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Jul 25, 2025 Bulletin 365: Russiagate exposed / WORK WITH US DURING HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI WEEK / Congress requires two pit pit factories; other updates / History of broken pit promises at LANL Permalink for this bulletin (please forward!). Ukraine war updates, analysis. Much is happening there, affecting the entire world. We urge anyone interested in nuclear disarmament to read and think about what we've put there, and share that page with friends and colleagues. This Bulletin:
Dear friends and colleagues -- Our work here has been slower than usual due to pleasant family responsibilities preceded by a shared covid adventure, but will resume at full pace next week, inshallah. In the meantime we have kept up our Ukraine news page, our pages on plutonium pit production, and some of the news regarding nuclear modernization, and have made quiet progress on some analytical products.
Starting on July 20, we began posting some of the more interesting analyses regarding Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard's revelations regarding the highly-placed conspiracy to undermine the first Trump presidency and U.S.-Russian relations. This conspiracy set back the cause of peace and disarmament for what is now almost a decade. Consequent events could continue, like dominoes, to do so for decades to come. As we wrote on July 20,
This is a very big deal, in other words, not just because it accelerated the complete trashing of U.S.-Russian relations and set the stage for the thoroughly-provoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, and also not just because it revealed how American "democracy" was working at the highest levels back in the "good old days" of 2016. As Dorothy of the Wizard of Oz said, we are not in Kansas anymore. We haven't been. People who do not work closely with government generally do not know how dramatic the changes in government have been since about 2008. As one senior auditor said to me, that was the year in which congressional oversight more or less stopped. We at the Study Group were nonetheless able to make great progress in our government interactions after that date, but in hindsight we were (and still are) operating on the remaining fumes of democracy. These "new" revelations (the documentary evidence is new, not the overall story) are also important because Russiagate brought about a kind of mass hysteria that affected millions of people, and which still affects much of the public and the media which leads them. This was followed by a covid mania in which hundreds of thousands of people in the U.S. died in entirely preventable, institutionally-required ways. The preventable carnage was at least equal to the number of U.S. deaths in World War II and could be twice that, and it is not over. Effective treatments were withheld. Doctors and public health experts who knew how to prevent and to cure were prevented from doing so. Bogus "vaccines" were forced on millions, doing little if any good for most and as far as we can see, much bad. Many of us gradually figured out what was going on, but said little. Propaganda isn't new, but since most of us have never lived in let's say North Korea, we had not experienced the psychology and sociology of totalitarianism before. Yes it's soft (for most people, most of the time), and yes it's often subtle, but its effects are thorough nonetheless and as we have seen in Ukraine and in our recent pandemic management, often deadly. The effects in our legacy news media and in Congress remain truly severe. While Russiagate was a U.S. political phenomenon, the "fallout" is, as Tarik Amar put it yesterday, worldwide. The effects on most nuclear disarmament, arms control, and on some peace groups -- on thinking, public messaging, and strategies -- have been devastating. The mass formation many of us have observed and studied via books, articles and lectures over the past five and more years was one of the subjects at our July 16 discussions. Psychiatrist Dr. Mary de Luca, one of our panelists, was kind enough to prepare these take-away notes. Are we more susceptible to stupidity (Bonhoeffer) than ever, and if so what can we do about it, in our work?
For a number of reasons, we think the best way to honor the Hiroshima and Nagasaki victims and prevent more of them is to double and triple down on building opposition to making more nuclear weapons right here in our region, while also writing and talking to national audiences and allies -- doubling and tripling down on that too. The week spanning those two crimes 80 years ago is a very good time to make that push. It is important to honor the victims of those crimes and to understand what happened then, and why. But how shall we do that? When a crime is being committed NOW and we have or can acquire the means to stop it, it is not appropriate for us to merely gather to commemorate past crimes, or even to condemn possible future crimes in a general way. Such actions would not show much spirit. They would be morally deficient. We've organized dozens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki protests and demonstrations running back four decades now, from the largest in New Mexico history to intimate days of meditation and prayer. That's not what's needed here and now. Most of know that "increasing awareness" is never a good strategy. Our opposition must be real, if we would be real. If it's politically comfortable it's not real opposition. We must measure the quality of our resistance by the discomfort it engenders in those who are responsible for the ongoing crime. If, in our case, the New Mexico delegation is comfortable or supportive of what we are doing, we aren't doing much. These individuals consistently promote and fund war, genocide, and nuclear weapons. We have to change their minds, change their jobs, or make them irrelevant. In New Mexico, we are "fortunate" to be "present at the creation" of the new nuclear arms race. We also live in a kind of nuclear colony that is not really sovereign to the degree other states are sovereign within the United States of America. Our location gives us latent power, privilege, and responsibility. By far the most important issue before us is whether to continue building out a new factory for nuclear weapons cores ("pits") in our midst, at a cost far exceeding any other project in the state's history. Other nuclear issues have different degrees of political relevance and merit -- some more, some less, some none at all -- but the $25+ billion factory, without which a new nuclear arms race cannot be fully pursued by the U.S. for the coming crucial decade, is the Dragon King of nuclear politics in New Mexico. Nothing else matters anywhere near as much. With all this mind, we crave your help, preferably your in-person help, during the week of 8/4- 8/8, to recruit further public opposition to this factory. Opposition is large and growing, but not fast enough as yet. Most opposing opinion is still invisible, and as such has no political agency. It has to be clear, public, enduring, and practical. Hence the Call. We will have work going on in Albuquerque here at our offices, in Santa Fe, and possibly also in Taos. There will be work happening elsewhere as well, but for reasons of morale, mutual education, and administrative simplicity we'd like people to be physically present at least once or twice during the week, if possible. You don't have to help for the whole week to be very helpful, because as we never tire of saying, you have contacts we don't. Please tell us if, when, and where you can help, so we can plan. Write Trish. Some people have already stepped forward. We have targets and methods in mind, but these will evolve as we better understand how many people are available during this one-week push. We will be reaching out, in some cases with your help, to latent allies. Often people just need a call. We will reach out to some of our legislators, to our congressional delegation, to local government officials, as well as to businesses, individuals, and organizations. We will ask them to sign the Call and to help in other ways as may be appropriate for them. We are going to have discussions and trainings that week as well. I'd rather not describe these and possible other activities yet, until we see who is involved and where. If you know of people who might want to help, talk to them. Thank you for your solidarity. "It is for him that is lonely or in prison to dream of fellowship, but for him that is of a fellowship to do and not to dream." (William Morris, A Dream of John Ball)
Many people made a massive technical-political-legal* error in promoting, or in other conspicuous cases failing to oppose, LANL pit production. Preventing LANL production is an winnable battle and a logically necessary one. (*The legal error was made by the plaintiffs in the South Carolina lawsuit, discussed here).
At LANL, the roughly average 41 ppy production is to be achieved, after FY2032, by a single production shift, yet infrastructure provisions are being requested to accommodate an additional 800 workers in a second production shift. Recall that LANL is under a legal mandate to make 80 ppy, if possible, as soon as possible (see final notes, below).
Don't try to read these on your phone, LOL. The first is a sketch of the several different approaches DOE and NNSA have taken at LANL over time to make pit production possible. Following that is a fully-referenced table of DOE and NNSA pit production commitments at LANL. It is a story of broken promises, one after another. Congress has seen an earlier version of both tables and it is appropriate that our members should have ready access to this also. We also have a history of the exploding cost projections at both sites, not quite ready for prime time. We will post them all together when they are done. Best wishes to all, Greg, for the Los Alamos Study Group
Acronyms:
[1] DOE, “Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives,” Jul 1996, https://lasg.org/documents/AnalysisOfStockpileManagementAlternatives_Jul1996.pdf, pp. 34-57. [2] DOE, “Supplement Analysis: Enhancement of Pit Manufacturing at Los Alamos National Laboratory,” March 1998, pp. 5, 13, https://lasg.org/documents/SA_EnhancementPitManLANL,SSMP-EIS_Mar1998-withGMnotes.pdf. [3] Los Alamos Study Group, “Seismic Hazards at Los Alamos National Laboratory with Emphasis on the Plutonium Facilities at TA-55,” Jan 23, 1997, https://lasg.org/archive/1997/seismic.htm. [4] Cited in DOE Inspector General, “The Department of Energy’s Pit Production Project,” April 12, 2002, pp. 1-2, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/DOE-Pit-Production-Project-ig-0551_Apr2002.pdf. [5] Ibid. [6] “The importance of Los Alamos' role in the success of the program is illustrated by the statement of the Los Alamos Director, in April 2001, that the Laboratory's highest priority was reestablishing the nation's capability to manufacture pits.” Ibid., p. 5 [7] Ibid. [8] Pit production 2007-2012 is from LA-UR-12-25400, “Pit Manufacturing Fiscal Year 2012 Program Report to the University of California,” Bradford G. Story; reproduced in pertinent part at slide 24 in Los Alamos Study Group, “Pit Production Workshop: Why, how many, when, how, where, with what risks?” July 12, 2018, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/Mello_PitProductionWorkshop_12Jul2018.pdf. [9] Patrick Malone, “A near-disaster at a federal nuclear weapons laboratory takes a hidden toll on America’s arsenal,” Center for Public Integrity, June 18, 2017, https://apps.publicintegrity.org/nuclear-negligence/near-disaster/. [10] NNSA, Fiscal Year Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY2011 SSMP) Summary, May 2010, p. 36. https://lasg.org/budget/Sect1251_FY2011_SSM_summary_May2010.PDF. [11] NNSA, FY2012 SSMP, p. 49. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2012.pdf [12] Patrick Malone, op. cit. [13] Los Alamos Study Group, “CMRR Project 2002 – 2014,” https://lasg.org/CMRR/open_page.htm. [14] NNSA, FY2014 SSMP, pp. 137, 238. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2014.pdf. [15] Patrick Malone, op. cit. [16] NNSA, FY2015 SSMP, pp. 8, 24, 32. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2015_10Apr2014.pdf [17] Patrick Malone, “State: LANL, WIPP will face steeper fines,” Santa Fe New Mexican, Jan. 28, 2015, https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/legislature/state-lanl-wipp-will-face-steeper-fines/article_d4d6ff20-f04b-54e9-b52a-fb319dcb2187.html. [18] NNSA, FY2016 SSMP, p. 47. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2016/FY2016_SSMP16Mar2015.pdf [19] Patrick Malone, op. cit. [20] NNSA, Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), Oct. 2017 pp. 47-48, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf. [21] NNSA, FY2019 SSMP, p. 49. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2019/SSMP_FY2019_Oct2018.pdf. [22] For “41,” see NNSA AoA p. 13. For “36,” see NNSA, Assessment of Pit Production at LANL, Office of Cost Estimating & Program Evaluation (CEPE), May 2021, p. 7, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/NNSA-AssessmentPitProductionLANLPlan_May2021.pdf. [23] NNSA, FY2021 SSMP, pp. 10, 44-46. https://lasg.org/documents/FY2021_SSMP_Dec2020.pdf, pp. 10, 44-46. [24] NNSA, Draft Supplement Analysis of the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, June 2019, p. 14. https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/CTSPEIS-SA_draft_DOE-EIS-0236-S4-SA-02_Jun2019.pdf. NNSA, Draft Supplement Analysis of the 2008 Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory for Plutonium Operations March 2020, p. 12. https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/LANL-SWEIS-SA-draft-0380-SA-06_Mar2020.pdf. [25] NNSA, FY2022 SSMP, pp. 11, 188. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2022_Mar2022.pdf [26] NNSA, FY2024 Congressional Budget Request (CBR), p. 212. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2024/doe-fy-2024-budget-vol-1-nnsa.pdf [27] This is 30 Base Key Performance Parameter 2 (30B KPP2): “Complete turnover to operations and equipment hot testing (as applicable) of the remaining equipment to support 30 war reserve PPY with moderate confidence.” https://lasg.org/budget/FY2025/doe-fy-2025-budget-vol-1-v2.pdf, p. 237. [28] NNSA, FY2024 CBR. Process prove-in activities can be initiated only after the “30 Reliable” equipment set is installed (p. 216). [29] NNSA, FY2023 CBR, p. 227. [30] NNSA, FY2023 SSMP, p. 29, 138. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2023_Apr2023.pdf [32] “Complete turnover to operations and equipment hot testing (as applicable) of the minimum equipment necessary for 30 war reserve PPY.” (emphasis added). See https://lasg.org/budget/FY2025/doe-fy-2025-budget-vol-1-v2.pdf, p. 237. [33] NNSA, FY2024 SSMP, p. 183. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2024_Nov2023.pdf. [34]NNSA, FY2025 CBR, p. 239. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2025/doe-fy-2025-budget-vol-1-v2.pdf. [35] LANL began 24/7 plutonium operations in PF-4 in support of the pit production mission in April 2025 (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, April 20, 2025 Weekly Site Report, https://www.dnfsb.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/Los%20Alamos%20Week%20Ending%20April%2018%202025.pdf). [36] NNSA, FY2025 SSMP. https://lasg.org/documents/SSMP-FY2025_Sep2024.pdf. [37] NNSA press release of Oct. 2, 2024, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-completes-and-diamond-stamps-first-plutonium-pit-w87-1-warhead. [38] NNSA, May 7, 2025 written testimony of Teresa Robbins, Acting NNSA Administrator, p. 6. https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/nnsa_hasc-sf_2026_budget_testimony.pdf. [39] NNSA, FY2026 CBR, pp. 173, 174. https://lasg.org/budget/FY2026/doe-fy-2026-vol-1.pdf. [40] Ibid. p. 172. [41] Ibid. pp. 280, 286. [42] E.g. Sigma. NNSA, FY2026 SSMP, p. 4-20. [43] See discussion in the Sept. 2, 2020 Amended Record of Decision (AROD) for the 2008 LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS). https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/LANL-SWEIS-0380-AROD_2Sep2020.pdf. See also the statutory language of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, https://lasg.org/budget/FY2019/NDAA-PLAW-115publ232-Sec3120_13Aug2018.pdf. Surge production up to 80 ppy is part of the "No Action Alternative" in both the draft LANL SWEIS (p. S-8, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/EIS-0552-LANL-SWEIS-summary-Jan2025.pdf) and the Notice of Intent (NOI) for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Plutonium Pit Production (p. 19707, https://lasg.org/MPF2/documents/EIS-0573-NOI-plutonium-pit-production-9May2025.pdf). |
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