Stockpile Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting Minutes
Pentagon, Room 3C912
Purpose: In concert with the NPR, evaluate the issues of maintaining confidence in the nuclear deterrent;
evaluate the risks in
our current assessment process and ways to reduce those risks, and the
current and planned infrastructure capacity and capability.
ATSD(NCB) – Dr. Klein, Chairman
STRATCOM - RADM Byrd
Joint Staff – RDML Walsh
OSD (P) - Dr. Payne
NNSA - Dr. Beckner
SAG - Dr. Burnett (advisor)
SSP Strategy & Risk Panel Chair– Brig Gen Haeckel (NNSA)
Future Arsenal Panel Chair – Dr. Hardebeck (STRATCOM)
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Chair – Mr. Beck (NNSA)
Strategy and Policy Panel Chair – Dr. Maaranen (OSD(P))
· Evaluate the DoD/NNSA Requirements process. Do we adequately identify requirements, and their priority in existing systems?
List of Attendees
Mr. Beck, NNSA
Dr. Burnett, SAG (Advisor)
Dr. Younger, DTRA
Ms. Montie, DTRA
Dr. Immele, LANL
Dr. Goldstone, LANL
Dr. McMillan, LLNL
Dr. Goodwin, LLNL
Dr. Beckner, NNSA
Brig Gen, Haeckel, NNSA
Dr. Maaranen, OSD(P)
Mr. Victory, OSD(P)
Mr. Celec, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Ms. Stoner, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Mr. Steinhoff, OSD/AT&L (NM) (NNSA)
Mr. Hatch, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Dr. Wolkerstorfer, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Mr. Wade, NNSA
Mr. Bentley, SNL/NNSA
Mr. Schoenbauer, NNSA
Ms Hood, OSD/AT&L (NM)
CAPT Manaskie, JS
Dr. Stichman, SNL
Brig Gen Smolen, AF/XON
Dr. Mullins, AF/XON
Dr. Hannah, Navy SSP
Mr. Williams, OSD(P) Consultant
Invited but did not attend:
RDML Walsh, JS
Dr. Harvey, NNSA
Dr. Payne, OSD(P)
Panels: Draft Topics Lists and Members
SSP Strategy and Risk Panel
(1) How well do we quantify risk in our current assessment of nuclear weapons [warheads and those aspects of the delivery systems that impact the risk associated with the warheads] in the stockpile?
(2) What existing, and new SSP tools coming on-line could provide enhanced capabilities to quantify and minimize performance risk both for the legacy stockpile, and potential new or modified weapons?
(a) What are the anticipated limits of the extent to which improved understanding of weapon physics is basis for confidence?
(b) In consideration of new weapons that might be needed in a post-NPR environment, are the tools we have the right ones or do we need to develop new tools?
(3) Are there stockpile performance issues that we cannot now or may not in the future be able to address fully, or for which developing SSP capabilities are less certain? What are the risk mitigation measures for these existing and potential gaps in our understanding?
(4) What can we do to strengthen the process for reducing the risk in assessing the military effectiveness of our current and future stockpile?
(a) What is the overarching strategy for managing risks in the SSP?
(b) Are there alternative (foreign) approaches to managing risks that should be examined?
(5) What is the role of nuclear testing in reducing risk in the stockpile? What parts of those risks are associated with the absence of nuclear testing, in comparison to the risk associated with a 150kt threshold or a low-yield test program? What is the uncertainty in confidence and potential risk threshold for a test recommendation---what would demand a test?
(6) Assess the following with regards to the certification infrastructure:
(a) What will be the impact on (5) of the operation of the NIF over the next 5 – 15 years? Similarly, what would be the impact of the operation of AHF in 10 –15 years?
(b) What are the demands on the capabilities and capacities of the Certification Infrastructure over time?
(c) At what level, over time, can the certification (also R&D assessment) infrastructure being develop and tested with current deliverables be transferable and agile for changing priorities?
(7) Do we need to change the rebuild strategy for QART consumed warheads?
(8) Is the current Annual Certification Process sufficient, or does it need to be modified to take into consideration political considerations regarding testing?
(9) What are the lessons we’ve learned since the Stockpile Stewardship Program began? In the decades when we were testing, tests sometimes revealed surprises. What have we learned from this?
SSP Strategy and Risk Panel Membership
John Birely SAG advisor
Future Arsenal Panel
(1) What are the warhead characteristics and advanced concepts we will need in the post-NPR environment?
(a) Establish methodology for making choices
(b) Strategy for selecting first “small builds”
(c) Requirements for low-yield weapons, EPWs, enhanced radiation weapons, agent defeat weapons
(d) Effects modeling capabilities to effectively plan for these weapons
(e) What forms of testing will these new designs require?
(f) What obvious weaknesses exist in our ability to attack targets and assess target damage for present and future targets and weapon systems?
(2) How do we link service-provided platform requirements for the arsenal?
(a) What is the testing strategy for weapons more likely to be used in small strikes?
(b) Does a requirement for higher confidence in small strikes drive larger test asset inventories?
(c) Hardness and compatibility of conventional and dual use platforms
(i) How do we institutionalize these requirements?
(d) Leverage on existing SAGSAT efforts on dual-use platforms
(e) Reliability requirements
(f) Other requirements (e.g. precision)
(3) Given the size and composition of the operationally deployed stockpile, are our assumptions correct as we size the stockpile? (Leverage on existing US STRATCOM and NWC work.)
(a) Reliability replacements
(b) Augmentation quantities
(4) Plans for modernization of delivery platforms
(a) Are these plans consistent with the SSP and NMMP?
(b) Is the LEP schedule tuned to DoD needs?
(5) Regarding guidance requirements and assumptions on availability of GPS:
(a) Is GPS, or other advanced systems, available for all plans or just special cases?
(b) Do we put GPS on all systems, or just a few?
Future Arsenal Panel Membership
George Miller SAG advisor
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel
[ Note from
(1) Assess the adequacy and robustness of assessment and planned capability and capacity at and NNSA design, assessment, test, and production sites and appropriate DoD facilities. Determine if the NNSA and DoD infrastructures are agile enough to support a ‘small build’ strategy. [Panel should look at DoD infrastructure where it impacts NNSA’s ability to do its tasking—flight testing, ranges, simulators, etc.]
(2) Examine the balance and flexibility between design, research and development, production, maintenance, and small builds.
(a) What is most stressing task?
(b) Are the required skill sets transferable and agile for changing priorities?
(c) Can we cover plausible unforeseen stockpile emergencies?
(d) What are the tradeoffs between maintenance of production capability/capacity and the supporting R&D base?
(3) Comment on the success of implementing the Chiles Commission Recommendations and on the health, experience, and training of design, engineering, and military staffs.
(4) What recommendations can be made as to how NNSA’s SSP and DoD’s programs can be better harmonized?
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel Membership
Tom Seitz SAG advisor
Strategy and Policy Panel
(1) The contribution of nuclear forces to each of the four principal defense goals: assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat
(2) The proper relationship of nuclear forces to the non-nuclear strike and missile defense elements of the Triad
(3) Qualitative differences in nuclear forces that may be needed to implement the strategy
(4) Policy guidance and policy issues that must be resolved to facilitate the necessary changes in nuclear forces and infrastructure
Reexamine the policy issues of the various levels of testing. Should the
(b) How do we frame the explanation of emerging policy to show the deterrent the value of reduced-collateral damage, precision, agent defeat, and penetrating nuclear capabilities in meeting our national security objectives?
(c) What should be the policy and process for granting authorities to adapt and build small quantities?
Strategy and Policy Panel Membership
Paul Robinson SAG advisor