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Study: U.S. underestimates peril if Los Alamos were to leak plutonium

Jul 10, 2026

  • By Alicia Inez Guzmán The New York Times

The U.S. Energy Department has underestimated the potential deadly consequences should plutonium escape Los Alamos National Laboratory, which produces bomb cores for America’s nuclear weapons, a study published Friday by independent scientists found.

The chances of a leak are considered minuscule. But one is possible, especially following a natural disaster like an earthquake. Plutonium could escape from protective work stations inside a building called Plutonium Facility 4, or PF-4, and ignite. Then, if one or more of the building’s safety systems fail, radioactive plutonium particles could enter the outside air and spread through the surrounding communities in a plume of smoke.

The Energy Department, which manages the country’s nuclear weapons production, had previously concluded a so-called loss of containment at the lab could spread about 1 kilogram of plutonium, a radioactive metal, leading to nine cancer deaths on average in the surrounding area. But modeling in the new study, published in Science and Global Security, showed the potential for much worse: Hundreds of people who inhale or ingest particles from a leak could eventually die from cancer, the researchers said.

And in the most serious possibility modeled in the study — if more than 1 kilogram of plutonium escaped — the town of Los Alamos could become unlivable and radioactive particles could spread across state lines. As many as 3,200 people could eventually get cancer, the researchers estimated, leading to about 1,000 deaths. The remediation of land could run up to an estimated $150 billion.

“In the worst case, it would be devastating for Los Alamos and New Mexico,” said Sébastien Philippe, an assistant professor of nuclear engineering and engineering physics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who led the study. “We find that it could be 10 to 100 times worse” than the government’s estimates, he added.

The peer-reviewed study is the first to independently evaluate the department’s assessment of a potential leak. The journal Science and Global Security is affiliated with Princeton University, where Philippe is also a visiting researcher. The study was funded by the Andrew Carnegie Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund, both of which underwrite arms control and nonproliferation research.

The study arrives amid a threat of a global nuclear arms race. China, North Korea and Russia are upgrading or expanding their arsenals. And Iran, at war with the United States and Israel, has a stockpile of enriched uranium. The United States is ramping up its own bomb core production at Los Alamos, where the country’s only active plutonium-handling facility is running round-the-clock operations as part of a $1.7 trillion effort to modernize the nation’s weapons.

The country already has thousands of bomb cores — each about the size of a grapefruit — made during the Cold War, but the new ones are intended to arm next-generation land-based missiles and submarines. Just one would produce a blast far more powerful than the one at Hiroshima. And while Congress required the production of at least 30 bomb cores per year by 2030, Los Alamos could be called upon to produce up to 80 per year.

The lab sits on a fault system, and the federal government has identified the most consequential risk to be an earthquake that knocks over one of PF-4’s thousands of glove boxes, oxygen-free enclosures where workers handle radioactive materials.

Plutonium particles pose little harm if they are not inhaled, similar to radiation from an X-ray. But when inhaled or ingested, those particles can cause damage over years or decades, even altering DNA. Children are the most vulnerable because their cells are still forming.

In a statement, a spokesperson for the National Nuclear Security Administration, an agency within the Energy Department, wrote that PF-4 “has robust safety programs and systems in place to ensure multiple and redundant layers of protection for our workers, the environment and the public.” The statement continued: “The facility is one of the safest places in the country to be in the event of a natural disaster.”

In 2008, the department publicly released a loss-of-containment scenario written by a government contractor. It concluded that if all of the plutonium estimated to be in the handling facility were engulfed in flames, just over 1 kilogram would escape outside in a form that could be inhaled, and an average of nine people would eventually die of cancer related to exposure.

For the new study, the researchers reverse-engineered the government’s methodology, and replicated a similar fatality average. But then they recalculated the risks of a leak with additional context and under different assumptions.

Using wind and precipitation data from every hour of every day of 2022, the researchers modeled 8,760 scenarios of a plutonium leak, tracing the possible trajectory of particles. In some circumstances, the data shows particles would have traveled as far north as central Colorado and as far south as Southern New Mexico.

mas B. Cochran, a former senior scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council and former adviser to the Energy Department, who was not involved in the study, said the research seemed to offer a “thorough analysis of the issue.”

And the scientists chose the best modeling software for the analysis, said Steven Hanna, an expert in meteorology and atmospheric physics who was also not involved with the study. But, he added, they did not account for statistical uncertainty as exhaustively as is possible.

For estimates in its own assessment, the government had used an Energy Department handbook that relied on data from the 1960s through the 1980s, information that predated findings about other containment breaches, the study said.

For example, from 1951 to 1989, hundreds of fires occurred at the Rocky Flats Plant, a federal nuclear facility near Denver that produced bomb cores during the Cold War. A major fire there in 1957 released a large amount of plutonium particles, according to research published after the plant shuttered in the 1990s.

Soil analysis from Rocky Flats show that the size of those particles were roughly one-fifth the size of the particles considered in the government’s analysis. Smaller particles can disperse farther, the researchers said, increasing the area contaminated and the number of people exposed. They can also remain in the lungs longer, increasing the risk of cell damage.

In one scenario modeled by the researchers, approximating a lab breach on an October night in 2022, shifting wind patterns could have moved smaller particles across several towns, tribal reservations, Santa Fe and parts of Albuquerque. Up to 210 people could have eventually died from cancer, they estimated.

Things get even more dire should more plutonium escape. Using other data from Rocky Flats, the researchers determined that just over 5 kilograms of plutonium — quadruple government estimates — could escape Los Alamos. On that October night, as many as 3,200 people could have developed cancer, leading to about 1,000 deaths, not including lab workers or emergency medical workers, the study said.

The researchers also examined the Savannah River Site in Aiken, S.C., which is expected to begin plutonium-pit production in the mid 2030s. The Energy Department estimated in 2020 that a breach there would lead to an average of two long-term cancer fatalities. But the scientists identified a night in May 2022 when wind could have carried the particles northwest beyond a buffer zone and into Georgia, possibly leading to as many as 330 cancer-related deaths.

The plutonium-handling facility was built almost 50 years ago for nuclear research, not production. Now, it is replacing aging infrastructure that has disrupted work at times and spread contamination, a New York Times investigation found last year.

The lab performs its own internal safety analysis, which is not made public. Workers are installing a new fire suppression system, which Rocky Flats didn’t have. And some, but not all, of the glove boxes at Los Alamos have been made earthquake resistant as part of the renovation.

But one component will not be fully replaced: the ventilation system.

For decades, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, a federal watchdog, has recommended the facility upgrade the system so that, in the case of a catastrophe, it could capture tiny plutonium particles before they leak into the environment.

In 2022, the Energy Department said the upgrade was too expensive.

Alicia Inez Guzmán reported on nuclear weapons production in New Mexico as part of The New York Times’ Local Investigations Fellowship.


Published comments by Greg Mello:

    I am forced by my role to comment on this without as much careful study as I would like and which the study deserves. 

    I do not like the approach taken in this study to use an entirely different modeling approach, asking entirely different questions and getting entirely different answers of a purely theoretical nature, without comparison to the Gaussian models used heretofore except as the latter are presented in summary, opaque form in EISs. (Those EIS results were always worthless, throwaway numbers and I don't even read them. Does anybody?) 

    The results of the study are not reframed as bearing on existing safety standards for exposure of the public. That is because the arbitrary nature of the assumptions used precludes any such comparison.

    Plutonium deposition is a real concern, regarding which there is too much silence, but is downstream ("downwind") of the assumptions going into this model. 

    A large body of work has been done on this topic. I agree with your critique of the compounding "worst-case" assumptions involved here. But I think that prior to this a deeper flaw is the study's blindness to the actual buildings involved, as noted above in my reply to Mr. Harris. 

    Could the future SRPPF (the pit factory in South Carolina now under construction) burn, breaching its containment? How rugged are the two approaches to filtering, HEPA filters at LANL's PF-4 vs a non-flammable sand filter in the earth at SRPPF? How could both buildings be improved, realistically? I am frustrated with physicists who don't want to deal with real situations, as we see in this study. 

    Overall, the results of the study do not pass the smell test, for me. One of the core problems is probably the assumed height of the source term, which was taken from an estimate after one or more Rocky Flats fires. I for one don't see a linear source term 10-75 meters in height from PF-4. Combustible loading is an important factor. How do modern standards compare with Rocky? Rocky Flats gloveboxes (some? all?) had acrylic plastic windows. Rocky Flats had a very level of high material at risk. As far as we know, the SAVY 4000 containers in use dramatically cut down on that. 

    This study also completely omits the Pu-238 in PF-4, which is a major component of risk. Weapons-grade plutonium is relatively "benign' in comparison. 

    I am sure I have been in 20 meetings with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in DC regarding the safety profile of PF-4, over many years. It has been improved, on the one hand, but key improvements NNSA promised have now been rejected, and operational safety criteria are being eroded. Other improvements are delayed. Operational tempo is meanwhile being greatly increased. 

    Finally, I think the real safety issue is with workers in these facilities, and co-located workers nearby. As far as I can tell, the dangers to the general public are fairly localized, contra these results which involve contrived scenarios. By failing to consider more realistic scenarios, the difference between an old facility located 0.6 miles from the public and a new facility located 6 miles from the public -- ten times as far -- is washed out. 

    As noted, discussion is however being stimulated! 

    Fortunately, there is a highly-professional organization that knows the answer to some of these things. That organization is the DNFSB, which Trump's NNSA is bent on destroying. What will the New Mexico delegation do about that? Anything? If you have read this far, I suggest you ask them.

    Finally, if you don't want pit production, please consider endorsing our public registry of resistance at StopTheBomb.org. And why not talk to your local civic leaders, who used to oppose this work but are lately paralyzed in some way. See our centerfold advertorial in this week's Santa Fe Reporter for more.


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