
WITH UNCERTAINTY IN CONGRESS ON
CMRR, PROJECT FACES MURKY FUTURE
Appropriators and Authorizers Take Different Views
on Multi-Billion-Dollar Project, So Who Wins?
The Obama Administration’s decision to defer work on
Los Alamos’ Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-
Nuclear Facility has divided Congress, pitting
Republicans against Democrats and appropriators against
authorizers—a debate which some Congressional staff and
industry officials say may leave uncertainties about the fate
of the project at the start of the fiscal year. But in spite of
the divergent views on the controversial project, the
National Nuclear Security Administration isn’t planning to
change course any time soon. In an interview with NW&M
Monitor, NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Neile
Miller said the agency was still on track to wrap up work
on the multi-billion-dollar project by the end of September
as it follows the lead of House and Senate appropriators,
both of which this spring supported the Administration’s
decision to delay the project for at least five years. “No one
gave us any money to do anything differently,” Miller told
NW&M Monitor.
Authorizers, though, in the House and Senate believe they
did chart a different path, and competing provisions in
Fiscal Year 2013 legislation regarding the multi-billiondollar
facility sets up a battle between the two arms of the
legislative branch that control the future of the NNSA. In
contrast to appropriators, the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees authorized varying levels of funds for
the project in FY2013 to keep the project moving. “If push
comes to shove, this is prescriptive in statute and it says ‘of
the funds authorized to be appropriated for NNSA,’ “ one
Congressional aide said, referring to provisions in the
Senate version of the Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Authorization
Act. “So they would have to obey the law.”
Perhaps not surprisingly, not everyone agrees, as has
become common in the case of CMRR-NF, which has
become a poster child for debate over the Obama Administration’s
plans to modernize the nation’s nuclear weapons
complex and arsenal. “The fact that there is chaos now
suggests there is a pretty reasonable expectation that at the
end of the year we’re still going to be awfully confused on
this matter,” one industry official told NW&M Monitor.
A Debate Over Priorities
The debate began almost immediately after the Administration
announced in February that tightening federal
budgets were forcing it to defer work on the facility for at
least five years. At an estimated cost between $3.7 and
$5.8 billion, the Administration said the facility was too
expensive to afford—and it had other options. The Administration
directed Los Alamos to wrap up the project by the
end of FY2012 to save progress on the project and study
the Administration’s alternative plan: using existing
facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the
Nevada National Security Site, and at Los Alamos to meet
the nation’s plutonium needs. Republicans immediately
seized on the decision as an example of the Administration
reneging on promises made during debate on the New
START Treaty to pour $88 billion into the weapons
complex over the next decade, but conscious of budgetary
pressures, appropriators in the GOP-led House and Democrat-
led Senate went along with the decision, redirecting
money that had been expected to go to the project for work
on the alternative plan.
The NNSA, in the meantime, defended the decision to
defer the project as a reflection of economic pressure rather
than a statement against the project. “We always said we
need CMRR. We still need CMRR,” Miller said. “We
believe given the budget situation the appropriate course
right now is to maintain the capability we need, make sure
we have the capability we need, and do it in a way that
allows us to fund the other stuff we need. If somebody can
figure out how to fund things with all of it with less than
we said we needed I am looking forward to hearing it.”
Authorizers Offer Competing Approaches
While rule of thumb on Capitol Hill typically gives the
edge on funding issues to the lawmakers that actually sign
the checks—the appropriators—Congressional aides have
suggested that the authorizers also could have a say on the
project this time around. Confusing the matter even
further, however, is the fact that the two authorizing
committees with jurisdiction over the NNSA took different
approaches to reviving the project. The Senate Armed
Services Committee matched the appropriators’ $7.6
billion funding level for the NNSA’s weapons program,
but authorized the agency to spend $150 million on the
project in FY2013, ordering the agency in bill language to
dip into other accounts to come up with the money. The
committee also placed a $3.7 billion cap on the project.
In contrast, the House-cleared version of the FY2013
Defense Authorization Act authorizes $7.9 billion for the
NNSA’s weapons program, including an extra $100
million for CMRR-NF and gives the agency the authority
to use another $160 million in unspent balances for the
project. It also would move the project out of the NNSA
and under the control of the Pentagon starting in FY2014,
which would also shift the project to the Military Construction/
Veterans Affairs Appropriations Subcommittee.
Underpinning the decisions by both authorizing committees
is a concern that the current alternative won’t allow
the NNSA to meet Defense Department requirements to
have the capability to produce 50 to 80 pits a year. “Both
HASC and SASC have, on a bipartisan basis, voted to
reverse President Obama’s proposal to renege on his
promise to build CMRR,” one Congressional aide said.
“CMRR is a means to an end. CMRR and other key
modernization projects are the implementation of a bipartisan
policy to build a ‘responsive infrastructure’—which,
let’s not forget, is the President’s own policy as described
in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.” The staffer said the
policy decision is “lost in the weeds” of the CMRR-NF
debate. “This is really about the plutonium-related capacity
and capability we need.”
So, Who Wins?
Budget experts suggest that the authorizers’ position is
quite tenuous. Richard Kogan, an expert with the nonpartisan
Center on Budgeting and Policy Priorities, said the
way House and Senate rules are set up tilts the scales
vastly in favor of appropriators. “In general the appropriators
win,” Kogan said. “And also in general whoever does
the final bill wins, and that’s almost always the appropriators
because they’re almost always wrapping up things in
an omnibus appropriations bill before Congress adjourns.”
Kogan suggested that authorizers could succeed by
inserting language—as the Senate Armed Services Committee
has done—that in effect “re-decides on the use of
that money within the appropriations account” after the
appropriation has been enacted. But he said such an
approach could run afoul of House and Senate rules if it
was deemed to be an attempt to appropriate money in an
authorization bill. “So there are lots of reasons to think that
the appropriators win,” he said.
Bill Hoagland, who was the top budget aide to former
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and served on
the staff of the Senate Budget Committee under Sen. Pete
Domenici (R-N.M.) from 1982 to 2003, suggested an
attempt to reprogram funds to circumvent appropriations
could run into its own hurdles. “The actual request for
reprogramming does come back to the appropriators,”
Hoagland said. “It would all depend on where you’re
reprogramming from, and whose ox is going to get gored.
It could work but you’re not taking the appropriators out
of the process completely.” Some Congressional aides
have suggested that because it is in bill language, if it is
enacted, approval from appropriators would not be needed.
Appropriators could get around the language, however, by
inserting language into their version of the bill barring
funds from being spent on the project on an annual basis.
That language isn’t currently in either of the bills, but it
could be added during conference negotiations. “That’s
their trump card,” Hoagland said.
Reprogramming, But at What Cost?
One weapons complex observer suggested that the approach
favored by Senate authorizers to force NNSA to
reprogram money for the project had additional pitfalls.
“That means you end up sacrificing a third or a quarter of
the lab population to build these things? They’re not going
to be allowed to do that during an election year. You can’t
take it out of hide. There isn’t the hide there. You can’t
create money.” Such an approach would put the NNSA in
a problematic position, the official said. “Which part of the
weapons program would you like to break? Each one of
them is pretty close to breaking. This budget pressed on
every single piece of it,” the official said. “They’ve taken
margin out of everywhere because they’re in bad shape.”
For the NNSA, at least thus far, the direction is clear.
“There is no project,” Miller said. “The President’s budget
didn’t propose the project for the next five year and the
appropriators, who are the ones that actually have the
money, have not told us, ‘By the way we put that money
in for you to do CMRR.’ If we had seen any signal like
that, I’m sure we would have to be sitting down and
thinking how do we handle this.”
—Todd Jacobson
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