. “Have you ever lied to a loved one?”), then you must have been deceptive in answering the relevant question. If your physiological responses while answering the “control” questions are greater, then you must be telling the truth in answering the relevant question. And if your physiological responses while answering the relevant and “control” questions are about the same, then the outcome will be deemed inconclusive. If these assumptions seem overly simplistic to you, you’re right. As we stated at the beginning of
Chapter 1, polygraphy is not science: it is codified conjecture masquerading as science.

Perversely, it is the conscientious examinee who, at the polygraph examiner’s behest, “discuss[es] any troublesome questions with the examiner” and then answers the “control” questions truthfully (and thus exhibits weaker physiological responses to them than to accusatory relevant questions like, “Are you a spy?”) that is most likely to be found deceptive! As Honts (1991) notes:

…Lykken…has persuasively argued that the individual who tries to be truthful during a pre-employment polygraph examination and who, at the examiner’s urging, bares all of his or her past wrongdoing, is the very individual who is most likely to be rejected by the preemployment screening process, whereas the individual who makes minor admissions and then dishonestly maintains his or her innocence is more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt and passed through…. (p. 98)

This bias against the most honest individuals applies to all probable-lie “control” question “tests”—whether pre-employment or otherwise. Ironically, in every polygraph examination, at least one person truly is deceptive: the polygraph examiner!

Recognizing “control” questions may be made easier because the polygraph examiner will often emphasize them as he explains the questions he will be asking you. For example, if one of your “control” questions is going to be “Have you ever lied to loved ones?” your polygrapher may very well give you a short sermon on the virtues of honesty (ironic, isn’t it?) and expound about how experience has shown that the same people who would lie to a loved one turn out to be the very same kind of people who would commit the crime that is under investigation or the behavior that is being screened for.

In a probable-lie “test,” such as the one in our example where you are suspected of leaking a memo, or where you are an applicant for employment with the FBI or U.S. Secret Service, you may well encounter “control” questions such as:
1. Have you ever lied to a supervisor?
2. Have you ever lied to loved ones?
3. Have you ever lied to parents, teachers, or the police?
4. Have you ever lied to get out of trouble?
5. Did you ever reveal anything told to you in confidence?
6. Did you ever cheat in school?
7. Did you ever cheat in college?
8. Did you ever betray the trust of a friend or relative?
9. Did you ever steal anything from an employer?
10. Do you sometimes intentionally mislead or deceive your friends?
11. Are you a really honest person?
12. Are you absolutely trustworthy?
13. Do you think you are smarter than most people?
14. Are you an untrustworthy person?
15. Are you a dishonest person?

And if you consume alcoholic beverages and drive a car, you may well be asked:

16. Have you ever driven while under the influence of alcohol?

This may seem like a relevant question, but it’s not. Your polygrapher assumes that anyone who drinks and has a driver’s license must have difficulty to honestly say he’s never driven while under the influence of alcohol.

Other “control” questions commonly used in probable-lie “control” question “tests” that may at first seem like relevant questions are:

17. Is there anything in your background that you are afraid that our investigator might find out?
18. Have you ever done anything that would embarrass you if your parents found out?
19. Have you ever done anything you would be embarrassed to tell me about?
In addition, if, like most people, you initially admit to having told some white lies, your polygrapher may rephrase the question as:

20. Have you ever lied about anything serious?

Don’t be fooled. It’s still a control question. Your polygrapher expects that your denial will still be a lie, or that you will at least feel anxiety over whether your denial is completely truthful. Similarly, if your polygrapher rephrases, “Did you ever cheat in school?” to “Did you ever cheat in college?” it’s still a “control” question.

Directed-Lie “Control” Questions

Directed-lie “control” questions differ from probable-lie “control” questions in that the subject is not misled into believing that the directed-lie question must be answered truthfully. Instead, the subject is instructed to “lie” in response to the directed-lie “control” question, which is introduced as a “diagnostic” question. (As we mentioned earlier [p. 52], directed-lie “control” questions are used primarily by the Departments of Defense and Energy for polygraph screening. If your polygraph “test” is with any other governmental agency, you are not likely to encounter this format.) Here are DoDPI’s textbook instructions on how polygraph examiners are to explain directed-lie “control” questions to subjects (Dollins, 1997):

Explain and review the directed lie comparison questions. Use the following explanation as a guideline.

I am now going to discuss the second type of question, the diagnostic questions. As I explained earlier, when you lie your body responds and I will be able to see the response, just as I did during the demonstration. If, however, you were given a test and I saw no responses to any of the questions, it would look like you were telling the truth. For various reasons (sick, tired, using some medication) some people lose their capability to respond. Consequently, I must ask some questions that demonstrate you continue to have the capability to respond when you are
lying and that you do not respond when you are telling the truth.

First I will review those questions used to determine if you are capable of responding when you lie. I already know the answer to these questions because we all have done these things at one time or another. When I ask the question I want you to think of an occasion when you did this--don’t tell me about it, just think of a specific time. Then lie to me and say no.

Before each question preface it with--we have all (e.g. violated traffic laws)--you have haven’t you (they should answer yes)--of course. Now think of a specific incident (don’t tell me). When I ask you ‘Did you ever violate a traffic law’ I want you to lie to me and say “NO.” When I ask you this question on the test--I want you to think of that incident when you lie to me.

Although directed-lie “control” questions are less devious than probable-lie “controls,” the explanation provided to the subject is nonetheless false and misleading:

1. “…[W]hen you lie your body responds and I will be able to see the response, just as I did during the demonstration.”

   *Your body may or may not produce physiological responses measurable by the polygraph when you lie.*

2. “For various reasons (sick, tired, using some medication) some people lose their capability to respond.”

   *If you were to “lose [your] capability to respond” physiologically, you would have such severe health problems as would preclude you from sitting for a polygraph exam. If you are physically capable of sitting down for a polygraph “test,” your body is “capable” of responding physiologically.*
3. “...I will review those questions used to determine if you are capable of responding when you lie.”

_When you answer a question falsely as instructed, you are not “lying.” Any responses measured by the polygraph when you answer the directed-lie “control” questions have nothing to do with deception._

The true purpose behind the “directed-lie” questions is to cause you to feel anxiety about whether you are providing appropriate physiological responses while answering these “control” questions. The polygrapher assumes that if you are truthful in your answers to the relevant questions, then your anxiety while answering the directed-lie “control” questions will result in stronger physiological responses than when you answer the relevant questions.

Professor Honts (1994) has described the rationale behind the Directed-Lie “Control Test” (DLCT) thus:

...The rationale of the DLCT is similar to that of the CQT [“probable-lie” “Control” Question “Test”] except that the comparison question, the one expected to elicit response from the innocent, is a known lie. For example, the examiner may ask, “Have you ever told a lie, even one time in your life?” The subject initially answers “yes,” but is then directed to answer “no” during the examination. In the DLCT, truthful and deceptive subjects are expected to respond differentially to the relevant and directed-lie questions.

The directed-lie control questions are prepared in the following manner. A subject is told that it is important for comparison purposes that he or she answer some of the questions on the test deceptively. The examiner also tells the subject that it is critical that he or she respond appropriately when lying. However, the nature of appropriate responding is not defined for the subject. Finally, the subject is told that if he or she does not react appropriately to the directed-lie questions, the examination will be inconclusive and will have to be repeated at another time. In this case, differential reactivity is expected because the innocent subject’s attention has been focused on the directed-lie questions by the examiner’s instructions and by concern over responding ap-
appropriately. The DLCT is evaluated in the same manner as the CQT.

As with probable-lie “control” question “tests,” the polygrapher assumes that if your physiological responses when answering a relevant question are greater than when answering the directed-lie “control” questions, then you must have been deceptive in answering the relevant question. If your physiological responses while answering the “control” questions are greater, then you must be telling the truth in answering the relevant question. And if your physiological responses while answering the relevant and “control” questions are about the same, then the outcome will be deemed inconclusive. Again, this is codified conjecture, not science.

You may wish to ponder which would cause you the greatest physiological response: a) falsely denying having ever told a lie in your entire life, as instructed by your polygrapher or b) truthfully denying having had contact with a foreign intelligence service, knowing that your trustworthiness is being assessed based on a pseudoscientific procedure that depends on trickery.

The directed-lie polygraph screening format adopted by the Department of Defense in 1993 and the Department of Energy in 1999 is called the “Test for Espionage and Sabotage” (TES). The directed-lie “control” questions used in the TES—which questions you will be instructed to answer falsely—may include:

1. Did you ever take any government (company) supplies for your personal use?
2. Did you ever violate a traffic (fishing, hunting, boating) law?
3. Did you ever say something derogatory about another person behind their back?
4. Did you ever violate a software copyright law?
5. Did you ever say something that you later regretted?
6. Did you ever lie to a previous supervisor about anything?
7. Did you ever borrow anything and forget to return it?
8. Did you ever lie to a co-worker about anything at all?
9. Did you ever say anything in anger that you later regretted?
10. Did you ever brag about yourself to impress others?

**Irrelevant Questions**

Irrelevant questions are concerned with nothing of importance. In both probable-lie and directed-lie “tests,” the subject is instructed to answer these questions truthfully. DoDPI teaches polygraphers to explain irrelevant questions thus (Dollins, 1997):

> …Explain and review the irrelevant questions. Use the following explanation example as a guideline.

> The final diagnostic questions you may hear are ones you will answer truthfully so that I can see how you are responding when you tell the truth. It will be obvious that you are telling the truth.…

*The rationale provided to the subject is a lie.* The purpose of the irrelevant questions is not so that your polygrapher “can see how you are responding when you tell the truth.” In both probable- and directed-lie “control” question “tests,” the irrelevant questions are not scored at all!

Irrelevant questions commonly appear at the beginning of a polygraph question series (usually the first two questions) to soak up the initial stress of the polygraph interrogation. As with the sacrifice relevant question, polygraphers expect that even truthful subjects may react to the first questions in a series merely because they are first. Irrelevant questions are also used as buffers between various scored questions (that is, relevant and “control” questions).

*Common irrelevant questions include:*

1. Are you now in (name of the state in which you are located)?
2. Is today (today’s date)?
3. Do you sometimes drink water?
4. Are you sometimes called (your name)?
The “In-Test” (Polygraph) Phase

The examiner fits a blood pressure cuff around your arm, metal contacts on your ring and index finger, and pneumograph tubes around your torso and abdomen. He will ask a series of usually about ten questions, and instruct you to keep your eyes open, remain still, and answer “yes” or “no” to each question. Your polygrapher will ask the questions at intervals of about 30 seconds, and will probably repeat the question series three times. In between question series repetitions, your polygrapher may leave the room for about 15 minutes to “examine the charts” (and to let you sit and stew about your fate), then return to interrogate you about why you may have been “responding” to a certain question before he proceeds to the next series. By the way, when the examiner leaves the room, don’t assume that you are alone. You may well be under observation from behind a two-way mirror. (If your polygrapher assures you that there is no one behind the mirror, you may rest assured that someone is.)

Depending on the number of issues being investigated, you may have more than one series of questions. For example, the FBI and U.S. Secret Service probable-lie pre-employment polygraph “tests” as well as the Department of Defense directed-lie polygraph screening “test” include two distinct series of questions.

The “Post-Test” Interrogation

If the examiner suspects you of deception (and sometimes not), he or she will confront you with the polygraph charts and seek to obtain a confession from you. Interrogation techniques vary, but typically, the polygraph examiner will ask you to explain why you reacted strongly to a particular question. If you have truly responded strongly to a relevant question, no explanation short of a confession or damaging admission is likely to suffice. If the examiner is just bluffing, your truthful denials will be adequate, the examiner’s doubts notwithstanding.
In trying to obtain an admission, your polygrapher may try the following approaches (Janniro, 1991):

• They didn’t bring me here to ignore my report. The test confirms that you haven’t been completely truthful. Your situation will only get worse if we don’t get this cleared up.
• The only thing that will help you now is to be completely truthful. When a person hides something or lies they usually regret it later on when the truth comes out… like it will in this situation.
• We’ve all been in situations when we withheld something or told a lie about something that didn’t seem too bad. But then, we had to tell another lie and another lie and another until the whole story fell apart.
• It is no longer an issue as to whether you did this or not. The only things left to discuss are why and how you got involved in this matter. In fact it is really an insult to my intelligence for you to tell me that you have been completely truthful here today.
• I promised that I would be honest with you here today [!] and you promised me the same thing. You and I both know that you haven’t been truthful now. I could respect you more if you just told me that you don’t know how to deal with this… that you don’t want to confess.
• If you were to show me a picture of someone close to you, I could never persuade you that it was someone else. These charts are like a picture of truth or deception and we can’t change them no matter what we say.
• A lie is like a cancer inside of you that eats away at you and never goes away until it is taken out. Then the body can get well.

The above-cited DoDPI report will make interesting reading for anyone facing polygraphic interrogation. Watch for it on AntiPolygraph.org.
Other Polygraph Formats

While we have discussed the “Control” Question “Test” in both its probable- and directed-lie versions, we should also mention some less common polygraph formats. These are not used in pre-employment polygraph screening, but are sometimes used in criminal investigations.

**Peak of Tension (POT) or Guilty Knowledge Test**

This kind of polygraph examination depends on the polygrapher having knowledge of details of a crime that a suspect should also know only if he is guilty. For example, in the case of an assassination, a suspect could be asked: if you were the trigger man, you should know what kind of ammunition was used. Was it:

- a) a **nato**-standard 5.56mm round?
- b) a 7.62 x 39mm round?
- c) a .22 long rifle round?
- d) a 30-06 round?
- e) a 9mm semi-jacketed hollow point round?

It is expected that the guilty subject will physiologically respond when asked about the ammunition he used in the assassination. Professor Lykken describes the Guilty Knowledge Test, which is based on sounder theoretical principles than the “Control” Question “Test,” in chapters 20 and 21 of *A Tremor in the Blood*.

**Searching Peak of Tension (SPOT) “Test”**

When certain information would be known only to a guilty subject but not to an innocent subject or the polygrapher, then a polygrapher might resort to a Searching Peak of Tension “test.” A government employee suspected of espionage might be asked:

Did you commit an act of espionage for Russia?
Did you commit an act of espionage for China?
Did you commit an act of espionage for Israel?
Did you commit an act of espionage for France?
Did you commit an act of espionage for North Korea?

If your responses among the questions are relatively equal, the examiner will probably regard you as truthful. If one question elicited a noticeably stronger response, the examiner will suspect that you lied when answering that question.

*Relevant/Irrelevant “Test”*

In this format, as the name suggests, the polygrapher compares the subject’s responses while answering the relevant questions with responses while answering irrelevant questions. Although the Relevant/Irrelevant “test” has largely been supplanted by the “Control” Questions “Test,” the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute still teaches this polygraph “test” format.
CHAPTER FOUR
Polygraph Countermeasures

Tis No Deceit to Deceive the Deceiver
—title of a play by Henry Chettle, 1598

Dr. Gordon H. Barland of DoDPI has defined countermeasures as “deliberate techniques that deceptive subjects use in an attempt to appear non-deceptive when physiological responses are being monitored during a PDD [psychophysiological detection of deception] examination.”

We will adopt a broader definition than Dr. Barland, and define polygraph countermeasures as simply “deliberate techniques that may be used to ‘pass’ a polygraph interrogation.” While deceptive persons may choose to employ countermeasures in order to appear non-deceptive, truthful persons may also choose to use them to protect themselves against a false positive outcome.

In this chapter, we will discuss three basic methods for protecting yourself against a false positive outcome:

1. refusal to submit to polygraph interrogation;
2. complete honesty;
3. polygraph countermeasures.

Just Say No
The surest approach to avoid a false positive outcome is to refuse to submit to polygraph interrogation. However, this approach may have serious adverse consequences. If you refuse to submit to a polygraph screening interrogation, you may be denied employment, and if already employed, you may lose your job.

If, however, you stand accused of a crime, “just say no!” You have little to gain and much to lose: if you “pass,” the police may well continue to suspect you regardless; if you “fail,” it will only confirm their suspicions. As John A. Larson, a pioneer of polygraphic lie detection lamented:

I originally hoped that instrumental lie detection would become a legitimate part of professional police science. It is little more than a racket. The lie detector, as used in many places, is nothing more than a psychological third-degree aimed at extorting confessions as the old physical beatings were. At times I’m sorry I ever had any part in its development.\textsuperscript{3}

In refusing to submit to polygraphic interrogation, you may additionally use the “complete honesty” approach described below.

**Complete Honesty**

A second approach is to be completely honest with your polygrapher. Tell him that you know the lie behind the lie detector. Explain to him that you understand that the true purpose of the “stim test” is to dupe you into believing in the validity of polygraphic lie detection. Tell him that you understand the trickery behind “control” question “tests”—whether probable- or directed-lie. Explain that you understand the difference between “control,” relevant, and irrelevant questions and that you have studied and know how to employ polygraph countermeasures. Give him a printout of this book to prove it in a way that he will not be able to later deny. Explain to him that you are not a suitable candidate for polygraphic interrogation, and request that your polygraph “testing” be waived.

One of the authors of this book knows of a Department of Defense employee whose polygraph screening was waived when he explained...
to his polygrapher that he understood how polygraph “tests” work and that he had received training in how to defeat them.

If everyone who reads this book were to use this approach, it would force the agencies that are using polygraphy against their employees and prospective employees—as well as the elected representatives who have sanctioned it—to confront the plain truth that the lie behind the lie detector has been exposed. It would quickly spell the end for polygraphy.

But beware! While the Wizard of Oz may have meekly admitted to being a humbug once the curtain was drawn aside and his humbuggery laid bare, your polygrapher might not be so accommodating. One graduate of DoDPI has cautioned that if a subject were to follow this “complete honesty” approach, the polygrapher would probably go ahead with the polygraph interrogation anyhow and arbitrarily accuse the subject of having employed countermeasures. Maureen Lenihan is a case in point. She worked as a research assistant with the federal Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, also known as the “Moynihan Commission.” She later applied for employment with the CIA. She explained to her CIA polygrapher that she had researched polygraphy while working with the Commission. The polygrapher proceeded with the interrogation anyhow, and later accused her of having employed countermeasures. (Weiner, 1999)

We believe that the ethically preferable choice for those facing polygraph interrogation is to either refuse to submit or to use the “complete honesty” approach (or both). But we are also aware that these two choices may entail serious adverse consequences.

We believe that it is not unethical for truthful persons—faced with a government that routinely lies to and deceives its employees and prospective employees through the polygraph screening pro-
cess—to employ polygraph countermeasures to protect themselves against a false positive outcome.

Polygraph Countermeasures: How to Pass a Polygraph “Test”

(First, if you haven’t read Chapter 3, go back to page 41 and read it carefully.)

The key to “passing” a polygraph “test”—that is, to producing a “truthful” chart—is to produce stronger physiological responses when answering the “control” questions than when answering the relevant questions.

We Americans have a thriving folklore about how to beat a polygraph “test.” You may have heard that you can pass by taking drugs such as meprobamate, by rubbing antiperspirant on your fingertips, or through meditation or hypnosis, or by wiggling your toes, or flexing your arms, or coughing. Forget these. They are prescriptions for failure.

Perhaps the most widely-known countermeasure is the old tack-in-the-shoe. While this countermeasure (if properly applied) can be effective, polygraphers have developed counter-countermeasures for it (the simplest being to simply make the subject remove his shoes).

Read on to learn how to pass your polygraph interrogation.

Two Types of Countermeasures

There are two basic types of polygraph countermeasures: behavioral and chart-recording manipulation. Behavioral countermeasures are those things that you can do to appear honest and truthful to your polygrapher, while chart-recording manipulations are those countermeasures that will actually affect the physiological responses measured by the polygraph instrument. We will discuss both types, beginning with behavioral countermeasures.
Make No Admissions

Rule number one is to make no admissions! While the lie detector cannot detect lies (it only records physiological responses), any admissions you make will be duly noted by your polygrapher. Admissions that may seem minor to you can be spun out of all proportion by your polygrapher. He sees admissions as trophies. Don’t give him any.

The only exceptions to this rule are that, during the “pre-test” interview, you may make minor admissions regarding the “control” questions only, such as stealing candy when you were a child, or lying to your parents, or taking pens home from work. But go no further.

In addition, if you are submitting to a directed-lie “control” question “test” such as the TES format used by the Departments of Defense and Energy, you should not stubbornly deny having ever committed one of the common human failings used in the directed-lie “control” questions such as violating a traffic law, or having told a lie, even once in your life, etc. (See p. 59 for a list of common directed-lie “control” questions.)

Polygraph “Tests” are Interrogations

Your polygraph “test” is actually an interrogation. Even if you have not been accused of anything specific but instead face polygraph screening, you must never forget that your polygraph “test” is actually an interrogation.

Some security officials are fond of the quip, “In God we trust—all others we polygraph.” Don’t you make the mistake of trusting your polygrapher. Some will be friendly, others confrontational. Some will regard you as a criminal suspect, while others will expect you to pass (especially when large numbers of employees are screened). Other polygraphers will have decided to fail you before the polygraph interrogation even begins.
Your polygrapher may very well be polite, pleasant-mannered, and congenial, but he is also a trained interrogator who understands that he may at first catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. He is not your friend. He is not there to “help” you. Be on your guard at all times.

**Make a Good First Impression**

Your polygrapher’s subjective opinion of you may influence the outcome of your polygraph interrogation. Look your best. Make sure you have a conservative haircut; dress professionally, polish your shoes. If you’re a woman, wear make-up, but not too much.

Be friendly. Smile. Keep good eye contact with your polygrapher, but don’t stare. Your polygrapher may interpret avoidance of eye contact as a sign of deception. Don’t mumble. Answer questions directly—with confidence and without hesitation—but be natural. You don’t want to appear like Data in “Star Trek: The Next Generation.”

**Arrive Early to Avoid Being Late**

The last thing you want to do is to arrive late for your polygraph interrogation. Your polygrapher may interpret your late arrival as a subconscious attempt to avoid the polygraph—heightening his suspicion of you even before he asks his first question. If the drive to the polygraph site will be in rush hour traffic or take more than an hour, you might want to get a hotel room near the “test” site the night before.

**A Warning to U.S. Secret Service Applicants**

If you are seeking employment with the U.S. Secret Service, your pre-employment polygraph “test” will probably begin in the morning and continue into the afternoon with no break for lunch. This
seems to be a deliberate psychological tactic designed to wear down applicants. Make sure to get a good breakfast.

**Remember, You Are Being Watched**

Be aware that from the moment you arrive for your polygraph interrogation, your polygrapher will be observing you. He will size you up based not only on what you say, but also on your appearance and demeanor. When you arrive early, you don’t want to be seen fidgeting in the waiting room, which, like the interrogation room itself, may be equipped with a two-way mirror. Bring something to read.

What you bring to read is also important, because it, too, will make a subtle impression on your polygrapher. Bring something like a professional journal, a magazine like *The Economist*, *Scientific American*, or the *New York Review of Books*, or a bestselling novel or professional book. Just make sure it’s something highbrow. Don’t bring a trashy dime novel or tabloid newspaper. And by all means, don’t bring anything remotely related to polygraphy! In addition, you might not want to bring one of the publications listed above—polygraphers who read this book might now become suspicious if you do. You want something that will subtly make a favorable impression on your polygrapher. (Clifton, 1991)

**The “Pre-Test” Interview**

Be polite and cordial. Answer your polygrapher’s questions directly, but remember to make no damaging admissions! In response to the “control” questions, you may admit to some minor childhood misdeeds. But in response to the relevant questions, you should make no admissions whatsoever. Any minor admissions you make regarding the relevant questions may be spun out of all proportion by your polygrapher.

Keep your answers short. Answer any yes/no questions with a simple “yes” or “no.” Avoid replies such as “yes, basically” or “not
really.” Such evasive answers will make you appear deceptive to your polygrapher. Don’t be chatty or palsy-walsy with your polygrapher. If you are overly talkative and ingratiating, your polygrapher may interpret this as a sign of anxiety—and hence deception. Moreover, he may use superfluous information you provide to fabricate an admission.

Mind Games

Your polygrapher/interrogator may play little games with you to establish his dominance. Upon entering the polygraph room, you should find that it is skillfully orchestrated for interviewing and interrogation. The room will be sparsely furnished, with a table for the polygraph instrument, a chair for the polygrapher, a chair for you to sit in while connected to the polygraph instrument, and, quite possibly, a third chair for you to sit in during the “pre-test” phase. Your chair for the “pre-test” interview will in all likelihood be stationary, while your polygrapher’s chair will probably be wheeled for his ease of movement, placing you at a psychological disadvantage.

Upon entering the room, you may find that the chair you are to sit in is facing the wrong direction or in the wrong location. By directing you to move the chair, your polygrapher may subtly demonstrate that he is in control.

Your polygrapher may instruct you to remove your coat and hand it to him, whereupon he will remove it from the room. He does this to make you feel as though you are being psychologically “stripped.” And by taking your coat out of the room, he wants you to feel that he now controls a piece of you.

Do not be intimidated by your polygrapher’s little mind games. Play along. Let your polygrapher think that he is in control.

“So What Do You Know About Polygraph Testing?”

At some point during the “pre-test” interview, your polygrapher will ask you what you know about polygraphy. Don’t get into an
argument with him about the validity of this voodoo science! Polygraphy is his profession, and if you question it, he will take offense (and be more likely to conclude that you are deceptive).

If you’ve been polygraphed before, you can mention it. But don’t tell your polygrapher that you’ve read this book or that you’ve done research on the Internet and visited such websites as AntiPolygraph.org, NoPolygraph.com, and StopPolygraph.com! If you admit to having researched polygraphy, your polygrapher will become suspicious. His next questions may well be, “Why have you educated yourself so much about polygraphs? Do you have something to fear from them?” Instead, provide a general answer to his question about what you know about polygraphy, such as:

- I heard on T.V. that they’re almost always accurate when used by a skilled examiner. Is that right?
- A friend of mine in law enforcement said not to worry, just go in and tell the truth, and you’ll have no problem!
- I understand that polygraphs are a lot more accurate than those voice stress analyzers. (Polygraphers generally hold the competing voodoo science of Computerized Voice Stress Analysis [cvsA] in utter contempt.)
- I read in the paper that the polygraph has been constantly improving with time, and that the latest computerized polygraphs are very reliable.
- When I was in grade school, a polygraph examiner came and gave a demonstration to my class and showed us how the test is done using my teacher as a volunteer. She lied about a card she had picked from a deck, and the polygraph examiner caught her lie and was even able to figure out exactly which card she had picked!
- I heard it caught O.J. in a lie! (Virtually no one in the polygraph community believes O.J. Simpson to be innocent of the murder of his ex-wife, Nicole.)
All of these answers show confidence in the validity of polygraphy, and are just the kind of thing your polygrapher wants to hear. Whatever answer you give, don’t memorize and repeat the above examples word-for-word. Polygraphers will be reading this book, too, and if something you say exactly matches something in this book, your polygrapher might notice! You may wish combine elements from any of the above examples with your own experience, or think of new examples on your own. And you can always fall back on ignorance: “I really don’t understand how polygraph tests work.”

**Want to Get Anything Off Your Chest? No!**

After he has reviewed with you the questions he’ll be asking, your polygrapher will give you the “opportunity” to get anything off your chest that may be “bothering” you. Don’t fall for it. Make no admissions.

**Chart-Recording Manipulations**

We will discuss chart recording manipulations to control both the breathing and cardio channels of the polygraph instrument. But before applying chart-recording manipulations, it is essential that you be able to distinguish “control” questions from relevant questions. (We discussed “control” questions in Chapter 3 at pages 51–60.) Review these pages if necessary. Note that in directed-lie formats such as the TES, your polygrapher will identify the “control” questions for you: they are the ones which he will instruct you to answer falsely.

**Breathing Countermeasures**

Your polygrapher will attach the polygraph’s electrodes to your ring and index fingers, the pressure cuff to your arm, and place one pneumograph tube around your chest and the other around your
abdomen. From the moment the pneumograph tubes go on, you need to be concerned about your breathing. Many people are falsely accused of attempting to “beat the box” because they (in the polygrapher’s opinion) breathe too deeply or too slowly or both.

Your polygrapher will be happy if your breathing rate is between about 15 and 30 breaths per minute, or 2–4 seconds each. Pick a breathing rate within this range that is comfortable for you and take shallow—not deep—breaths. Each breath should be about the same length and well-rounded, that is, the transition between breathing in and breathing out should be gradual and not sudden, as with panting. Practice until it becomes second nature.

You should maintain this baseline breathing pattern until the pneumograph tubes are removed from your chest and abdomen. Don’t relax and change your breathing pattern as soon as the last question has been asked! The polygraph is still recording your breathing, and your polygrapher may let the instrument continue recording your physiological responses for a minute or so after asking his last question in order to see if your breathing pattern changes. He may interpret any change after the last question is asked as an indication that you were employing countermeasures.

Your polygrapher will ask his series of questions, with a pause of about 20–30 seconds between questions. You will have already mentally categorized the questions he reviewed with you as “control”, relevant, or irrelevant during the “pre-test” interview. There will be no surprises. If you cannot decide whether a question is a “control” question, then you should err on the side of caution and consider it as relevant.

As soon as you recognize that the question your polygrapher is asking is a “control” question, or, alternatively, immediately after answering the question, change your baseline breathing pattern to produce one of the patterns described below. Polygraphers believe these changes in breathing indicate deception (Reid & Inbau, 1966),
and remember, you need to appear “deceptive” on the “control” questions to produce a “truthful” chart:

1. After answering the “control” question, hold your breath for 5–20 seconds, but no longer than the beginning of the next question. Williams (1996) cautions that while this breathing countermeasure is the easiest, it is also the least desirable.
2. After answering the “control” question, create a “staircase” suppression by breathing out more than you breathe in over several breaths.
3. After answering the “control” question, raise your respiration baseline by taking a deeper breath, then exhaling less than you breathed in, and then continuing to breathe while keeping the added reserve of air in your lungs. Maintain this elevated baseline for about 15–20 seconds, but no longer than the beginning of the next question.
4. Simply change your breathing pattern: breath more slowly, more quickly, or more deeply, either as soon as you recognize the question as a “control”, or as soon as you answer. Continue for 5–20 seconds after answering the “control” question, but resume your baseline breathing pattern by the beginning of the next question.
5. Breathe a “sigh of relief” after answering the “control” question.
6. Simply breathe erratically, either as soon as you recognize a “control” question or as soon as you answer it, and continue for 5–20 seconds.

Cardio Countermeasures

In addition to the breathing countermeasures described above, you can enhance your cardio (heart rate and blood pressure) response to the “control” questions with the following, additional countermeasures:
1. Constrict your anal sphincter muscle (anal pucker). (Lykken, 1998; Williams, 1996) Begin either as soon as you recognize a question as a “control” question, or right after answering the “control” question, and continue for 8–20 seconds, but no longer than the beginning of the next question. Make sure that it is only your anal sphincter that you contract. Be sure not to tighten your legs at the same time—there may be a strain gauge placed under the front legs of your chair. (Such strain gauges are included with many late-model computerized polygraphs, and are intended to alert the polygrapher to such countermeasures as the tack in the shoe, or pressing one’s toes to the floor. Those countermeasures are to be avoided.) Be sure not to flex your buttocks—some polygraph chairs may be equipped with sensors in the seat cushion. Be sure to constrict only the internal anal sphincter muscle. By sitting on your hand while you practice this countermeasure, you will be able to feel whether you are flexing other, external muscles.

2. Bite down slowly on your tongue. (Honts et al., 1985, 1994) Bite down hard enough to produce moderate pain, but don’t cut your tongue. Again, begin either as soon as you recognize a question as a “control” question, or right after answering the “control” question, and continue for 8–20 seconds, but no longer than the beginning of the next question. If you start biting as soon as you recognize the “control” question, you will of course pause long enough to answer the question, and then resume the tongue bite. Be subtle, your polygrapher mustn’t notice. You can practice this “pain countermeasure” in front of a mirror.

3. Think exciting thoughts, (e.g., falling off a cliff, an encounter with a rattlesnake, being raped at knifepoint—use your imagination). You want to think of something that will make your heart race and cause an increase in blood pressure. Thoughts
that require focused attention, such as quickly determining the square root of 223 in your head, etc., are also effective. Again, begin either as soon as you recognize a “control” question, or right after answering the “control” question, and continue for 8–20 seconds, but no longer than the beginning of the next question.

**Countermeasures and the “Stim Test”**

Don’t try to fool your polygrapher during the “stim test” (see pp. 44–46). Instead, by employing the breathing and cardio countermeasures you’ve learned to augment your physiological responses as you answer the question about the number you actually picked, you can make your polygrapher think that you really are a “screamer.”

**Practice Makes Perfect**

You should practice both the breathing and cardio countermeasures until you can employ them at will and with confidence. It would be wise to re-read Chapters 3 and 4 of this book several times.

**What About the Relevant Questions?**

You may naturally be upset at being asked accusatory questions such as “Did you leak that memo?” or “Have you committed an act of espionage against the United States?” Don’t worry. Just maintain your baseline breathing pattern. Your mind should be more at ease knowing that you—and not your polygrapher—are in control. Even if you produce a slight response when asked the accusatory relevant questions, you will have artificially produced stronger responses while answering the “control” questions.

**It’s Not Over Till It’s Over**

Remember to continue your baseline breathing pattern until the pneumograph tubes are removed from your chest and abdomen.
If you have correctly identified the “control” questions and applied the countermeasures described above, you should have produced a strongly “truthful” chart.

To Explain or Not to Explain

Responses to Relevant Questions

At some point in the “in-test” phase, your polygrapher may turn off the polygraph instrument, sit down in front of you, and tell you that a question is troubling you, and ask you if there is anything you would like to get off your chest before a repeat polygraph chart is done. This is a commonly-used bluff. Don’t fall for it.

If you have agreed against our advice to submit to a polygraph interrogation in a criminal investigation, then under no circumstances should you try to explain why you might have reacted to a question. Remember that any minor admissions you make at this point are likely to be blown out of proportion. Maintain your truthfulness politely, but firmly. “I told you the truth, nothing is bothering me about that question.”

If, however, you have submitted to a pre-employment or post-employment polygraph screening interrogation, then you should have some explanation prepared in advance that cannot be turned into a damaging admission, just in case your polygrapher tells you that one of the relevant questions really seems to bother you. If you refuse to offer any explanation at all as to why you might have reacted to a certain relevant question, then your polygrapher might interpret it as stonewalling and use his discretion to render an adverse opinion. Thus, you should appear concerned and puzzled as you offer a pre-planned explanation. Some examples of explanations that cannot be twisted into damaging admissions include:

• “All I can think of is that I’ve always felt guilty when I’m accused of something. When I was a kid, if my Dad asked me if I had done something bad or a teacher accused me of copying
someone else’s homework, even if I hadn’t, I’d get upset, and I just knew I looked guilty to them.”

• “The only thing that comes to mind is that I’m in the middle of reading a Tom Clancy novel which involves espionage/drug dealing.” (If you use an explanation like this, be prepared to name the book, and be sure you’re familiar with the story, just in case.)

• “I recently heard that an old childhood friend of mine died of a drug overdose. I hadn’t seen him in years. I never would have imagined that he would grow up to become a drug abuser. I couldn’t help thinking of him when you asked me the question about drug use.”

Don’t memorize and repeat any of the above explanations word for word! Again, polygraphers are likely to be reading this book, too, and if you repeat any of the above explanations verbatim, your polygrapher may catch on. Instead, have a couple explanations based on your own life experience handy before you go into your polygraph interrogation. If all goes well, you’ll never have to offer your explanations as to why you might have reacted to a relevant question.

If, however, your polygrapher remains unsatisfied after you have offered your explanation as to why you might have reacted to one of the relevant questions, then you should offer no further explanation. “I told you the truth. I can’t think of any other reason why I might have reacted when you asked that question.”

Don’t Stay for a “Post-Test” Interrogation

After you’ve gone through all the question repetitions, your polygrapher may attempt to subject you to a “post-test” interrogation. He may tell you that your charts show deception (even if, based on polygraph doctrine, they don’t), and that he can’t help you unless you admit to whatever it is that was bothering you. Again, don’t fall for this bluff. Your polygrapher is not there to “help” you. The sole purpose of the “post-test” interrogation is to obtain a confession or
damaging admission. If your polygrapher attempts a “post-test” interrogation, it is a good sign that you have already “failed.”

You have nothing to gain by remaining for this interrogation. Politely, but firmly, terminate the interrogation, and leave. “I told you the truth, but you say I’m lying. I don’t understand. I have nothing more to say to you. Good day.”

What If I’m Accused of Employing Countermeasures?

The countermeasures we’ve discussed produce physiological responses that are indistinguishable from those that polygraphers believe to be indicative of deception. But if the polygrapher (or his boss) was already suspicious of you before the polygraph interrogation, he may remain suspicious even after you produce a “truthful” chart. He may accuse you of having employed countermeasures, even though he can’t prove it.

This situation may be more likely if you have “failed” a polygraph interrogation in the past. Perhaps you are reading this book because you told the truth but “failed” a polygraph interrogation, and you want to make sure that you are not a false positive the second time. Your polygrapher will be biased against you based on the earlier polygraph chart reading, and may well be suspicious when you pass your second polygraph interrogation with flying colors.

Your polygrapher might try the following bluff in an attempt to get you to admit to employing countermeasures. He’ll turn off the polygraph, disconnect the pneumograph tubes, arm cuff, and electrodes, pull up a chair knee-to-knee with you, look you dead in the eye, and in a calm voice declare, “I know what you’re doing.” (London & Krapohl, 1999) Alternatively, your polygrapher may appear angry or offended as he delivers his bluff. Don’t fall for it!

If your polygrapher attempts this bluff with you, you should appear to be confused, “I don’t understand. I told you the truth. What’s the problem?” Remember the first rule we discussed at the beginning of this chapter: make no admissions! And the most damaging ad-
mission you could possibly make (in your polygrapher’s mind) is that you employed countermeasures.

**An Anecdote**

During the Department of Energy’s public hearings on polygraph policy (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999b), Dr. Gordon H. Barland, who is in charge of countermeasures training at DoDPI, attempted to convince his audience of scientists and engineers that nowadays, polygraphers are able to detect countermeasures such as those we’ve discussed in this book:

> We now are training our examiners how to detect people who are trying to manipulate their results, and we have learned a lot about how people go about doing that.

Earlier this year we published a case where Doug Williams had given information to a person on how to beat the polygraph, but he was not successful. But Dr. Barland forgot to mention that the person “was not successful” because he admitted to having employed polygraph countermeasures! Had he not made this admission, he would have “passed.”

DoDPI itself uses Doug Williams’ manual, “How to Sting the Polygraph” in its countermeasures training. (Mr. Williams has granted DoDPI permission to make copies free of charge.) No one at DoDPI has come up with a reliable method for detecting these countermeasures, and Dr. Barland’s misleading statement before an audience of top-notch atomic scientists and engineers is testimony to the polygraph community’s consternation over polygraph countermeasures.

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Douglas Williams is a former police polygrapher who has been teaching people how to produce “truthful” polygraph charts for more than twenty years. The method he teaches in his tutorial, “How to Sting the Polygraph” (Williams, 1996) is consistent with what you’ve read in this book.

If DoDPI had indeed developed a reliable method for detecting polygraph countermeasures, one would expect that instead of discouraging countermeasures attempts, DoDPI would keep mum and give special scrutiny to those caught employing countermeasures. Instead, Dr. Barland tried to scare his audience with misleading information.

**Keep Notes!**

As soon as your polygraph interrogation is over, take detailed notes for your personal records. You might take a portable tape recorder with you for this purpose and leave it in your car, briefcase, or purse. Often, you will not be told whether you passed or failed before you leave. If you have employed the methods described in this book, you should have handily passed. But you may have made a mistake. Or your polygrapher may have decided even before asking his first question that you are not going to pass. In the event you are later told you failed or that your results were inconclusive, your contemporaneous notes will be of great importance.
CHAPTER FIVE
Grievance Procedures

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

—United States Constitution, Amendment I

...when we assumed the soldier we did not lay aside the citizen.

—George Washington

Speak truth to power.

—Old Jewish tradition

If you have read this book prior to your polygraph interrogation, you should not need to contest your polygraph results. However, if your first exposure to this book comes after you have already submitted to and “failed” a polygraph “test,” read this section carefully. If your polygrapher accuses you of being deceptive, there are several steps you can take to maximize the utility of what little protest process currently exists.

Start Keeping Records

Immediately after your polygraph interrogation ends, start to compile a detailed “Memorandum for Record.” You may initially make handwritten notes or use a tape recorder, but you are better off copying these to a word processor file if you have a computer: it’s easier to add to and edit this way. Start off with the place you took the exam, the examiner’s name, and the date. Write down every detail you can remember about the polygraph “test”—no matter how insignificant it may seem at the time. Begin with the questions you were asked, and which ones the polygrapher accused you of being deceptive
on. Also, be sure to include any derogatory comments made by the examiner, questionable and/or abusive tactics, etc. Be sure to start this memo the day of the exam—not the next morning when you may have forgotten details. Keep this document nearby so that you can add to it during the following days when you may recall details that slipped your mind. Having an accurate record will be crucial to almost anything you do in attempting to clear your name.

Write a Letter of Protest

The next step is to send a letter to the Director of the agency for which you took the exam maintaining your innocence and requesting a “re-test.” This letter, like any further correspondence you may have with the agency must be sent out by certified mail, return receipt requested. These provisions amount to substantial proof that your letter was sent and received. Many agencies, especially federal ones, tend not to respond to letters from applicants who have failed the polygraph. Write again if you do not receive a timely reply.

The following are the names and addresses of the directors of the three federal agencies most known for rejections based on polygraph exams, and are current as of September 2000:

Drug Enforcement Agency

MR. DONNIE R. MARSHALL
ADMINISTRATOR
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
700 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON VA 22202
Federal Bureau of Investigation
MR. LOUIS J. FREEH
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
J. EDGAR HOOVER BUILDING
935 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON DC 20535-0001

United States Secret Service
MR. BRIAN L. STAFFORD
DIRECTOR
US SECRET SERVICE
950 H STREET NW
WASHINGTON DC 20001

Report Abusive Behavior
If your polygrapher exhibits abusive behavior or inappropriate language, file a report with the appropriate office. For example, in the case of the FBI, you can file a report with the Bureau’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) or with the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Justice, addresses for which are provided below. These venues are particularly powerful because these groups must investigate—they may not simply dismiss a complaint out of hand.

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FBI HEADQUARTERS
J. EDGAR HOOVER BUILDING, ROOM 11861
925 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW
WASHINGTON DC 20535
(202) 324-3370
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
950 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW, SUITE 4706
WASHINGTON DC 20530-0001

File a Freedom of Information Act Request

If your polygraph exam was for a position with the federal government, it is wise to request any records that the agency you took the exam for is keeping under your name. These records may now contain erroneous information that it is in your interest to learn about and attempt to correct.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), enacted in 1966, provides that any person has the right to request access to federal agency records or information. All agencies of the United States Government are required to disclose records upon receiving a written request for them, except for those records that are protected from disclosure by the nine exemptions and three exclusions of the FOIA. More information regarding the FOIA may be found on the Department of Justice website at:


Keep in mind that the FOIA applies only to federal agencies. If your polygraph was with a state or local agency, check your local laws. Each state has its own public access laws that should be consulted.

FOIA requests must be in writing (once again, send everything certified mail, return receipt). See Appendix B for a sample FOIA request. Although the FOIA mandates that a government agency must make a determination on a request within 20 working days of receipt (which may be extended by an additional 10 working days), many agencies routinely fail to comply with the requirements of the FOIA. Agencies frequently take months or even years to make a determination on requests for materials regarding polygraph examinations. Sometimes, agencies never respond at all. You may receive
a more prompt response if you submit your FOIA request through an attorney, or through one of your elected representatives. These requests are known to be taken far more seriously than requests from “ordinary” citizens.

Here are some general guidelines for FOIA requests, taken from the U.S. Secret Service web site:

1. a request for records shall be made in writing, signed by the person making the request, and stating that it is made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552;
2. the request shall identify whether the requester is an educational institution, non-commercial scientific institution or representative of the news media subject to fee provision described in Section 1.7;
3. the request must be addressed to the component that maintains the record. Both the envelope and the request itself should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Request”;
4. the request must reasonably describe the records;
5. the request must set forth an address where the person making the request wants to be notified about whether or not the request will be granted;
6. the request must state whether the requester wishes to inspect the records or desires to have a copy made and furnished without first inspecting them;
7. the request must state a firm agreement of the requester to pay the fees for duplication, search and/or review as may ultimately be determined in accordance with Section 1.7 or request that such fees be reduced or waived and state the justification for such request.

Below are the addresses to which to send FOIA requests to the three federal agencies best known for rejecting applicants based on false positive polygraph results and the Department of Energy. Web links for further information are also included. This information is current as of September 2000.
Department of Energy

http://www.hr.doe.gov/es/foia.htm

Requests for doe records should be sent to:

FOIA OFFICER
US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
1000 INDEPENDENCE AVENUE SW
WASHINGTON DC 20585

Drug Enforcement Agency

http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/index.html

Requests for dea records should be sent to:

KATHERINE L. MYRICK, CHIEF
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS UNIT
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
700 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON VA 22202
(202) 307-7596

Federal Bureau of Investigation

http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/index.html

Requests for fbi records should be sent to:

JOHN M. KELSO, JR., CHIEF
FOIPA SECTION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
935 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON DC 20535-0001
(202) 324-5520
**United States Secret Service**

http://www.treas.gov/usss/index.htm?foia.htm&1

Requests for Secret Service records should be sent to:

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST**

U.S. SECRET SERVICE
950 H STREET, NW
SUITE 3000
WASHINGTON DC 20001

**Keep in mind…**

Fees: For information requested for a private, non-commercial purpose, fees are charged for record searches and photocopying. There is no charge for the first two hours of search time and the first 100 pages of photocopying. The Justice Department (FBI and DEA) assumes that you are willing to pay up to $25.00. If they estimate that providing the records will cost more, they will contact you in writing before providing them. The Treasury Department (Secret Service) requires you to state in a FOIA request the amount that you are willing to pay. A good idea is to state that you are willing to pay fees up to $50.00 for any FOIA request, regardless of the agency from which you are requesting it. Request that the agency contact you if costs will be higher.

Describing the Records: Describe your records as broadly as possible to prevent the agency from withholding something because you were too specific in your descriptions. A good idea is to request any and all information about yourself including but not limited to:

1. Your application for employment with the agency;
2. Oral interview evaluation notes and ranking;
3. Polygraph charts and audio/video tapes (if the examination was taped);
4. Polygraph examiner written reports and evaluations;
5. All other documentation regarding your application;
6. All information maintained in [the agency’s] files about you;
7. All information that [the agency] may have entered into a
database about you, regardless of whether or not that database
is directly maintained by [the agency].

See Appendix B for a sample FOIA request letter.

Notarization: your request must be notarized because it is for Privacy
Act information. This service is available at most banks.

Write Your Elected Representatives

Write your congressman and senators, explaining what happened
and how you were treated. Inform them of the AntiPolygraph.org,
NoPolygraph.com, and StopPolygraph.com web sites. Urge them
to introduce legislation removing the governmental exemption to
the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act. To find the mailing
addresses for your representatives, go to:

http://www.house.gov
http://www.senate.gov

Also, write Senator Charles Grassley and the members of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts. Senator Grassley is the chairman of this
subcommittee, which is responsible for the oversight of federal law
enforcement agencies, and he has expressed interest in this issue.

Mailing addresses for members of this subcommittee may be found
at:

http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/aoc/test.htm

In addition, write to your state legislators, and urge them to ban
polygraph screening at the state level. The Minnesota polygraph
statute provided in Appendix C a good model for other states to
follow.
Investigate Legal Action

Currently, little recourse is available to false positive victims of pre-employment polygraph exams. Governmental agencies are exempt from the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act (eppa). Few, if any, laws regulate polygraphers and their conduct. However, as of September 2000, one noteworthy legal challenge to pre-employment polygraph screening is pending.

On 15 March 2000, noted Washington, DC attorney Mark S. Zaid filed a lawsuit against the dea, fbi, and Secret Service in Federal District Court on behalf of applicants who were rejected solely on the basis of polygraph results. (Zaid, 2000) This lawsuit is based on 5th amendment grounds, arguing that the applicants were denied due process. For further information about the lawsuit, contact Mr. Zaid at <ZaidMS@aol.com>.

Post Your Experience on the Internet

Exercise your 1st Amendment right to free speech by publicly exposing polygraph waste, fraud, and abuse. Post an account of your experience on-line at AntiPolygraph.org, NoPolygraph.com, or StopPolygraph.com. Your silence only plays into the hands of those who have abused you. The webmasters of these non-profit sites are polygraph victims themselves, and are eager to post the accounts of others who have been wronged because of our government’s reliance on unreliable polygraphy. They are willing to post your story anonymously if you so desire.
Afterword

The whole process smacks of 20th century witchcraft…

—Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

In the preceding chapters, you have seen that polygraphy is not science, that it depends on trickery, that it is biased against the truthful, and that deceptive persons can and have easily defeated it through countermeasures. Our reliance on unreliable polygraphy is a danger to our national security.

What is to be done about this danger? The answer is simple: polygraphy must be abolished. Although Congress banned most compulsory polygraph “testing” in the private setting through the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) in 1988, our Government’s own polygraphers continue to operate with impunity.

On the state level, Minnesota’s antipolygraph law (Appendix C) is an excellent model for other states to follow. This legislation prevents any employer (including state and local government entities) from even requesting that an employee or candidate for employment submit to any “test” purported to determine truth or deception (this covers the polygraph, CVSA, and any new “lie detection” methods that may crop up). Even if an employee requests such a “test,” the employer must inform him/her that the “test” is voluntarily. Moreover, the law establishes criminal as well as civil penalties for those who violate it.

On the federal level, the 1988 EPPA contains a fatal flaw: a carte blanche exemption for Government. Congress must enact a new EPPA with no exemptions.

Our legislators should not stop at preventing future harm. They must also act to repair the harm that has already been done. Agencies that have relied on pseudoscientific polygraphy must be compelled to expunge from Government records all derogatory “information” developed through polygraphy.
Candidates for employment whose applications were terminated as a result of polygraph “testing” should have their applications reinstated. To safeguard both our nation and the reputations of its citizens, we must rely upon real background investigations—not the voodoo science of polygraphy.

Let us leave this 20th century witchcraft in the 20th century. *Polygraphy must be abolished.* 🌟
APPENDIX A

Modified General Question “Test”

The Modified General Question “Test” (MGQT) is a common probable-lie “Control” Question “Test” format. The examiner compares your reaction to the “control” or comparison question with your reaction to the relevant question. Irrelevant questions serve as buffers and are not scored. Norman Ansley, former chief of the NSA’s polygraph unit, in an article published in the American Polygraph Association quarterly, Polygraph, (Ansley, 1998) publicly disclosed the precise question sequence of both FBI’s and DoDPI’s versions of the MGQT.

Those who may wish to employ countermeasures to protect themselves against a false positive outcome should be aware that knowing the question order is no substitute for knowing how to recognize the different types of questions (relevant, irrelevant, and “control”) on the fly.

MODIFIED GENERAL QUESTION TECHNIQUE (MGQT)
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1985

1. Irrelevant
2. Irrelevant
3. Relevant (Did you participate …)
4. Irrelevant
5. Relevant (Did you …)
6. Comparison question
7. Irrelevant
8. Evidence connecting relevant (Is that you in the photograph?)
9. Relevant (Are you lying to me about anything …)
10. Comparison question

Mixed series for third chart is: 4-1-9-6-2-3-10-5-6-8-10.
MODIFIED GENERAL QUESTION TECHNIQUE SUMMARY
(MGQT TEST)
DoD Polygraph Institute, 1989

1. Irrelevant
2. Irrelevant
3. Relevant (plan, help, participate)
4. Irrelevant
5. Relevant (Did you …)
6. Comparison question
7. Irrelevant
8. Evidence connecting relevant
9. Relevant (Do you know who, knowledge …)
10. Comparison question

Mixed series for third chart: 4-1-5-6-3-10-9-6-8-10.

The CIA also uses the MGQT. London & Krapohl (1999) describe the pre-employment polygraph interrogation of a high-priority applicant for an “undisclosed” federal agency, known to be the CIA. The polygraph format used is identified in the article as the MGQT. The article provides charts for the 1st and 2nd question series, the order of which is:

1. Irrelevant
2. Irrelevant
3. Relevant
4. Irrelevant
5. Relevant
6. Comparison
7. Irrelevant
8. Relevant
9. Comparison

Note that in all three variations of the MGQT (FBI, DoDPI, and CIA), each “control” or comparison question immediately follows a relevant question.
APPENDIX B
Sample FOIA Request Letter

[name]
[address]
[telephone number]

Freedom of Information Act Request
[agency name]
[agency address]

Dear Sir or Madam:

Under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552), I hereby request any and all information about me including but not limited to:

1. My application for employment with the [agency name];
2. Oral interview evaluation notes and ranking;
3. Polygraph charts and audio tapes;
4. Polygraph examiner written reports and evaluations;
5. All other documentation regarding my application;
6. All information maintained in [agency name] files about me;
7. All information that [agency name] may have entered into a database about me, regardless of whether or not that database is directly maintained by [agency name].

My Social Security number is [social security number]. I agree to pay fees of up to $50 for materials responsive to this request. Please inform me first if the cost will be greater. However, I request that fees be waived, because I am not requesting these materials for a commercial purpose.

Sincerely,

[signature]
[name]
APPENDIX C

Minnesota Polygraph Statute

Chapter 181 Section 75 of the Current Minnesota Statutes (1999 edition) should serve as a model for other states:

181.75 Polygraph tests of employees or prospective employees prohibited.

Subdivision 1. Prohibition, penalty. No employer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly solicit or require a polygraph, voice stress analysis, or any test purporting to test the honesty of any employee or prospective employee. No person shall sell to or interpret for an employer or the employer’s agent a test that the person knows has been solicited or required by an employer or agent to test the honesty of an employee or prospective employee. An employer or agent or any person knowingly selling, administering, or interpreting tests in violation of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. If an employee requests a polygraph test any employer or agent administering the test shall inform the employee that taking the test is voluntary.

Subd. 2. Investigations. The department of labor and industry shall investigate suspected violations of this section. The department may refer any evidence available concerning violations of this section to the county attorney of the appropriate county, who may with or without such reference, institute the appropriate criminal proceedings under this section.

Subd. 3. Injunctive relief. In addition to the penalties provided by law for violation of this section, specifically and generally, whether or not injunctive relief is otherwise provided by law, the courts of this state are vested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this section and to require the payment of civil penalties. Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the attorney general that this section has been or is being violated, the attorney general shall be entitled, on behalf of the state, to sue for and have injunctive relief in any court of competent jurisdiction against any such violation or threatened violation without abridging other penalties provided by law.
Subd. 4. Individual remedies. In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of this section may bring a civil action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court. The court may, as appropriate, enter a consent judgment or decree without a finding of illegality.
Bibliography

This bibliography includes works cited in this book in addition to some works not cited which may be of interest to those wishing to learn more about polygraphy.

  The author is a psychophysiologist who requests that his name be withheld.


http://www.nopolygraph.com/examiner.htm

Although SA Byford is not identified as the author of this e-mail on the above-referenced page, his identity and the date of his e-mail message are made clear at para. 56 of attorney Mark S. Zaid’s polygraph lawsuit. (Zaid, 2000)

http://cbsnews.cbs.com/row/story/0,1597,157220-412,00.shtml


While the author’s treatment of polygraph chart-recording manipulations is entirely inadequate, his discussion of behavioral countermeasures is good. Chapter 6 (The Day of the Test) provides excellent advice on how to make a good impression on, and develop rapport with, a polygraph examiner. See also Appendix A (Polygraph Dos and Don’ts) and Appendix B (Polygraphers’ Favorite Verbal Ploys).


This report provides the protocol only for a validity study. Appendix I of this report explains how the polygrapher is to conduct
the interrogation, including the psychological manipulations (deceptions) involved.


From both a scientific and an applied psychophysiological point of view, the related but different ideas of using physiological measures to differentiate and detect deception are of considerable potential interest. This paper’s primary concern is with psychophysiological detection, and it is mainly focussed on the North American “Control” Question “Test” (cqt). The treatment is disinterested in the sense that there is an insistence on employing fundamental terms in a logically consistent way. Following a detailed description of the cqt, and an analysis of it and related psychophysiological deception procedures, it is suggested that, by and large, the North American research psychophysiological community has failed to measure up to the standards of disinterestedness with respect to the psychophysiological detection of deception. Instead it has adopted an uninterested perspective, which has allowed the interested community of professionals who employ the cqt to hood-wink both themselves and others (including the American Psychological Association) that the cqt is a controversial, but scientifically-based, test for detecting deception. As the most cognate organization, the international psychophysiological research community needs to take a more active and disinterested role in this salient purported application of psychophysiology—the detection of deception.

The entire article is available on-line at:

http://psych.utoronto.ca/~furedy/napoly.htm


Effects of physical countermeasures on the accuracy of the control question test (CQT) were assessed in two laboratory mock-crime experiments. In Experiment 1, 21 male and 27 female college students were divided into four groups, three of which enacted a mock crime. Two of these guilty groups were trained in the use of a countermeasure, either biting the tongue (pain countermeasure) or pressing the toes against the floor (muscle countermeasure) during the control question zones of the CQT. All countermeasure subjects were given extensive information about the nature of the CQT. No significant effects for countermeasures were found. Experiment 2 assessed the effects of additional training and the concurrent use of both countermeasures with 31 female and 26 male college students who were divided into three groups, two of which enacted a mock crime. Countermeasures subjects produced 47% false negatives as compared to 0% false negatives for Guilty Control subjects. False negative outcomes occurred when subjects were able to produce physiological responses that were larger to control questions than to relevant questions. These results should be qualified by the possibility that the countermeasure task would be considerably more difficult if the relevant questions dealt with a real crime in an actual investigation. Countermeasure detectors, counter-countermeasures, and the implications of these results for the probative value of the CQT are discussed.

In the first experiment, subjects received a maximum of only 15 minutes of training. In the second experiment, a maximum of 30 minutes of training was provided, though subjects “were encouraged to practice their countermeasures at home.” Readers of *The Lie Behind the Lie Detector* will have significantly greater time and motivation to prepare themselves.
Most of the private-sector uses of the polygraph in the United States were eliminated by the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988. However, polygraph use by the federal government continues to grow unabated. The government uses polygraph tests in criminal investigations and in national security screening. All uses are controversial, but the screening uses are particularly so. In national security screening, polygraph tests are used both in the hiring process and with current employees. Polygraph tests used in the hiring process are without empirical support. Polygraphers’ claims of high utility on the basis of development of information during interrogations are suspect because information they develop has never been shown to be predictive of future behavior. Research and analyses conducted on the Department of Defense’s Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) Screening Program indicate that the polygraph tests used in that program are unable to discriminate truthtellers from deceivers. It appears that the CSP polygraph examinations correctly classify only about 2% of the guilty subjects. Effective countermeasures exacerbate this problem and may render the CSP Screening Program completely ineffective at detecting deception. Politically unpleasant changes that must involve calling a substantial number of innocent subjects deceptive are necessary if national security screening polygraphs are to be applied effectively.

The entire article is available on-line in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format (1 MB) at:

http://truth.boisestate.edu/raredocuments/ENC.html

Effects of countermeasures on the control-question polygraph tests were examined in an experiment with 120 Ss recruited from the general community. Ss were given polygraph tests by an examiner who used field techniques. Twenty Ss were innocent, and of the 100 guilty Ss, 80 were trained in the use of either a physical countermeasure (biting the tongue or pressing the toes to the floor) or a mental countermeasure (counting backward by 7) to be applied while control questions were being presented during their examinations. The mental and physical countermeasures were equally effective: Each enabled approximately 50% of the Ss to defeat the polygraph test. The strongest countermeasure effects were observed in the cardiovascular measures. Moreover, the countermeasures were difficult to detect either instrumentally or through observation.

In this experiment, the subjects received a maximum of 30 minutes of instruction and were polygraphed a week later. Again, readers of this book will have significantly greater time and motivation to prepare themselves.


The widespread use of polygraph (“lie detector”) tests has important social and individual consequences. Courts asked to admit polygraph findings into evidence, as well as individuals asked to submit to polygraph tests, have a natural interest in the acceptance by the relevant scientific community of the polygraph technique. For this reason, we conducted mail surveys to obtain the opinions of 2 groups of scientists from relevant disciplines: members of the Society for Psychophysiological Research and Fellows of the American Psychological Association’s Division 1 (General Psychology). Survey return
rates were high (91% and 74% respectively). Most of the respondents believed that polygraphic lie detection is not theoretically sound, claims of high validity for these procedures cannot be sustained, the lie test can be beaten by easily learned countermeasures, and polygraph test results should not be admitted into evidence in courts of law.

The entire article may be downloaded in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format (1 MB) at:


The protagonist of this thriller is a financially-strapped polygraph examiner who agrees to teach a criminal suspect how to pass a polygraph interrogation. Johansen’s treatment of polygraph countermeasures in Chapter 4 is largely accurate, including, especially, his account of the “anal pucker”. However, he also introduces the dubious method of taking up smoking to reduce palmar sweating. While those who wish to learn how to pass a polygraph “test” should not rely upon this novel, they may find it entertaining. In his acknowledgments, Johansen writes, “...I owe a debt of gratitude to the polygraph examiners I visited—and their complete inability to determine that I was lying to them.”

A post-Cold War examination of government security policies and practices. Chapter 4 addresses polygraphy and Appendix C provides a separate statement of Commissioner Lapham on polygraph policy. Available on-line at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/jsc/


“Peter S. London” is a pseudonym. While the main author is described only as “a federal polygraph examiner,” we can confirm that he works for the CIA. This article describes a case where an applicant for employment with the CIA admitted using polygraph countermeasures, and describes the bluff that the polygrapher (London) claims to have used to elicit the admission. This article also provides charts from the polygraph interrogation.

Lowe, Michael W. (1999) Affidavit. 9 April 1999. This affidavit was filed in support of a request for a warrant to search the home of Dr. Wen Ho Lee. Available on-line at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/lowe_affidavit.html

A must read for anyone interested in polygraphy. In this well-annotated book, Lykken discusses the history, theory, utility, validity, and social and legal implications of polygraphy. Chapter 2 takes the reader through a sample polygraph interrogation. Chapter 8 provides a detailed discussion of the “Control” Question “Test,” the most commonly-used polygraph format. Chapter 19 discusses polygraph countermeasures. Chapter 11 covers Voice Stress Analysis.

http://www.nopolygraph.com/mallah.htm

http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/maschke.html
Annotated critique of the polygraph screening format adopted by the Departments of Defense and Energy.

http://www.nopolygraph.com/tenenbaum-complaint.htm

http://www.nopolygraph.com/richardson-testimony.htm

in Effort to Oust Jewish Employee.” 9 April 1999. Available on-line at:


http://www.spse.org/Polygraph_Park.html


In their section on “deception responses” (p. 40 ff.), the authors provide details on the breathing responses described in this book, along with illustrations of pneumograph tracings.

http://www.nopolygraph.com/drewtest.htm

Dr. Richardson of the FBI laboratory division warned the Subcommittee that polygraph screening “is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity.” His warning has gone unheeded.


or in HTML format at:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/ota/index.htm


U.S. Department of Energy. (1999d) Transcript of public hearing on proposed polygraph regulation. Los Alamos National Lab-
oratory. 17 September 1999. Available on-line in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format at:


http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999_r/cox/


For sale on-line at:
http://www.polygraph.com

An excellent manual on how to pass a polygraph “test.” Explains the “Control” Question “Test” and how to apply countermeasures while answering the “control” questions. Provides practice question series. In addition, Mr. Williams provides consultation to customers by phone and/or e-mail.
http://www.nopolygraph.com/complaint.htm

On-line Resources

*American Polygraph Association*

Back issues of the APA quarterly *Polygraph* and other APA publications may be ordered from this site:
http://www.polygraph.org

*AntiPolygraph.org*

AntiPolygraph.org, the publisher of this book, is dedicated to abolishing polygraphy. Find out how you can help. Updated versions of *The Lie Behind the Lie Detector* will be made available here:
http://antipolygraph.org

*Federation of American Scientists Polygraph Resource Page*

Provides government documents as well as commentary on polygraphy:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/index.html

*NoPolygraph.com*

This site provides a wealth of information on polygraph screening, especially as used by the FBI, and has an active message board where visitors may post questions or share their experiences. Updated versions of *The Lie Behind the Lie Detector* will also be made available here:
http://www.nopolygraph.com
Polygraph for Screening
This web page maintained by Professor Charles R. Honts of Boise State University provides studies on polygraph screening in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format:

http://truth.boisestate.edu/raredocuments/screening.html

The Polygraph Place
A website run by polygraphers for polygraphers. Includes a message board, but that board is censored. Posts that openly reject the validity of polygraphy are deleted:

http://www.polygraphplace.com

Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers
Provides links to documents regarding the Department of Energy's polygraph screening program:

http://www.spse.org

Sting Publications
Doug Williams’ manual, “How to Sting the Polygraph” may be ordered via this website. Mr. Williams also provides a frequently asked questions list and testimonials from his customers:

http://www.polygraph.com

StopPolygraph.com
Provides documentation of polygraph abuse, especially by the U.S. Secret Service. Updated versions of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector will also be made available here:

http://www.stoppolygraph.com
About this book

This book was designed on an Apple Macintosh Quadra 800 with 88 megabytes of RAM running MacOS 8.1. Text was edited and formatted with Nisus Writer 5.1.3 from Nisus Software. The document was printed to a PostScript file from which an Adobe Acrobat file was produced using Acrobat Distiller 3.0. Main text is set in 12 on 14 Adobe Minion.