HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF:

MS. JILL M. HRUBY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MR. FRANK A. ROSE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MS. DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MR. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Thursday, May 27, 2021

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding], Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.

Also present Senators Heinrich, Nunn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Chairman Reed: I would like to call the hearing to order.

First, I would like to begin this morning's hearing by recognizing the passing of Senator John Warner at the age of 94. Senator Warner was a member of this committee for 21 years, and either Chairman or Ranking Member for eight years. He was the consummate public servant, but more importantly, he showed us all the importance of bipartisanship. His work with Senator Levin and others is what ensured the National Defense Authorization Act was passed every year and made this committee what it is today, and he will be missed.

Turning to today's hearing, the committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of Ms. Jill Hruby to be Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. Frank Rose to be Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; Ms. Deborah Rosenblum to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; and Mr. Christopher Maier to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. I thank the nominees for their long careers of service to the United States and their
willingness to assume these important roles.

I would also like to welcome the guests and family members who are here with us today. I want to thank Senator Heinrich for joining us to introduce Ms. Hruby. Mr. Rose, I welcome I believe -- is your mother here? Well, Ms. Athalyn Rose, welcome, and your sister, Ms. Nikko Rose, welcome.

Ms. Rosenblum, I am seeing that your husband, Todd Rosenblum, is here also, and welcome, and I want to thank Senator Nunn, who will introduce you via Webex. And, Mr. Maier, I believe welcome your wife, Ms. Emily Louise Franklin, and thank Senator Manchin, who will be introducing you today.

Ms. Hruby, you are well qualified to be nominated as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, having previously directed Sandia National Labs and its 13,000 engineers and scientists who design components for our nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, there are a number of challenges that will require your attention.

The United States has not produced plutonium pits in quantity since the late 1980s. Ms. Hruby, you have supported a "two site" pit manufacturing strategy, dividing production between the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River site in South Carolina. I would ask that you share with the committee the rationale
for this two-site solution.

The NNSA is facing its highest workload demand since the 1980s as we modernize our nuclear deterrent, which includes five warhead programs, and recapitalization of our nuclear facilities, many of which date back to the Manhattan Project of World War II.

Finally, last year's NDAA included a provision to ensure the DoD and the NNSA work closely together in developing budgets to meet DOD requirements. Ms. Hruby, if confirmed, you will be the point person interfacing with DoD on this issue and many others, and I ask that you share with us today how you would plan to address these challenges.

Mr. Rose, you have been nominated to serve as Deputy Administrator of the NNSA. Your prior positions as Assistant Secretary for Arms Control at the State Department and as a staff member on the House Armed Services Committee handling strategic forces issues should serve you well as you take on the larger policy issues facing the NNSA.

If confirmed, you will lead the day-to-day running of the NNSA and be responsible for addressing a number of institutional issues within the organization. In the intermediate term, you will need to maintain the NNSA's federal workforce of 1,800 specialized nuclear scientists and engineers, fully a third of whom are eligible to retire.

I would like to know your thoughts on how you will retain or
replace these skilled civil servants.

Ms. Rosenblum, you bring a wealth of experience through your previous service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, most recently, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, you will assume a role that is focused on acquisition and will require an understanding of the technical nature of nuclear physics and engineering, rather than just policy. I would be interested in hearing how you will adapt your experience to this position.

More importantly, you will oversee the day-to-day functioning of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which ensures that the NNSA can meet DoD requirements for our nuclear deterrent. Last year this committee spent considerable effort to enable the Council and the NNSA to communicate better and coordinate more closely, and I seek your commitment in maintaining that relationship.

Mr. Maier, your role is quite different from our other three nominees. You have been nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, or SOLIC, at a critical time. Your previous experience serving as the Acting ASD(SO/LIC) and as the director of the DoD Defeat-ISIS Task Force makes you well-qualified for this position.
For several years, this committee has focused on empowering the ASD(SO/LIC) to fulfill its "service secretary-like" responsibilities for ensuring the equipping and readiness of our special operations forces. I strongly support the recently issued Department of Defense guidance that clearly articulates the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the oversight of and advocacy for U.S. Special Operations Command. Though long overdue, this guidance is a meaningful signal of the Department's commitment to fully implement the ASD(SO/LIC) reforms mandated by Congress.

Unfortunately, the position of ASD(SO/LIC) has been without a Senate-confirmed individual for much of the last few years. If confirmed, your service will be important to providing empowered leadership and stability as the office grows in resources and responsibilities.

Mr. Maier, you will also play a central role in shaping the Department's policies and operations with respect to counterterrorism, irregular warfare, counternarcotics, stability and humanitarian affairs. We look forward to hearing your views on these issues today.

Thank you again to our nominees. I look forward to your testimonies. Now let me now recognize Ranking Member Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also for recognizing Senator Warner. He was a class act, an enjoyable guy. I remember when he was the chairman of this committee, and I was brand new here, and he came out to Oklahoma, and he would keep people laughing the whole time he was there. He had some unusual characteristics. He did not like to fly in airplanes. He did not like to ride in boats. So it limited a little bit some of the things he was able to do. But he was a great guy and we loved him dearly.

A former Marine, Secretary of the Navy, and lawyer, he had it all.

Well, I would like to thank our nominees for being with us and for their willingness to serve the nation.

Our nation's top military and intelligence leaders have told this committee in recent months that the world is more dangerous and complex than we have ever had, but we understand that. That is true. We are more threatened today than we have ever been before.

This is why I continue to highlight the National Defense Strategy as the right roadmap to deal with these challenges, but it requires the right resourcing to make it a reality, and we have not been resourcing properly.

Modernizing our nation's nuclear deterrent has been a
key priority for the past several years, and we have not
done a very good job. Our senior military officers always
tell us that, whenever they come before this committee. We
put off much needed investments in this area for decades,
watching as our infrastructure crumbled and our most
important military capabilities became harder to keep in
working order. We have got to do a better job than we have
been doing with our nuclear modernization effort.

This demands close cooperation between DoD and NNSA,
and clear-eyed leadership on both sides. We simply cannot
afford to fall further behind our adversaries.

So we have got a problem out there and you guys are
going to have to do a good job, and you are the right ones
to take the horn. Thanks again.

Chairman Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Now I would like to call on Senator Manchin for
the introduction of Mr. Maier.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN III, U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I appreciate very much the ability to go ahead. I have a committee meeting that we have to go to, and I know Senator Heinrich does too, so we are going to move on. But anyway, I want to thank you all. I consider it an honor to serve on the committee with all of you, and to have the opportunity to introduce a nominee I believe will excel within the Department of Defense.

The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has grown into an essential figure within the DoD due to the demands we placed on our Special Operations forces, through constant deployments in support of a wide range of missions, including counterterrorism, direct action, civil affairs, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We depend on these elite units to always be ready to answer the call while maintaining the highest levels of quiet professionalism, and our nominee today certainly exemplifies those requirements.

Chris Maier has had a distinguished career in public service spanning five presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, but just as important in his career with the Air National Guard. I am very proud to say
that Chris currently serves as a member of the 130th Airlift Wing out of Charleston, West Virginia, as an intelligence officer.

After standing on the National Security Council from 2009 to 2013, which is notorious for round-the-clock work and constant burnout, he decided that he had not had enough and enlisted with the 130th the same year he finished his assignment on NSC. Further demonstrating his commitment, he deployed multiple times with the 130th to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, not to mention the monthly trips back to West Virginia, which I can tell you from personal experience that the drive is beautiful but it is still long. I felt a personal responsibility to highlight his service in the Air National Guard not because it is a direct connection back to my state but more importantly I believe it speaks volumes of Chris' character and commitment.

The ability to rise to the challenge of demands within civilian and military career, and the institutional knowledge he has gained from working at the National Counterterrorism Center, to most recently leading the Defeat ISIS Task Force as its director, will certainly be needed as we continue to realign the global power competition with our near-peer adversaries across a number of domains.

Our Special Operations forces are very familiar with providing flexible support to our national security
objectives, but the next few years will require a leader who can set a clear example for what is expected of them.

I have no doubt that Chris Maier will set that example. He exemplifies the impartiality of our civilian leaders and the sacrifice of our military leaders. I wish him and his wife, Emily, and their son, Lincoln, the best of luck through this daunting process. For these reasons and many, many more, I will support his nomination, and I encourage each and every one of my colleagues to do the same.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Manchin.

Now it is a great privilege to introduce, via Webex, Senator Sam Nunn, a former chairman of this committee, distinguished member of the United States Senate, and among your remarkable achievements was the Nunn-Lugar legislation which went a long way in securing loose nukes in the former Soviet Union.

Senator Nunn, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. SENATOR SAM NUNN, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR

Senator Nunn: Thank you very much, Chairman Reed. Can you hear me?

Chairman Reed: Yes, sir, we can.

Senator Nunn: Okay. Good.

Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe, let me just say a couple of words for a personal privilege how honored I am to be before this committee and how many memories it brings back, and I want to say amen to the remarks both you and Senator Inhofe made about John Warner. John put the national interest first. He treated every person with respect and with dignity. He had unquestioned integrity, and I think he set an example of civility for all of us. So John will be deeply, deeply missed.

Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, members of the Armed Services Committee, I am honored to present Deborah Rosenblum to the committee, and I strongly recommend that she be confirmed as our nation's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, [inaudible] have a nominee with the experience, the knowledge, and I must add, the boundless energy that Deborah would bring to this important role. Deborah has skilled leadership, she
has sound judgment, and she has a deep understanding of today's complex threats. She also brings a background in spirit, most importantly of nonpartisanship, and a history of working [inaudible] that Deborah would lead the Defense Department's efforts in preparing for and preventing and deterring and mitigating current and future weapons of mass destruction threats.

Deborah's previous work at DoD and her experience as Executive Vice President of our organization, called the Nuclear Threat Initiative, for the last 11 years, has uniquely prepared her for this very important position.

I currently serve as co-chair of the NTI board of directors, and I have had the opportunity of working closely with Deborah over the last 20 years, particularly during my time as CEO of NTI. Let's correct that -- 10 years with Deborah, 20 years in that position. But continuing today in my current role, I work very closely with Deborah on a daily and weekly basis.

Deborah's contributions to the NTI have been very impactful, with leadership roles in every aspect of our work. Deborah serves on NTI's executive leadership team. She helps oversee the organization's operations, development, and programs, as well as giving oversight and managing our annual operating budget. She has provided strong oversight to our NTI biological program, which works
to reduce biological risk and enhance global biosecurity.

Deborah also manages NTI's work on security issues related to China, and has traveled there regularly to engage in dialogue with governmental as well as non-governmental organizations. She is well versed in the important role that the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, play in our nuclear posture, and if confirmed, she would be an outstanding director, staff director, of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Prior to NTI, Deborah was Vice President of the Cohen group for 7 years, an international consulting firm led by our colleague and friend, former Senator and former Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen. Deborah's previous work in the Department of Defense is notable and also very impressive. For approximately 12 years, she served in senior positions at DoD in the areas of homeland defense, peacekeeping operations and support, nuclear forces, and counter-proliferation. While at DoD, she represented the United States as a member of the negotiating team with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on bilateral negotiations concerning its nuclear program.

In conclusion, Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe and members of the committee, I am confident that Deborah is fully prepared to serve in this critical role. I strongly support her nomination by President Biden. I urge the
committee's support, and I urge her confirmation by the full Senate.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe. It is a great honor to be back in the environment of the Senate Armed Services Committee, an institution I cherish. Thank you very much.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Nunn. Let me now recognize Senator Heinrich, who will introduce Ms. Hruby.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN HEINRICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

Senator Heinrich: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member

Inhofe, it is a pleasure to be joining you and the other members of this great committee as a guest, after serving for a number of years on this committee. I really appreciate you allowing me to share a few words about Jill Hruby, President Biden's nominee to serve as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration at DOE.

This critical national security role safeguards the safety and the reliability of our nuclear deterrent, and I honestly cannot think of anyone better suited, or more qualified for it than Jill Hruby. And, frankly, that is not just because we are both mechanical engineers.

Over more than three decades at Sandia National Laboratories, Jill rose from a technical staff position all the way up to becoming the first woman director to lead one of our national laboratories. She has developed deep knowledge in nuclear weapon systems, component design, nuclear nonproliferation, defense and homeland security technologies and systems, renewable energy, material science, engineering sciences, and microsystems technology.

Jill has received the Department of Energy Secretary's Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security
Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service. She has authored numerous publications and reports, she holds three patents, and receive an R&D 100 award.

Since her retirement from Sandia in 2017, Jill served as the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Jill has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs Advisory Committee, and the National Academy of Science Committee for International Security and Arms Control.

She is a frequent participant in international dialogues, a spokesperson for women in engineering, and a mentor for many emerging leaders. There is even a fellowship named in her honor at Sandia Labs for women pursuing careers in engineering and science to ensure national security and global peace.

On a personal note, I always appreciated working with Jill when she was director at Sandia. She did a remarkable job, and I greatly appreciate her willingness to once again serve our country and the American people, and I hope that all of you on this committee will join me in supporting her confirmation.

Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Heinrich.

And now, Ms. Hruby, your statement, please, and then we will follow to Mr. Rose and down the table. Ms. Hruby, please.
STATEMENT OF JILL M. HRUBY, NAMINEE TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Ms. Hruby: Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. I am
honored to be considered to lead the United States' nuclear
security efforts at this critical time for both our nation's
nuclear deterrent and international nonproliferation and
arms control. I appreciate the confidence of President
Biden and Secretary Granholm in putting forth my nomination
as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA.

I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his
kind introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator
Heinrich, as he mentioned, a fellow mechanical engineer, to
assure that the NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on
their nuclear security roles, and simultaneously contribute
more broadly to national security, energy, and economic
development.

My husband, our daughters and their families, including
a brand-new granddaughter, our extended family, and my
colleagues and friends are watching this hearing remotely.
I thank them for their love, support, and encouragement as I
pursue a challenging and consuming assignment again.

My life's work has been in the missions of the
Department of Energy and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of graduate school and have had the opportunity to lead or work in renewable energy, nuclear weapons, homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear energy, as well as many years contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and microsystem sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director in 2017, I have remained active exploring the intersection of emerging technologies with national security policy through my work with non-governmental organizations, the National Academy of Science, the Defense Science Board, and other boards and advisory committees.

I believe my background provides me the foundation needed to quickly contribute to the important issues facing NNSA and our nation today. The NNSA counts on the world-class expertise of scientists, engineers, and program managers in our national security laboratories, dedicated plants and sites, and our Federal workforce to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile that is effective for the required deterrence and defense missions. Simultaneously, the NNSA enterprise supports nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to provide a stable, predictable, and safe world. NNSA also supports the nuclear reactor program required to power our nuclear Navy's submarines and ships.
If confirmed, my top priority will be to deliver, in a cost-effective manner, on the significant commitments in the NNSA programs across the board. We must meet the critical deliverables for the stockpile modernization, stockpile assessment, and infrastructure programs. Pit production, uranium processing, and other infrastructure programs will take constant attention, diligence, and transparency throughout the design, construction, and start-up phases. These unique facilities are essential to the future of our nation and NNSA's programs.

In addition, we must continue to bring cutting-edge science and creativity to sustain and fully understand our stockpile without testing; provide new technologies and procedures to lower cost and reduce the time to deliver all mission requirements; to stay ahead of our adversaries; and to develop advanced capabilities to enhance nuclear security, arms control, and Navy reactors.

The other high priority to me is to forge transparent, productive, and enduring institutional relationships between the DOE/NNSA and our partners including the labs, plants, and sites; the Department of Defense; the Department of State; Congress; and our international allies. We also need to rebuild technological cooperation with our adversaries on issues such as monitoring and verification technologies and nuclear security.
The nation has benefited enormously from the support and investment in the people and unique facilities of the NNSA enterprise. Training, recruiting, and retaining experts and leaders of the future is a foundation that has never been more critical due to the demographics of the complex, the fast pace of technological advancement, and the geo-political environment. Our stockpile, our capabilities, our institutions, and our creativity are the world's standards. If confirmed, I will be dedicated to making sure our national capabilities are unparalleled, our partnerships are enduring, and creative solutions are provided to the growing national and international challenges.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee today and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hruby follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you. Mr. Rose, please.
STATEMENT OF FRANK A. ROSE, NOMINEE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Rose: Great. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, it is a great honor to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary Granholm for the confidence they have shown in me by nominating me to be the next Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA. I would also like to thank several members of my family, including my mother, Athalyn, my father, Frank, and my sister, Nikko, for their support, not just today, but throughout my life.

Mr. Chairman, as the President's March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance notes, the United States and its allies face a complex set of current and emerging threats. Some of the most pressing threats include an increasingly assertive China, a destabilizing Russia, and the continuing challenge of nuclear proliferation. To address these threats, the guidance states that the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, pursue arms control arrangements, and renew American leadership on nonproliferation.

NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these
threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator to achieve several key priorities. The first priority would be to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent to enable the United States to deter threats to itself and its allies. This includes plutonium pit production, uranium processing, completing the various warhead life extension programs currently underway, modernizing NNSA's aging infrastructure, and supporting the naval nuclear reactors program.

Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States possesses the right tools to address the arms control, nonproliferation, and verification challenges of the 21st century. These challenges in this area are fundamentally different than what we faced in the past, especially with regard to issues like the monitoring and verification of nuclear warheads, cyber security, and threats to the nation's space assets. NNSA and the national laboratories are well positioned to help the United States government meet these challenges.

Mr. Chairman, you know, third priority is people. At the end of the day, NNSA's ability to achieve its mission ultimately depends on the ability to recruit, develop, and retain a highly skilled workforce of national security professionals, especially the "next generation" of leaders and experts. In recent years, significant progress has been
made in this area through programs like NNSA’s Graduate Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding these types of critical personnel programs, including at the labs, plants, and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.

And finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by NNSA alone. To the contrary, it will require partnerships with Congress, within the Executive branch, and with our allies and partners around the world. One of the most important attributes I would bring to the position of Principal Deputy Administrator is a long history working for, and with, NNSA's key partners. For example, I previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; as a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special Assistant at the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that NNSA's partnerships remain strong.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you and your colleagues may have. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Rose. Ms. Rosenblum, please.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, NOMINEE TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Ms. Rosenblum: Thank you very much, Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee for your
consideration of my nomination to be the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs. It is a great honor for me to come before this
committee. If confirmed, I pledge to work in close
coordination with Members of Congress and this committee on
behalf of the American people and our Armed Forces. And I
would like to thank Senator Nunn for his very gracious words
and for his lifetime of leadership and dedication to our
country.

I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris,
and Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me
and their support for my nomination.

I also want to extend a thank-you to my extended family
who has taught me that with hard work, compassion, and
resilience, I can help to make the world a better place. My
husband and two children are my guiding beacons, support,
and inspiration.

Senator Nunn gave a wonderful summary of my
professional career. I just want to emphasize how proud I
am to have served my country over so many years, both inside
and outside of government, and to have encouraged and
supported the next generation of U.S. national security
leaders. If confirmed, I will bring breadth of experience
and deep understanding to bear in addressing today's complex
nuclear, chemical and biological threats, including the
expansion of Russia, China, and North Korea's nuclear
arsenals, growing global biological threats, the continued
use of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity threats
from our adversaries, and the dangerous potential for the
misuse of emerging technologies and science.

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the
United States has a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. I agree with Secretary Austin that continuing to
modernize our nuclear deterrent is a critical national
security priority. To do so will require effective and
transparent partnerships with the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as with
Congress. I also join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
Hicks in supporting the nuclear triad, the bedrock of our
deterrent over the past 70 years.

Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare
the devastation that occurs when countries, including the
United States, are not adequately prepared to prevent,
detect, and respond to biological threats. If I am
fortunate enough to be confirmed, I will make improving and
investing in chemical and biological defense capabilities
one of my top priorities.

With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to
the discussion this morning.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. Mr. Maier, please.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, NOMINEE TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. Maier: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to
appear today as President Biden's nominee for Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict. I appreciate your consideration of my
nomination, and thank Senator Manchin for his kind
introduction.

This committee has long supported the people of our
nation's Special Operations enterprise and the essential
missions they conduct in our defense. I am humbled to be
nominated to serve alongside the women and men of our
Special Operations Forces who continue to inspire us through
their commitment to excellence in executing our nation's
most challenging military missions. We must not lose sight
of the sacrifice that they, as well as their families,
continue to make on our behalf.

I have been blessed with a large and loving family, who
have challenged me throughout my life to seek a calling of
service to others. To my parents, Donna and Paul, your
careers of service to others set the example for all of us.
To my wife, Emily, I thank you for all your support, for
your two decades of service as a Naval officer, and for the
mother you are to our son. I also would like to acknowledge
the unsung national security professionals with whom I have
served in the intelligence community and the Defense
Department over my career, and my fellow airman in the West
Virginia Air National Guard. All of you have modeled the
commitment to service that inspires me today.

I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and
Secretary Austin in nominating me at such a dynamic and
strategically important time for the Special Operations
community. Congress created the position of ASD(SO/LIC) in
1986, and this committee's leadership and continued support
for the organization have been instrumental in strengthening
civilian oversight of Special Operations. The Department's
recent reforms further bolster the roles and
responsibilities of ASD(SO/LIC) through a unique direct-
reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense, while
ensuring special operations and low-intensity conflict
policy is integrated with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this
committee to continue to implement these reforms.

As the security challenges facing our nation grow
increasingly complex, Special Operations Forces, or SOF,
will remain critical to U.S. efforts in conducting
sustainable counterterrorism, competing for influence with
near-peer rivals, and responding to crises. To meet these
new and evolving missions, the Special Operations enterprise is undertaking its most comprehensive transformation in a generation. Broadening of skills, rapid fielding of technology, creative adaptation of tactics, and partnering for outsized effects will be even more essential. If confirmed, I will work every day to ensure ASD(SO/LIC) provides the essential leadership and guidance to evolve the force and missions.

As part of this transformation, we must redouble our commitment to ensuring SOF can recruit, develop, and retain the diversity of talent necessary to compete globally. A more diverse force integrates new skills, learned experiences, and perspectives that I believe is an operational imperative. I am committed to ensuring we are providing the necessary role models and resources to recruit and retain that talent in our formations.

We also must ensure that SOF represent the values and ideals of the nation we serve. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM in implementing the recommendations from its comprehensive review of SOF ethics and culture. Sexual assault and harassment, extremist behavior, and criminal activities violate our oath and corrode the force.

Fundamental to the success of SOF is, and will remain, its people. USSOCOM is the standard-bearer for caring for its personnel, from the Preservation of the Force and
Family, to the Warrior Care program. As we continue to learn of new challenges across the physical, psychological, cognitive, cultural, and spiritual domains, I am committed, if confirmed, to ensuring that every member of the SOF community receives the best possible care, and is ready to compete, deter, and win in a changing global landscape.

I look forward to your questions and thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maier follows:]
Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. Now I will ask a series of questions required of all civilian nominees. Please respond appropriately.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Ms. Hruby: Yes.

Mr. Rose: Yes.

Ms. Rosenblum: Yes.

Mr. Maier: Yes.

Chairman Reed: Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Ms. Hruby: No.

Mr. Rose: No.

Ms. Rosenblum: No.

Mr. Maier: No.

Chairman Reed: Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibility makes it important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this committee when requested?

Ms. Hruby: Yes.

Mr. Rose: Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum: Yes.

Mr. Maier: Yes.

Chairman Reed: Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such records?

Ms. Hruby: Yes.

Mr. Rose: Yes.

Ms. Rosenblum: Yes.

Mr. Maier: Yes.

Chairman Reed: Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established by this committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

Ms. Hruby: Yes.

Mr. Rose: Yes.

Ms. Rosenblum: Yes.

Mr. Maier: Yes.

Chairman Reed: Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Ms. Hruby: Yes.
Mr. Rose: Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum: Yes.
Mr. Maier: Yes.

Chairman Reed: Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Hruby: Yes.
Mr. Rose: Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum: Yes.
Mr. Maier: Yes.

Chairman Reed: Let the record show that all of the witnesses have responded in the affirmative to all of the questions.

Mr. Hruby, among one of the major challenges that you have is the production of 80 pits in the next several years. The original idea was to construct 5,000 square foot modules at Los Alamos, and roughly the cost per square foot of such construction was about 20,000. That plan was changed in 2018 to recondition or refit the MOX facility in Savannah, Georgia, which is 450,000 square feet, about 25 percent completed. So there is obviously going to be a cost differential here.

What are your views on the two-facility production plan?

Ms. Hruby: Chairman, thank you for your question.

This is the biggest issue I think facing NNSA today, is
delivering the pit production capability for our nation for the first time in many decades. The current plan that NNSA has developed, and that I support, includes producing pits at both Los Alamos and Savannah River, 30 pits per year minimum at Los Alamos, 50 pits per year minimum at Savannah River.

The 30 pits per year at Los Alamos is on track to be delivered in 2026. The 50 pits per year at Savannah River, originally planned for 2030, is likely to now be somewhere between 2030 and 2035, a decision that will be made at the Critical Decision 2 point.

I believe that the two-site solution is a good solution for a couple of reasons. One is that it is, as expressed by NNSA, and again, I agree that it is more resilient than a one-site solution. Should anything go wrong, should there be an accident, it allows the other site to continue to make pits. And I think that is quite important and allows the throughput of pits to be closer to 80 than it would need to be, to hedge against bets.

The other reason is I think it takes advantage of the infrastructure at NNSA and the skill sets at NNSA. So the scientists at Los Alamos, I believe are very important to pit production. I also believe that the culture of a production plant that exists at Savannah River is also important. And if the two organizations work together well,
and if confirmed, it will be my job to make sure that they do, I think we take best advantage of the infrastructure and the people of NNSA, and we end up with the most resilient pit production capability in the country per dollar.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. Because of the limited time, I ask the respondents to be concise, and if we have a second round I will try to reach everyone. But let me just ask Ms. Rosenblum. If confirmed, you will be the Executive Secretary of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and will you assure us that you will do everything you can to timely coordinate the budget reviews between DoD and NSA, to guarantee the Council can meet DoD requirements?

Ms. Rosenblum: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I am confirmed, yes, I will. I have reviewed all of the responsibilities that would be mine, if confirmed as the staff director, and feel prepared to carry them out, and will do so.

Chairman Reed: Thank you. Mr. Maier, you have a dual-hat responsibility. You report to the Secretary of Defense the service-like activities of SOCOM, and then you report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy with respect to policy matters. Can you briefly give us an idea of how you intend to discharge those dual responsibilities?

Ms. Maier: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question. So one way we will look at that is having
different staffs that integrate at a more senior level but
work different parts of that portfolio, and I personally
think there is great value in having ASD(SO/LIC) that does
both, because it can speak to the policy components in parts
of those conversations in the Department but also represents
SOCOM and provides that civilian oversight independently but
in a synergistic manner with the policy.

Chairman Reed: Thank you. And finally, Mr. Rose, just
a quick, in my remaining 5 seconds. You indicated one of
your challenges is maintaining a robust workforce. About a
third of your employees are eligible for retirement, and
would likely do so. You are competing against a very
competitive market for skilled engineers, and particularly
anybody that knows anything about a computer.

So can you give us, very briefly, your thoughts on this
issue?

Mr. Rose: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for the question. I would say recruiting, developing,
and retaining the next generation of nuclear security
experts is absolutely vital. And as I mentioned, there has
been a lot of progress in the past several years, in large
part thanks to this committee. But we still have
significant gaps, as you mentioned.

One of my first objectives, if confirmed in the
position, would be to meet with the leadership of NNSA, the
labs, and the sites to, one, identify where our gaps are with regards to personnel, and then, two, developing a comprehensive plan to implement and close those gaps. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Mr. Rose. Senator Inhofe, please.

Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I think all opening statements were great opening statements. I commend you on those statements.

Ms. Hruby, last year we had major concerns with the Secretary of the DOE interfering with the work of the NNSA and putting our nuclear modernization programs at risk, even questioning what our role is in developing the budget and some other things, and it was not a workable thing. In fact, I had to personally intervene with then President Trump to get things pretty well straightened out. So we have got to have a clear understanding at DOE and OMB about the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Now I like the fact that you -- and I told you this before -- came right out with some of your priorities, and stating what those priorities were, number one, ensuring the success of our weapons programs, two, updating obsolete infrastructure, and three, taking care of our people. And I agree with those priorities. Will you agree to keeping us informed as to how you are coming along with your
priorities?

Ms. Hruby: Yes, Senator. Of course, I would be delighted to keep you informed, if confirmed.

Senator Inhofe: Okay. And I think also, Mr. Rose, how do you plan to support Ms. Hruby in these priorities, these three priorities?

Mr. Rose: Senator, I agree with all of her priorities, and I will do everything in my power to be a very good deputy, if confirmed.

Senator Inhofe: That is good. And, Mr. Maier, I want to talk a little bit about what is happening in Africa right now. It is a critical theater for implementing our National Defense Strategy. China and Russia are on the rise. China has opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. A lot of people do not realize that. This is the first time they have done this, and now they are all the way as far south as the southern part of Tanzania. They are active in there as well as Russia being on the rise in that area. So right now ISIS and al Qaeda are on the increase as well, and to deal with these threats we only have 6,000 personnel, military personnel, on the entire continent.

I was critical of the previous administration, because when they were talking about revamping and changing our priorities in different parts of the world I really feel that we are understaffed. That is the only area where we
are starting off understaffed. And I am not anticipating or expecting that you had a chance to look at and evaluate the personnel and whether or not it is adequate, but any first thoughts in terms of where they are in that field?

Mr. Maier: Senator, thanks for the question, and I think Africa is a very important theater, as you say, for both things that Special Operations is focused on -- obviously 20 years or more of the counterterrorism fight there, as you mentioned, a number of ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates there -- but then it is also an arena for competition, as you referenced, in Djibouti. And I think my objective, if confirmed, is to very much look at where we are getting return on that investment and where we can combine some of those missions to get more benefit for the National Defense Strategy.

Senator Inhofe: Okay. Well, I think one of the first things that I would like to have you do, and share with us, on what your impression is in terms of adequacy of our resources in Africa. Would you do that?

Ms. Maier: I would, Senator. If confirmed, I would be glad to look at that as a first priority.

Senator Inhofe: Okay. Lastly, I think that there is going to be some of the members are going to be talking to you and Ms. Rosenblum about the issue of no-first-use policy. There is some confusion as to where you are in some
people's minds, and I will give you one shot to state that
before the rest of them get to you. All right?

Ms. Rosenblum: All right. Thank you, Senator. I
appreciate the opportunity to clarify my view on this. Give
the strategic environment that we face, one that is
absolutely challenging U.S. interests and those of our
allies, I do not support a no-first-use policy.

Senator Inhofe: All right. Thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman?

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me now
recognize Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to each of our nominees this morning for your
willingness to be considered for these very important posts
and for your testimony this morning.

I want to begin with you, Mr. Maier, because in your
opening remarks you talked about the importance of diversity
in our Special Operations Forces, and one aspect of that
diversity are the women that we need to have join Operation
Forces, yet a study from 2016 found that 85 percent of
Special Operators opposed allowing women into their
specialties, and 71 percent opposed women in their units.

So this is obviously an ongoing challenge. It is
getting better, I know. We just had our first -- we have 50
graduates, I think, of Ranger School that just happened, and
one of our first Green Berets. But can you talk about what you think some of the challenges are to better integrating women, and specifically, reading the report that just came out in April of Women in Army Special Operations Survey, one of the things that I found particularly interesting was that one of the biggest challenges is equipment fitting. And I had the opportunity to go out to Minot Air Force Base recent with General Brown, and one of the demonstrations he provided for us, that they are doing there in Minot, is working to refit the equipment that women are wearing so that they can operate better with the equipment we have for our women in the military.

So can you talk about those challenges and how you will address them?

Ms. Maier: Yes, Senator. I think it is a very important issue, and I think the first step has been opening all fields to women, and I think what we are seeing is the evolution of that. So the survey you cite from U.S. Army Special Operations was commissioned by them internally, and I think this is indicative of the ongoing effort to build both the ability for women to operate on an equal footing and have the acceptance and, in many cases, the equipment that is required.

If confirmed, this is one of the top priorities I would have. I think it fits into the Secretary and, by extension,
the President's strive to really have a diverse force. We know, as we compete globally, we are going to need both genders in the fight, and we are going to need people with other expertise that we might not have had as much of in the force at this state.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you. As an aside, if you did not hear the public radio piece on how women are required to wear their hair in the military, that was on this morning, I would urge you to listen to it. It was a very important example of why we have got to respond to some of these challenges that women are facing, in a way that is more friendly to the differences between men and women, which are not worse. They are just different.

Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, I think this question is for both of you. We just saw the impact of the cyber hacking into the Colonial Pipeline and what that meant for the country. How do we reassure people who have questions about our nuclear weapons, and our nuclear command and control structure, that they are not also open to those kinds of cyberattacks?

Ms. Hruby: Thank you, Senator Shaheen, for the question. Of course, cyber is a major challenge across the U.S. Government, and particularly in the places that we want to keep most secure, the nuclear weapons facilities. The people in the nuclear weapons, in the NNSA complex, work
tirelessly to protect the networks and have been fairly successful in doing so. I think we need to continue to find talent, to use that talent effectively to protect our networks and to share those lessons across the government.

Thank you.

Senator Shaheen: Mr. Rose?

Mr. Rose: Senator, thanks very much for the question. I agree with everything Ms. Hruby said, and if confirmed, one of my first priorities would be to hire a new chief information officer for the NNSA. The most recent officer just retired. But I fully agree. I actually teach a course at Georgetown University called "Outer Space But Strategic Capabilities," and it talks about all the interrelationships between cyber, nuclear, as well as outer space.

So I think you are absolutely right. We have to look at these strategic issues from a holistic approach. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Fischer.

Senator Fischer: Thank you, Chairman Reed. Ms. Rosenblum, in a 2019 talk, you described our nuclear forces as being on a, quote, "hair trigger," end quote. I am concerned by this, because for the entire time that I have been on this committee, military and civilian officials,
from both the Obama and the Trump administrations, have consistently argued against this phrase and the idea that it is meant to foster, which is that there is something inherently unsafe about our ICBM posture.

Just a few weeks ago, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, we heard General Kehler, the former STRATCOM Commander, explain again why this is a red herring. In fact, I remember testimony from the Obama administration that reducing the alert posture for our ICBM would actually be destabilizing. Senator Shaheen just spoke about a CODEL that a few of us took to Minot in North Dakota, the base, where that phrase was also identified as a red herring.

So do you believe that our alert posture is unsafe or that it needs to be changed?

Ms. Rosenblum: Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to clarify my views with respect to this issue. I support the current alert posture and believe it is an important piece to making our nuclear deterrent credible. I believe that what you are referring to is an op-ed that I had done in 2019, in the Des Moines Register, in advance of the Iowa caucuses. The purpose of the op-ed was to encourage Iowans to be able to engage with the candidates around issues related to nuclear weapons. It was in an attempt to have that language be accessible and understandable that I used the phrase "hair trigger alert."
I certainly did not mean any offense by it, and if I did, I apologize.

Senator Fischer: Well, I thank you for those comments. I think it is extremely important that all public figures are careful in terminology that is used with regards to the security of this nation. As you know, there are numerous safeguards that are in place, and all the testimony that has been given to this committee over the years about this, that "hair trigger" phrase is such a mischaracterization, and I believe it is not serving the people of this country well to have that kind of language out there that does not reflect the true environment that we live in.

Dr. Hruby, last week in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee I talked to Dr. Verdon about the relationship between modernizing NNSA's nuclear complex and how this investment actually reduces the potential need to [inaudible] nuclear test. Can you talk about how the relationship is between those two things, how you view that?

Ms. Rosenblum: Thank you, Senator Fischer. The modernization of the NNSA infrastructure is critical to keeping our stockpile safe, secure, and reliable without testing. And I want to, in particular, highlight the ability to make plutonium pits as part of that. We know that pits' performance change with time, and the planned pit production program allows us to get ahead of that and make
sure that we do not get to a point where we need to test the
weapons in an underground, in a nuclear explosive test, to
make sure they are reliable. Thank you.

Senator Fischer: Also, Doctor, I appreciated our
discussion about the importance of the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program, and I just wanted to confirm one
thing for the record. Do you believe that the United States
must rebuild and maintain the basic capabilities of design,
manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons
stockpile to support our nation's deterrent?

Ms. Rosenblum: Yes, Senator, I do. I think the
Stockpile Responsiveness Program is an excellent program
that has been started within the last few years and will be
very important to the future of our stockpile.

Senator Fischer: And, Mr. Rose, do you agree? Yes or
no. I am sorry to make it so short. I am out of time.

Mr. Rose: Yes, I agree.

Senator Fischer: Thank you very much. Thank you to
the panelists for coming. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now let me
recognize Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and congratulations to each of the nominees. I
believe you are all very well qualified for your positions.

I want to just also say a word about John Warner. It
is a true honor to be a Virginia Senator on the Armed Services Committee and think about my friend, and feel sad about his death but also celebrate an amazing life. Senator Warner was in the Pacific in World War II, and when he came back to the United States at the end of the war he went to Washington and Lee to go to college. And my father-in-law was also in the Pacific during World War II, as a submariner, and then came back and went to school at Washington and Lee. And they were very, very dear friends, beginning in 1946.

They built the modern Republican Party in Virginia from essentially nothing. When my father-in-law was the first elected governor, Republican governor, in Virginia history, John was the Secretary of the Navy, and they worked together on many issues, because Virginia is the center of naval power in the world. Their friendship was tested but not strained when they ran against each other for the United States Senate in 1978, and John Warner beat my father-in-law, beat my political hero, just like he later beat my best friend in politics, Mark Warner, in a race in 1996, for the United States Senate.

I knew how important this committee was to John Warner, when I was mayor and governor and was working with Senator Warner. His service on this committee was something that he talked about a lot. I think it was his favorite part of his
30 years in the United States Senate. But by the time I
came to the Senate he had been gone, but then I really
wanted to know even more about John Warner, because I got to
meet people like Jack Reed and John McCain, and Carl Levin,
and others who had served with John on this committee, and I
learned an entirely new dimension of my friend. And I just
wanted to begin my comments today just expressing how sad I
feel that he is gone but how proud I am to be a successor,
not a replacement as a Virginia Senator on the Armed, but I
am a successor to him.

One just personal privilege. When I found that he had
died I knew my father-in-law would be very distraught about
this. My father-in-law will be 98 in September. And my
wife just texted me. She reached her dad this morning to
talk to him about it at the retirement community where he
lives, and he was very stunned and saddened about it. And
kept saying, "But he is a youngster. He is younger than
me." That is very much like my father-in-law to think that
a 94-year-old is a youngster.

I want to ask just one question of Ms. Hruby and Mr.
Rose. The Navy has published a SIOP Shipyard
Industrialization Optimization Plan that really sort of lays
out, quite a ways into the future, the necessary investments
that need to be made in our public shipyards. Does NNSA
have something similar, kind of a long-term investment
document that would help us work with you to make sure that we are keeping the physical facilities of the NNSA in the shape they need to be in?

Ms. Hruby: Senator, is the specific question -- I just want to make sure I am answering the right question -- about the Navy Reactor Program, or just in general?

Senator Kaine: Just in general. Does the NNSA programs within its purview have a similar sort of long-term capital improvement investment plan that we can assess to determine whether we are appropriately investing?

Ms. Hruby: Okay. Thank you for the clarification. The NNSA has worked very hard over the last 5 years or so to develop a risk-based approach to infrastructure investment needs. It is a fairly sophisticated approach. The infrastructure needs are large, and so they have prioritized those by ability to deliver programs, and there is a long-term plan. And if confirmed, I want to take a close look at that, but there is a plan.

Senator Kaine: I also know the President is sending us up a budget today, and I am going to be interested to see the budgetary proposals to execute on a plan like that.

Thank you. I will yield back to you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.

And now I would like to recognize Senator King, please.

Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Rosenblum,
welcome to the committee. It is an honor to be introduced by Sam Nunn. I will overlook your association with Bill Cohen, I assure you, when it comes time to vote on your nomination. Please give him my regards.

Ms. Hruby, one of the issues involved with nuclear modernization is that many Americans do not understand why we are doing it. Those of us that have lived through prior decades have to realize the Cold War is in a 30-year rear-view mirror. Since that time we have had 9/11, we have had the war on terror, we have had COVID, and so I want to ask you some questions.

Our essential defense posture for the past 70 years has been deterrence of others' attacks on us. Is that not true?

Ms. Hruby: That is true, Senator.

Senator King: And deterrence rests upon your adversary understanding that you have a capacity to make life very difficult -- that is a euphemism -- for them and the will to use it. Is that not correct?

Ms. Hruby: That is correct, Senator.

Senator King: And if your deterrent is out of date, in bad shape, not modernized, not able to be delivered, then that, in fact, makes the country less safe, does it not?

Ms. Hruby: That is correct, Senator.

Senator King: And so the modernization that we are talking about is essential to maintaining the peace. Isn't
Senator King: I think this is important, because people back home in Maine say, "Why are we spending all this money on nuclear weapons?" And the reason is because we never want to have a nuclear war. The irony, or the paradox, of nuclear weapons is we build them so we will never have to use them. And that strategy has, in fact, worked for over 70 years. Is that correct?

Ms. Hruby: That is correct.

Senator King: Now let me go to the specifics of that, and I think the answer is contained in the conversation we have already had, and I apologize for cross-examining you in this way, but it is a way of getting through material in a shorter period of time.

We are going back into the business of making plutonium pits, which are necessary elements for a nuclear weapon. And I presume that the reason that is the case is that we have to modernization and that the pits that were built in earlier periods are no longer fully dependable and need to be upgraded along with other parts of the nuclear deterrent. Is that correct?

Ms. Hruby: Well, the pits today are dependable. The NNSA plan is to make sure that they can be replaced before they become not dependable.
Senator King: And that entails reinvigorating pit production at both Los Alamos, and the other question is, why do we need two places? Why are we talking about Los Alamos and Savannah River?

Ms. Hruby: Yes, Senator. The number of pits that are projected to be needed is a minimum of 80 pits per year. That is a significant capability at Los Alamos. If we were to do it all there it would require much more infrastructure investment. Using the MOX facility shell, which has been built as a Cat-1 facility, a facility that can handle plutonium, allows us to have a cost-effective program, use the talent across the NNSA complex.

Senator King: Thank you. Mr. Rose, I want to turn to you. A couple of things. We had a question a few minutes ago about cyber, and you said you were going to appoint a new CIO. I want urgency here, and I do not think -- I mean, I am fine with appointing a new CIO, but I would like you to stand up a team that aggressively red-teams your systems to test them, because every CIO says, "Oh, we are okay," and that goes up the line and you say, "We are okay." I want people who are paid to hack your system, to demonstrate whether or not you are, in fact, secure. There is no more important cyber protection than that of nuclear command and control and communication.

So I hope that you will go beyond a new CIO to an all-
hands-on-deck, urgent, urgent pursuit of cyber defense, of particularly in the NNSA.

Mr. Rose: Senator, thank you very much. I agree with you 100 percent. You know, we have got to get on our A-game with regard to cyber, especially that nexus between cyber and nuclear. One of the things that I have been focused on in my career over the last 5 years is the challenge of these new emerging technologies to nuclear deterrence. So if confirmed, I assure you that I will make your recommendation a priority, and we will work to get the NNSA's house in order with regard to cybersecurity.

Senator King: Thank you, sir. If you do not, I will come and find you.

[Laughter.]

Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: I do not know how to respond to the last comment.

Let me now thank Senator King and recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren.

Senator Warren: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations to each of you on your nominations.

Ms. Hruby, I want to talk about NNSA's out-of-control nuclear weapons budget. According to the agency's 25-year build plan, published last December, projected spending on nuclear weapons activities has risen to $505 billion. That
is a staggering increase of $113 billion, or 29 percent, from the 2020 version of the plan. Now I understand that cost overruns at the NNSA are the norm, but these figures are mind-boggling. And when we let the cost of weapons balloon it can crowd out other important Energy Department national security programs, such as nonproliferation.

So, Ms. Hruby, I want to ask, will you commit to providing this committee with cost estimates for major agency projects that are realistic and not low-balled, and schedules for completing these projects that are also realistic and not just a fantasy?

Ms. Hruby: Well, thank you, Senator Warren. Yes, the answer is yes, I will. I do think we need to get better at cost estimation and schedule estimation within the Department, and seeking talent to do that and making sure that is done will be a top priority for me, if confirmed.

Senator Warren: I would only amend what you are saying. You do not just need to get better. Based on where we are right now, you need to get a lot better on this. I also want to note that I am concerned about NNSA's current modernization plan, which, in addition to being unnecessary has no chance of being executed on time or on budget.

Now, Ms. Rosenblum, let me ask you, if confirmed, in addition to be an Assistant Secretary, you will also be the Staff Director for the Pentagon's Nuclear Weapons Council.
Last year, National Defense Authorization Act significantly increased the role of the Nuclear Weapons Council in determining the NNSA budget, decreasing the traditional role of the Energy Department. This effort prompted an outpouring of bipartisan opposition in the Senate and the House, but, unfortunately, key parts of the objectionable language were retained in the final bill.

So let me ask, Ms. Rosenblum, do you believe the Energy Secretary should retain the decision authority for the NNSA budget request?

Ms. Rosenblum: Senator, thank you very much for the question. I am very familiar with the changes that were made certainly to the legislation, and it is one that I do support and believe that the Council is appropriately chaired by the Department of Defense.

Senator Warren: I am not sure I understand the answer to my question, and that is, do you believe that the Energy Secretary should retain decision authority for the NNSA budget request? I just want to make sure I understand your answer. That is a yes or no.


Senator Warren: I appreciate that. I just wanted to make sure I understood.

So, Ms. Hruby, are you concerned that this new law will negatively impact your ability to set NNSA's budget?
Ms. Hruby: I think that we need forge a better relationship so things like this do not happen in the future, and I am confident we can do that and we can work through the legal requirements as needed.

Senator Warren: Well, I hope that you are right, but I am very concerned about this.

As my colleagues, Senator Manchin and Senator Murkowski, wrote last year, the Nuclear Weapons Council, quote, "has a narrower focus than the Secretary of Energy, and its recommendations would likely prioritize nuclear weapons at the expense of other critical energy department missions," end quote. I fear that this new law will make it harder to rein in the NNSA's dangerous budget growth, and I will look forward to working with both of you to make sure that we are able to do that.

So thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Warren. Now let me recognize Senator Kelly.

Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all four of you for being here today. I really appreciate it. This question is for Ms. Rosenblum.

In April, the Government Accountability Office issued a report which highlighted the threat that biological agents present to our servicemembers on the Korean Peninsula, and found that the Department needs to improve the preparedness
of U.S. forces to counter chemical and biological weapons. The DoD manufactured hundreds of thousands of doses of vaccines last year for both the plague and botulinum toxin, two threats for which the DoD has longstanding requirements to provide medical countermeasures. However, as part of the defense-wide review, the Department terminated the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program, ending funding for several medical programs. This included the vaccine programs for these biothreats that had already completed Phase 2 clinical trials, and manufactured 300,000 doses of each vaccine to demonstrate manufacturing capability.

As we continue to reckon with the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, I am concerned about the risk inherent in ending vaccine development programs that are aimed at protecting our warfighters. If confirmed, can you commit to reviewing the Department's policy and expeditiously providing a report back to the committee on the acquisition strategy for these vaccines, to include the status of the development, the cost to complete the development, and the risks to our servicemembers if development is discontinued?

Ms. Rosenblum: I do, Senator, and I believe it is critical that our Joint Forces have the protections that they require in order to be able to counter any kind of threat from weapons of mass destruction, including biological as well.
Senator Kelly: Well, thank you, Ms. Rosenblum. Mr. Maier, good to see you again. The National Defense Strategy Commission has cautioned us of the imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy, development, and implementation. As you know, Congress has taken steps to address this imbalance by including important reforms in recent defense authorization that are designed to enhance the ability of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to act as the Service Secretary-like civilian responsible for oversight and advocacy of Special Operations Forces.

What is the value to both the Special Operations enterprise and our overall national security in having an empowered Service Secretary-like civilian in the Pentagon?

Ms. Maier: Senator Kelly, nice to see you again as well. Thank you for the question. So I think it is critically important that as we look at our other services they have a civilian that is empowered that sits above them, and I think this committee has recognized that there are elements of Special Operations Command that did not have that. So in the first order it fills a gap.

I think in the second, and maybe more practical sense, it is an opportunity for there to be a civilian who is advocating for the men and women of Special Operations in the building, both in the policy and then in the
Senator Kelly: Do you think we have made any progress in moving this forward?

Ms. Maier: I do, Senator. I think the Secretary's recent announcement of how he intends to proceed with a dual-reporting chain, including a direct report to him for the administrative chain of command, in which, if confirmed, I would be that direct report, significantly empowers the position.

Senator Kelly: Well, thank you.

The next question is for Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose. In past testimony before the committee, the National Nuclear Security Administration has been candid about the risks posed by the aging workforce. With more than one-third of the workforce eligible to retire by 2024, the imperative of recruiting the next generation of American scientists and engineers is clear. I am proud to say that the students at the University of Arizona are among those that are already building relationships and experience with the National Nuclear Security Administration through the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program.

Can each of you speak to, in the remaining time, which is not much, can you speak to how you would build on these programs and other methods to develop a sustainable pipeline in STEM research?
Ms. Hruby: Yeah, very quickly, we need to work with community colleges, historically black colleges and university, minority serving institutions, top research institutions across the board to rebuild our workforce, and if confirmed, that will be a top priority.

Mr. Rose: Senator, let me just say, recruiting, developing, and retaining our nuclear security workforce is one of my highest priorities, and should I be confirmed, be assured that I will make it happen.

Senator Kelly: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me recognize Senator Cotton, please.

Senator Cotton: Ms. Hruby, what was your involvement in the incorporation of critical race theory or diversity equity and inclusion training at the Sandia National Labs?

Ms. Hruby: Senator Cotton, thanks for that question. I am strong believer in diversity, equity, and inclusion training for our workforce. And, in fact, study after study shows that the culture of institutions is the reason why we lose top talent, and particularly women and people of color. So my first statement is I am a strong supporter and have benefited greatly personally and been part of an institution that has benefitted greatly from diversity, equity, and inclusion training.

The issues with the Sandia divisive training occurred
after I left the laboratory, and I understand it has been reviewed, and if confirmed, I look forward to evaluating those reviews and making sure that we have high-quality training programs that will continue into the future.

Senator Cotton: Ms. Hruby, I have heard from concerned former NNSA officials and lab workers who said these controversial training regimens were conducted under your watch. Did you direct or participate in any of what you just called divisive training sessions?

Ms. Hruby: I did participate in training, diversity, equity, and inclusion training at the laboratories. The training that I participated in I never considered divisive nor did I hear that from any employee that participated in the training at the laboratory while I was there.

Senator Cotton: Did you personally participate in any training that instructed white employees to, quote, "deconstruct their white culture," end quote, or to apologize for bigotries or prejudices that they did not commit?

Ms. Hruby: No, Senator. The classes did explore privilege, but in my opinion they never were divisive or asked inappropriate questions or apologize of the white workforce.

Senator Cotton: Do you believe that any race is inherently prejudiced, bigoted, or oppressive?
Ms. Hruby: No, sir.

Senator Cotton: Do you believe that any race is inherently victimized or oppressed?

Ms. Hruby: No, sir.

Senator Cotton: Do you see any inherent danger in telling highly skilled technicians who control one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world that they are working for a country whose roots around on systemic racism?

Ms. Hruby: Well, no, I do, but I do think we need to be open to the issues that exist, and that the cultures that exist that do not allow us to fully utilize all Americans in our science and technology enterprise.

Senator Cotton: So you do not see any danger in teaching these technicians who are in charge of our nuclear stockpiles that America is a fundamentally, or systematically racist country?

Ms. Hruby: I do not think America is a fundamentally racist country.

Senator Cotton: And so, therefore, you would also not permit any such training in the agency, should you be confirmed?

Ms. Hruby: That is correct. I would want to make sure all of our training was high quality.

Senator Cotton: Thank you. I think that we can all
agree that if you are an American, no matter your race, sex, creed, preference, and especially if you are gifted in fields like math, physics, chemistry, or engineering, that we want you and we need you at the NNSA. But I hope that we also treat our workforce with respect and do not subject any of these highly trained professionals to this very foolish kind of training that teaches them that one race is inherently guilty by birth or one race is inherently oppressed by birth or that America is somehow a fundamentally racist or irredeemable or hateful country. I would suggest that is a very bad way to chase out some of our very best employees and put them into the arms of the private sector.

So thank you very much for your answers today, and thank you all for your appearance.

Chairman Reed: Thank you very much. Now let me recognize Senator Hawley, please.

Senator Hawley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses for being here.

Ms. Hruby, let me ask you about the Kansas City National Security Campus, which is in my home state of Missouri, that we are very proud of. It does extraordinary work manufacturing, as you know, the non-nuclear components for the NNSA's warhead programs.

We know that the Kansas City campus is going to need
additional capacity to meet its production requirements going forward. If confirmed, can you give me a sense how you will work to ensure that the campus has the space it needs to continue its vital work?

Ms. Hruby: Yes. Thank you, Senator Hawley, for that question. The Kansas City site is a very important part of the NNSA complex, and it is very active right now, and it is undersized to produce the components we need. I understand that there are several options, including lease options, to relieve some of the pressure on the infrastructure at the site, and if confirmed, I will look into what those options are and move forward swiftly with trying to relieve the pressures, the limitations from the infrastructure options.

Senator Hawley: Very good. Thank you for that.

Mr. Maier, let me come to you and let's talk a little bit about Afghanistan if we could. Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Helvey testified recently that the U.S. does not necessarily need the Afghan government in order to achieve our counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan. Let me ask you if you agree that if Kabul falls we may be able to work with other regional and local stakeholders in the country, in Afghanistan, to maintain the necessary access, gather the intelligence, and otherwise be able to facilitate our over-the-horizon operations. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Maier: Senator, I think that it will be immensely
more challenging if the Afghan government falls. While there are options, as I understand it, underway to look at other outside-facing locations, that is exacerbated by a fall of the Afghan security forces who are fighting and dying on the front lines.

Senator Hawley: But surely we have to plan for a number of contingencies. So my question is, if Kabul falls, will we be able to conduct the necessary intelligence-gathering, over-the-horizon operations, et cetera, by working with regional and local stakeholders?

Mr. Maier: Senator, I think we will be, but it is really a spectrum. It will be better if we are closer and we have more capability that we can apply against the problem, of course.

Senator Hawley: Fair enough. Let me ask you about Special Forces, which are such a key part of our effort to maintain contact and then work with the Northern Alliance in the earlier days of the war in Afghanistan. Do you think that Special Operations Forces should play a role in helping to maintain similar relationships going forward so that we can work with local partners again to achieve our counterterrorism objectives, if Kabul falls here, looking at the same scenario?

Mr. Maier: Senator, I think it is fair to say that SOF was first into Afghanistan and they be last out, and this is
definitely an option that I would look at, if confirmed.

Senator Hawley: Very good. Let me ask you about some of the work that has been going on in the Baltics. They have been working very closely with U.S. Special Forces again to strengthen their own resistance capabilities in order to help deter a Russian invasion. So with that precedent in mind, shift over to Taiwan. Do you think that Taiwan would benefit from strengthening its ability to conduct irregular warfare, along the lines of what the Baltic nations have been doing?

Mr. Maier: Senator, I do think that is something that we should be considering strongly as we think about competition across the span of different capabilities we can apply, SOF being a key contributor to that.

Senator Hawley: Give me a sense of how you think our Special Operations community can help Taiwan develop this kind of irregular warfare capabilities.

Mr. Maier: Senator, I think building on some of the areas that they may not be thinking of, of a fight in depth, if there is a Chinese military advance, where there could be some opportunities for, as you say, resistance networks or other capabilities that would leave behind, if you will, against a potential enemy, amphibious landing or something like that, sir.

Senator Hawley: Very good. In what specific ways do
you see our Special Operations Forces contributing to
deterring Chinese aggression, not just at the unconventional
level but also in supporting our conventional forces?

Mr. Maier: I think, Senator, when things work best the
SOF enterprise is in support of the Joint Force, and vice
versa, and I think information operations is a key area
where USSOCOM brings a lot of capability, and we need to, I
think, continue to improve upon that. One of the priorities
I certainly have, in looking at the competition space, is
how we can be better in that information environment, and
that, of course, is not only a SOF capability alone.

Senator Hawley: Give me a sense of, if you are
confirmed, what steps you will take to ensure that our
Special Operations Forces will be able to take the steps
that you just outlined and also maintain their readiness,
support over-the-horizon counterterrorism efforts in the
Middle East, and perform the many other additional missions
that we ask them to undertake in multiple other theaters?

Mr. Maier: Senator, I think it is going to be a
question of prioritization and really looking at returns on
investment. We are still going to need to do the
counterterrorism fight, and SOF is best positioned to do
that. But some of those partnerships we built over the
years are also applicable to the competition space. But we
need to evolve more towards that as a national defense
strategy. So I think it is going to be a constant tradeoff and looking for opportunities to get economies of scale on both of those mission set.

Senator Hawley: Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Hawley. I believe Senator King has an additional question.

Senator King: Mr. Rose, as Ms. Rosenblum already learned, one has to be accountable for writings going back to third grade, sometimes, but I want to compliment you. You published an article in December where you had, I think, an important insight. You said, "A deterrent posture review, as opposed to strictly a nuclear posture review, could help the administration determine the right set of military capabilities of policies, nuclear and non-nuclear, it requires to better deter current and emerging threats in a fiscally sustainable manner.

"Indeed, if a nuclear weapon were ever used, it will unlikely to be a result of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack, but the result of the escalation of a conventional conflict. Therefore, the best way to prevent a nuclear war may be by preventing conventional conflict from occurring in the first place."

I think that is an important insight. Could you expand a bit on that?
Mr. Rose: Thank you very much, Senator. You know, when you look at the threat landscape we face, during the Cold War we were very much concerned about that Soviet first strike. When we look at the current security environment, where we will most likely have a situation where a conflict could go nuclear would be in a regional conflict with a great power like Russia.

Senator King: And indeed, Russia has articulated a doctrine of the use of tactical nuclear weapons called "Escalate to Deescalate." They are openly talking about this strategy.

Mr. Rose: That is correct, Senator.

Senator King: And therefore, that is a risk that we really need to think about, and as you say, we need to think about deterring conventional conflict as well as the massive nuclear conflict that the doctrine of the '60s, '70s, '80s, and '90s conflated.

Mr. Rose: Absolutely, sir.

Senator King: Ms. Rosenblum, to move on to look at deterrence in another way, my nightmare is nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, nonstate actors, and the problem is that this whole theory of deterrence that we have been talking about does not work with a group of 30 people who would just as soon give their lives up for some abstract cause.
Number one, talk to me about how do we keep that from happening, either indigenous development of these weapons by a terrorist group or, more likely, purchased from a rogue state like North Korea.

Ms. Rosenblum: Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is something, I believe appropriately, we do need to be concerned about, and is part of the reason that there needs to be emphasis put on securing nuclear materials, civilian nuclear materials, throughout the world, particularly as we see the use of nuclear energy as part of the approach to the climate-related issue. And if I may, Senator, one other point. I worry very much also about biological weapons, particularly as --

Senator King: I should have mentioned that. I put that in almost the same category as nuclear, as we have just learned.

Ms. Rosenblum: Yes. Thank you. And particularly with synthetic biology, which is becoming more and more ubiquitous. It is allowing a much broader range of actors to have those tools, in much shorter time frame. And that is something that, if I am confirmed, I will take a very close look at the Department of Defense.

Senator King: I hope you will also look at where we are vulnerable in terms of biological weapons. One of my concerns is about our water systems. There are something
like 60,000 separate water systems in this country, and the question is how secure are they. And water systems not only give us drinking water and water we use in our homes but they cool power plants and enable a lot of other of our activities. So it is not only a question of the risk but what the downstream -- that is a bad pun, I guess, talking about water, but what the downstream effects are.

There is something called the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Is that something you hope to invigorate, and how much engagement do we have from our allies, and indeed other countries around the world, that recognize this weapons of mass destruction threat?

Ms. Rosenblum: Thank you, Senator. The Cooperative Threat Program has been very successful over the past 30 years, and I believe it is very important that the U.S. continue to work with allies to close capacity gaps in the fight against countering weapons of mass destruction. If I am confirmed, I really look forward to digging into a lot more of the detail with respect to how the program is currently operating. And again, if confirmed, I would welcome an opportunity to come back to talk with you and other members of the committee on how we are doing with the CTR program.

Senator King: I hope we can do that, because that is the legacy of Sam Nunn, as a matter of fact, Nunn-Lugar from
years ago, and it is an important one.

While I look forward to continuing to work with you, I consider the work that you will be doing, assuming you are confirmed, as among the most important jobs in our government, so thank you for your willingness. Thanks to all of you for your willingness to take on these new challenges.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King. Let me now recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.

Senator Rosen: Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and I would like to thank the nominees for testifying, and Ms. Hruby, for meeting with me recently.

I want to talk a little bit about some things happening, of course, in Nevada. I am a little worried about explosive nuclear testing and its possible resumption, because last year news reports indicated that the previous administration was considering resuming explosive nuclear testing. The Nevada Test Site, now known as the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS, is the only facility in the nation equipped to accommodate subcritical nuclear experiments. These help to advance our national security and maintain the integrity of our nuclear stockpile.

A resumption in explosive testing would not only
compromise the health and safety of Nevadans and harm the surrounding environment, but it would also undermine future stockpile stewardship efforts.

So, Ms. Hruby, is your professional opinion that there is not a current or foreseeable need for the United States to resume explosive nuclear testing, and if confirmed, how do you plan to improve the Stockpile Stewardship Program's scientific capabilities so that we never have to resume explosive nuclear weapons testing?

Ms. Hruby: Well, thank you, Senator Rosen, and I appreciated our conversation earlier about this as well. Making sure we have a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile without nuclear testing is the foundation of the NNSA. And I do not believe we need to test at this time. There is no technical indication of any reason to test.

If confirmed, I will make sure that the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to advance our laboratory testing, our subcritical testing, as we are doing now, advancing our diagnostics at the Nevada Test Site for subcritical testing, to make sure that nuclear explosive testing is not needed to understand our stockpile.

In addition, as we talked about earlier, even our infrastructure programs, and, in particular our pit production program at the NNSA is also a hedge against future testing, and if confirmed, I will strongly support
maintaining a stockpile without testing.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. I want to keep a little bit on the Test Site, because when I was last there I saw the ongoing construction of the U1a facility for our enhanced capabilities for those subcritical experiments that we are talking about, or the ECSE. And I am excited that the NNSS will host the most capable weapons radiographic system in the world.

And so, Ms. Hruby again, if confirmed, will you ensure that rapid completion of ongoing upgrades to the U1a complex in order to enhance the stewardship of our nuclear stockpile, and might you suggest any additional improvements that we need to do at the Test Site that would be prudent to ensure our stockpile safety, and that you can fulfill the mission that we need to there?

Ms. Hruby: Yes, Senator, the ECSE program is an important program on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and if confirmed, I will certainly try to keep that program moving forward. And I agree, we need to continue to look for all the capabilities that could be employed to make sure we have a full science-based understanding of our nuclear weapons.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. I want to move on now to plutonium removal. In 2018, of course the Department of Energy secretly shift a half metric ton of weapons-grade
plutonium from South Carolina to the Nevada National Security Site. As part of an effort to restore trust with the people of Nevada, NNSA committed to begin the removal of South Carolina material from Nevada no later than 2021, and complete removal by 2026.

So, Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, can you both commit, if confirmed, to continue to provide the Nevada delegation and our staff with updates on the removal of plutonium from Nevada? I can begin with Ms. Hruby and then go on to Mr. Rose, please.

Ms. Hruby: Yes, Senator Rosen.

Mr. Rose: Yes, Senator Rosen.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward to, if confirmed, working with both of you on making sure that Nevada National Security Site can complete this mission in the safest way for our Nevadans and for our country and for our homeland security and safety. Thank you.

Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Rosen. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and for their commitment to public service, both in the past and obviously in the future as they are moving towards their confirmation, I hope.

With that I would adjourn the hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]